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When the Rome Investment Forum was established at the end of 2014, “finance for
growth” emerged as the key concept of a new phase in economic policy making in
Europe.
Two years on, after a tepid and murky recovery of the global, and the Europe-
an, economy, tainted by fragility and growing uncertainty, “ﬁnance for growth” is
an elusive concept. To a great extent, it looks a missed opportunity. An assessment
is needed of what went wrong, what obstacles were found and why it is marked by
perplexity and disappointment. The concept therefore must be reviewed, refocused
and if necessary amended.
However, we claim, it can be argued that “ﬁnance for growth” remains a valua-
ble objective for policy change and regeneration. Its original inspiration remains va-
lid. Its emphasis on reforms and European integration has been corroborated. Its se-
arch for a better balance between innovation and stability, security and growth is ju-
stiﬁed. Its focus on investment and ﬁnancing widely endorsed.
The papers collected in this volume, which draw essentially on contributions pre-
sented at or stimulated by the December 2015 edition of the Rome Investment Fo-
rum, aim at this reconsideration and renovation. From a variety of points of view and
experience, national and international, European and global, they converge to in-
dicate that both re-aﬃrmation and re-calibration of the basic concepts are needed.
The challenge now is to translate an innovative concept into a common agenda:
that is what the diﬀerent contributions converge upon in pointing out. An agenda
implies the speciﬁcation of targets, intermediate output, expected results, the sca-
le of operations, and above all a timetable that is appropriate stringent and credi-
ble. An agenda requires that it is clear who does what, at what level and with what
partnerships. An agenda should pay attention to trial and error, learning by doing,
and the need for systematic checks and recalibrations. An agenda should be care-
fully designed, but also discussed and agreed upon by the many players involved,
and then swiftly implemented. It should carry the broad support not only of policy
and business interlocutors, but above all of the public opinion and the citizens.
An agreed agenda: that is what the Rome Investment Forum strives for. The agen-
da for ﬁnancing long-term Europe should centre more on investment and reforms:
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both of them need being enhanced and boosted. Investment is the bridge between
supply and demand, the short-term and the long-term, the cyclical and the structural
components of economic policy, the present and the future. Private and public in-
vestment are still lagging behind, particularly in Europe. Reforms are the conditions
for success, the only way we can create an environment conducive to innovation, con-
ﬁdence about the future, public private partnerships, the right mix of stability and
growth. They have to be carried out at the domestic as well as at the European le-
vel. Reforms have recently slowed down their pace and become marred by contin-
gent fears, lack of vision and low-level compromises.
The Rome Investment Forum intends to contribute to these renewed eﬀorts. The
present publication, we hope and trust, will give inputs and impetus to that goal. The
Italian Presidency of the G-7 in 2017 provides an excellent opportunity for putting
an improved formulation of “ﬁnance for growth” at the centerstage of the reform agen-
da, at the domestic and at the international level, starting from Europe and the EU
member countries. A more determined and ambitious reform orientation should un-
derpin a new agenda of “ﬁnance for growth”.
The original inspiration of “ﬁnance for growth” maintain its relevance and ap-
peal, as we said. When introduced, the formula meant to represent a synonym for
policy renaissance after the crisis, and overcoming the by-and-large disappointing
outcomes of the response to the crisis. It was also a synonym for industrial recove-
ry and restructuring in search of a more viable model of production and ﬁnancing.
In sum, it amounted to a kind of watershed.
Finance clearly ﬁgured, and still ﬁgures, as a crucial factor in those endeavours.
In fact, the shift in the philosophy of intervention and the role of ﬁnance looks re-
markable:
- from deleveraging and downsizing of the ﬁnancial balance sheets to supporting
recovery of aggregate demand and conﬁdence building;
- from “austerity”in public ﬁnance to budget reforms enabling expansionary tax
cuts and anticyclical ﬂexibility;
- from redressing excess savings and excess costs to boosting proﬁtability com-
petitiveness and production capacity;
- from tightening of prudential rules and behaviour to better calibrated and cu-
stomised risk assessment and risk management (particularly for long-term in-
vestment and securitisation).
At the heart of this strategy, there is not only the quantity, but also the quality of in-
vestment. Investment in the real economy should be turned towards the long-term,
research & development and innovation. In the financial sector, the shift is from bank-
centred lending to capital markets, from debt to equity financing. Institutional in-
vestors like insurance companies and pension funds should increase their role in fun-
ding the real economy, infrastructure and SMEs. Venture capital, private equity and
private debt are to expand funding opportunities for start-ups, mergers and acqui-
sitions, small mid-cups and the increase of firm size.
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Overall, nothing of this programme looks obsolete, and has to be reversed or re-
vised. The problem in the last few years has been one of implementation. It concerns
the scale and reach of operations, the political will to create through reforms an ena-
bling and supportive environment, and correspondingly the impact on public con-
ﬁdence, macroeconomic aggregates, incomes and jobs. The European economy has
remained into the grips of a precarious sluggish and volatile recovery, while strong
headwinds coming from diﬀerent directions and diﬀerent parts of the world have
impaired the smooth navigation out of the crisis.
Monetary policy has responded in a forceful and unconventional manner; but
central banks have not been accompanied and supported by other necessary and com-
plementary policy tools. Overreliance on monetary policy has also implied a progressive
loss of bite. Capital markets have not developed enough, and fast enough, due to lack
of a supportive context, including norms, tax incentives and regulation. Public in-
vestment has not taken oﬀ, constrained by public ﬁnance and still quite fragmented
along national borders. Private investment has been damaged by growing uncertainty,
fragile demand prospects and the legacy of the crisis (the debt overhang).
The illusory, and demoralising impact of “ﬁnance for growth” has been particularly
evident in Europe. Perhaps due also to excessive expectations, the Juncker Plan and
the Capital Markets Union, heralded as the signposts and emblematic projects of the
new era (new Commission, and new Parliament) did not have a signiﬁcant impact
on public perceptions, conﬁdence and the economic cycle. This is not to deny that
signiﬁcant steps were made in the new directions. The launch of the Banking Union,
the creation and ﬁrst operation of the European Fund for Structural Investment, the
regulatory framework for the European Long-Term Investment Funds or ELTIFs, the
work plan for the Capital Market Union (CMU), and other concrete measures. The
ﬁrst impression for many commentators when the new policy was announced was
that the Plan was utterly insuﬃcient to mobilise the resources needed, and in the re-
quired time frame, for having its impact felt at the macro level. Unfortunately, this
ﬁrst impression has been substantiated.
More broadly, the ambitious goals of economic ﬁnancial and monetary union in
Europe, and the corresponding policy programmes that were decided upon and star-
ted, have more recently slowed down, revealing growingly a backlog of unﬁnished
business and raising doubts on the ability of policy leaders to bring them home. Not
that was unclear what to do and in what directions to move forward. There were se-
veral reports, such as the “5 Presidents Report” that unambiguously indicated the
necessary steps to accomplish, and their implications. But the time table was modelled
more on the political constraints of member countries and their electoral appointments,
than on the urgency of completing the transitions underway. Europe then felt, and
was felt, to be in the middle of the pond, exposed to unchartered currents, the whims
of inadequate leaders, and sanguine and resentful public sentiments.
What stalled the European reform drive was exactly that: its growingly evident
inability to react to the shocks that have hit the European exchequer powerfully re-
peatedly and cumulatively. Many of these shocks came from the outside, but quite
a few originated from the inside. Think of emerging markets disequilibria and slow
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downs, commodity prices volatility, migration pressures, terrorist attacks, and la-
tely Brexit. Not only became the economics of reform more convoluted and costly,
but the politics of reform added an extra dimension of unruliness. The threat of po-
pulism was then interpreted as a consequence of reforms, and their costs, above all
social and political costs. In reality populism is gaining ground rather in response
to the elusiveness of reforms, and their inability to have an impact on ordinary ci-
tizens. Moreover, often populism has become an alibi for hesitant, and sometimes
unscrupulous leaders to postpone or emasculate the reform agenda. And the risk of
populist drifts has now dangerously extended to several countries, from Greece to
Brexit U.K.
Banks were hit speciﬁcally and directly by the diﬀerent dips of the crisis and vo-
latility, particularly in Europe and in peripheral countries. Concerns over long-term
proﬁtability, the legacy of the crisis (e.g. the issue of non-performing loans), the zero
or negative interest rates environment, pressure from regulators on recapitalisation,
competition challenges coming from new technologies and new players, increase of
operational risks (like litigation costs), etc., all these and other factors conjured to
expose the prospective or inherited vulnerabilities of the ﬁnancial sector. This we-
akness was compounded by the perceived risk of reform failures in Europe, i.e. mar-
kets have started speculating on whether the Banking Union and other institutional
reforms in the pipeline will break down or be postponed indeﬁnitely, rather than mo-
ving on. Brexit naturally gave the coup de grace to this widespread uncertainty and
political stalemate over European reforms and reform capacity. The result is that banks
and capital markets that were indicated in “ﬁnance for growth” to represent a way
out of the crisis, a solution to the sluggish recovery problem, are now often seen as
being the cause of the problem, an obstacle to sustainable growth.
Undoubtedly, the problems that banks and other ﬁnancial institutions are facing
are real, and should be addressed with boldness and determination. But it is equal-
ly undoubted that banks’ problems have been overblown, and reﬂect some misper-
ception. In response to the crisis, in fact, and in line with a modernisation trend that
started with the liberalisations of the 1980’s and 1990’s, banks have made considerable
progress strengthening their resilience, organization and performance, in an envi-
ronment that has become increasingly challenging for them. Consider for instance
recapitalisations, adoption of new technologies and business models (ﬁntech), more
transparency in corporate governance and customers’ relations, greater collabora-
tion at the international level, improvements in the regulatory and supervisory fra-
meworks, investment in business ethics, communication and ﬁnancial education. In
sum, now-a-days banks are more capitalised and risks more controlled, while in-
ternational dialogue over ﬁnancial services has never been more intense and con-
structive.
As far as Europe is concerned, the stress tests released in July 2016 acknowledged:
“the EU banking sector has signiﬁcantly shored up its capital base in recent years lea-
ding to a starting point capital position for the stress test sample of 13.2% CET1 ratio
at the end of 20156. This is 200 bps higher than the sample in 2014, and 400 bps hi-
gher than in 2011”. Moreover, European reforms promoting ﬁnancial integration, such
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as the Banking Union, the Capital Markets Union and the Jucker Investment Plan,
should strengthen further more ﬁnancial institutions, by enlarging and deepening
the credit and money markets, enhancing competitiveness and market discipline, fa-
cilitating cross-border activities, widening opportunities for savers investors and Eu-
ropean citizens.
This impressive amount of work, and progress achieved, stands in sharp contrast
with the sense of unease among market participants. The question then should be
asked: why banks and ﬁnance are globally, and in Europe in particular, often per-
ceived as being more vulnerable and exposed to shocks and volatility, more than other
sectors? What are the reasons for market scepticism about banks, which is evident
in low price-to-book value?
I believe that a few factors should be considered in this context:
1. Finance is characterized by a higher and growing interdependence with other
sectors; which means that it is exposed to shocks and weaknesses coming from
all other industries. Finance in other terms is more systemic than other service
sector activities. For instance it is well known that recessions aﬀect banks, and
their severity is closely related to the issue of non-performing loans. That is why
combating pro-cyclicality of ﬁnancial performance is a necessary and complex
policy challenge, and it is at the heart of the mission of monetary policy and its
transmission mechanisms.
2. Finance is highly dependent on policy reform. More than other sectors. A chan-
ge in business strategy requires and interacts with corresponding changes in the
policy environment, including regulation, taxation and the normative environ-
ment. For instance, it has been recently appreciated how important is the non-
ﬁnancial corporation insolvency regime for dealing with non-performing loans.
Tax incentives are critical for helping to shift from debt to equity, or from short
term to long term ﬁnancing.
3. In Europe, ﬁnance and banking are at forefront of the process leading to the in-
tegration of the EU member countries’ economies and institutions. Any diﬃculty
therefore in this process, due to political or social obstacles, or issues of inde-
pendence and sovereignty, reﬂect itself on the projects of ﬁnancial market in-
tegration at the European level. Banks become therefore the scapegoats of Eu-
roscepticism and the rebellion against the European, and national elites,
which feeds in many countries a dangerous drift towards populism and pro-
tectionism.
The latter factor is in my view the dominant one for Europe. Peter Praet, of the ECB,
has argued recently in the same direction:
“… the Euro area continues to be exposed to a number of uncertainties.…Most
important is the lack of clarity for firms and households over the future insti-
tutional architecture of EMU,which remains incomplete in core areas, especially
banking union. Key to removing that uncertainty is a clear roadmap for com-
pleting monetary union, which lays out both the end-point for the reform pro-
cess and the sequence of steps that will lead to it.”
(P. Prat, “Transmission channels of monetary policy in the current environ-
ment”, Speech at the Financial Times Festival of Finance, London 1 July 2016,
in ECB website)
Two years on after its launch, “finance for growth” appears ready to move forward
to its next stage. This implies re-affirming its original intentions, reflecting on its ac-
complishments and misjudgements, and adjusting its orientation towards lessons le-
arned and new challenges.
Drawing on the contributions to this volume, we may sketch out a few charac-
teristics of the new phase:
1. It should focus more on the ﬁnancial sector, its requirements and implications,
the policy reforms required for creating an enabling context for more and bet-
ter funding of investment and growth. The resilience and proﬁtability of the ﬁ-
nancial sector should be a concern not only for the ﬁnancial industry but for the
economy as a whole;
2. It should revamp the reform process at 360 degrees. At the national level. But
also at the European and the global level. This means accelerating the comple-
tion of the ambitious reforms underway, namely those concerning directly the
ﬁnancial sector, such as the Banking Union and Economic and Monetary Union.
A rediscovered sense of urgency should push towards more and better leader-
ship and concrete deliverables. The timeframe should be reassessed and made
more stringent. Above all, political decisions should be taken showing commit-
ment and determination. We need more “whatever it takes”! Markets should un-
derstand that there is no way backwards. And leaders should explain to the pu-
blic opinion that backtracking from reforms is much more costly that ﬁnishing
the job.
3. After Brexit, the idea of a concentric circles Europe, and diﬀerent speeds and in-
tensity of integration has become a reality. This new world should not be feared
and a priori condemned. Actually, concentric circles may give to the European
project more ﬂexibility, and enable diﬀerent countries and nations to proceed
at their own pace and will. But this should not prevent those countries that want
and need to move faster to do so. In particular, the economic and monetary union
involving Euro countries should be completed faster than currently planned and
expected. The way forward was already designed and explained in the 5 Presi-
dents Report. Not everything that is in that Report should be taken to the letter.
But the main direction cannot be too diﬀerent from the one illustrated there. Only
the timing should be accelerated, and the details of the Plan discussed in depth
and agreed upon. In sum, the Eurozone should move much faster, and faster than
the rest of the EU. Getting out of the pond will make the transition more eﬀec-
tive and less costly. It is a necessity. The theorem of the bicycle applies here. If
one stands still, she risks falling down.
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4. What is the future of Europe outside the EU? What long-term strategy and what
objectives? After Brexit this issue has become prominent. After Brexit, the rela-
tive size, and importance of the non-EU Europe will increase. This does not only
concern small countries like Switzerland, Norway and Lichtenstein. This concerns
vast European countries like Russia. And the whole Euro-Mediterranean region
including Turkey, and Israel. We cannot continue treating these countries like
foreign non-European countries, and deal with them on an opportunistic basis:
a treaty on energy, one on gas, one on pipelines, one on migration. And taking
them bilaterally, one by one. Leaving aside the more political aspects of social
and political integration, an economic agenda for integrating the EU with the-
se countries should be developed. The UK should obviously be part of this group
of countries and this agenda. Exiting the EU for the UK does not mean getting
out of Europe. EU policies vis-à-vis Europe, or we could say “Wider Europe” or
“Great Europe”, should be spelled out and discussed not only bilateral, but also
multilaterally with all the countries concerned. Investment and “ﬁnance for
growth” should be at the centre of an agenda for “Great Europe”. A Juncker plan
for the EuroMediterranean in particular should be designed and discussed on
a priority basis.
5. Growth for what? Investment for what? “Finance for growth” has often appea-
red as a macroeconomic trick, a tool for policymaking and interested entrepre-
neurs. Distant from the ordinary citizens, and their immediate concerns. The Jun-
cker Plan has suﬀered of a similar image and communication problem. This has
to change. The real economy objectives of ﬁnance for growth should be spelled
out. They should be put at the front and on top of the agenda. Making Shengen
more eﬀective in controlling the external frontiers. Deﬁning automatic ﬁscal sta-
bilizers linked to unemployment or public investment. Responding to the thre-
at of terrorism with a common security and defence strategy. Creating a Euro-
pe-wide open space for energy, telecommunications and transport, a Universi-
ty and research network with cross border interactions and opportunities. The-
se are all targets of great interest to the European citizens, particularly the young,
which can only be reached by implementing the agenda of ﬁnance for growth.
The Juncker Plan should be re-launched within this revamped agenda. It
should be extended, expanded, endowed with more resources, better targeted
and more clearly explained to the general public.
In such a renovated and refocused “finance for growth agenda”, investment will re-
main the key target and tool. Investing in Europe-wide infrastructure not only will
respond to the need to bridge the infrastructure gap with public and private funding,
but it will also stimulate demand, fiscal expansion and innovation. Investing in re-
search, Universities, R&D, new equipment, better quality housing, will provide cross-
border opportunities for young people (e.g. “Erasmus for apprentices”), more jobs
and a better skills’ match. Investing in more defence intelligence and antiterrorism
cooperation will make our cities and our lives more secure and protected. Investing
in cooperation with Turkey, the Euro-Mediterranean countries and Russia will con-
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tribute to prosperity, cohesion and contain emigration pressures. The Juncker Plan
should be reformulated and boosted to become a European plan for prosperity and
cohesion. A plan for making the European dream a reality.
“A common agenda for reforms” is the key concept for the revitalisation of “ﬁ-
nance for growth”. A bold and credible agenda that signals the willingness and de-
termination of European leaders to complete economic and monetary union, “wha-
tever it takes”.
“Without a clear roadmap, there is a risk that … uncertainty will hold back the
recovery in the euro area. And it has the potential to undermine the eﬀective-
ness of monetary policy as ﬁrms and households become less willing to engage
in inter-temporal substitution by exploiting the favourable interest rate envi-
ronment to frontload consumption and investment decisions. It weakens the ca-
pacity of the banking sector to act as a bridge between present and future spen-
ding decisions by intermediating between savers and borrowers …” (Praet, ibi-
dem).
In this ambitious and people-centred agenda, the ﬁnancial sector will play a pivo-
tal role. It will lead and guide the implementation of the agenda. It will be a prota-
gonist, rather than simply a tool of policy. It will have to provide a vision of the fu-
ture and exercise leadership.
We hope and trust that this vision and leadership will contribute to the ambition
and the success of the Italian Presidency of the G7 in 2017.
We thank all the contributors to this volume, who provided texts or revised the
transcription of their interventions at the Rome Investment Forum of December 2015.
Special mention deserve the various institutions that contributed to the organisa-
tion of the Forum. Let me list them: Cassa depositi e Prestiti, the Long-term Investment
and Reindustrialisation Intergroup of the European Parliament, Conﬁndustria
(Piccola Industria), the Long-term Investor Club, The City UK, Frankfurt Main Finance,
Paris Europlace, il Consiglio Italiano del Movimento Europeo, il Forum per la Finanza
Sostenibile, Integrate, the CEEP (the European Centre of Employers and Enterpri-
ses providing Public Services). Also thanks to the European Parliament (Rome In-
formation Oﬃce) and the European Commission, under whose patronage the event
took place, and to our media partners Data Stampa e EUNews. I also thank the Rome
oﬃce of Febaf, and in particular Fabrizio Spaolonzi and Giovanna Marando for hel-





The papers and contributions collected in this volume aims at discussing how in-
vestment can contribute to re-launching growth, jobs and prosperity in the European
economy, and worldwide. Investment has many dimensions, pre-conditions and im-
plications. It interacts with issues of economic and social policies, institutional re-
forms, business strategies, ethical foundations, access to ﬁnancing, productivity and
the quality of life, long-term vision and leadership capacity.
The volume will review the key aspects and challenges to address, if we want to
achieve an investment-led recovery and put it on a stable and sustained long-term
development path.
A special attention is devoted to ﬁnancing conditions, the role of savings, ﬁnancial
intermediaries and capital markets, the new sources of funding, particularly those
available to new entrepreneurs, local communities, infrastructure, households, in-
novation and basic social needs.
Long-term investment requires a strategic and partnership approach, where dif-
ferent business communities and social groups, diﬀerent levels and sectors of go-
vernment, policy makers and opinion leaders, cooperate with one another and look
responsibly ahead of the curve in order to create better conditions for future gene-
rations.
The europeaN reForm ageNda: iNvesTmeNT For growTh
In this part of the volume, the investment problematique is placed in the broader con-
text of the European reform agenda and in the process of European economic social
and political integration.
Europe in its 60 years of post-war history has achieved remarkable results, in terms
of widespread prosperity, peace and cross-border dialogue, fruitful social and eco-
nomic interactions. Nevertheless, the European project still remains by-and-large an
unﬁnished business. The immediate and extraordinary beneﬁts gained by abolishing
frontiers and eliminating obstacles to the free circulation of products, capital, peo-
ple and ideas have sometimes blurred the threat of increased vulnerabilities, insta-
bility and uncertainty that the European construction entails. In fact, “to reap the
beneﬁts of openness, markets need appropriate governance” (Mario Draghi speaking
at the Bank of England Open Forum, 11-11-2015, ECB website).
Topics oF This volume
The single market is unﬁnished business, particularly as far as the service sec-
tor is concerned, i.e. where most jobs and value added are created. The economic
and monetary union is unﬁnished business. Schengen is unﬁnished business. Even
more, the enlargement and neighbourhood policies and the common external and
security policies, are unﬁnished business.
Finding itself in the middle of the pond, Europe therefore is much more expo-
sed and vulnerable, vis-à-vis shocks and challenges, than other continents. Think for
instance of the ﬁnancial crisis, the sovereign debt crisis, the inﬂows of refugees and
the terrorist attacks. Strengthening common governance requires risk sharing and
the sharing of sovereignty, the transfer of national prerogatives to the supra-natio-
nal level, institutional reforms.
However, on such reforms, Europe appears profoundly divided. Some political
leaders, public opinions, business communities, seem prepared to move on up the
integration ladder, provided adequate democratic safeguards and guarantees are gi-
ven. Others do not feel ready, have doubts and fears. They do not see clearly the be-
neﬁts, and do not accept being pushed onward. Above all, they are reluctant to pay
the price of greater openness and freedoms.
Re-launching investment gets us at the heart of the European dilemma. In the
letter of the former British Prime Minister David Cameron to the President of the Eu-
ropean Council Donald Tusk, in February 2016, the case for more ﬂexibility is cle-
arly spelled out and argued. Moreover, the letter seems to suggest that a concentric
circles approach to integration, under certain conditions, is a positive sum game, a
win-win situation. After the Brexit referendum, and considering the many challen-
ges ahead, European reforms are at the centre of the policy agenda. And investment
is a critical dimension of reform.
The europeaN iNvesTmeNT sTraTegy:
The role oF NaTioNal, regioNal aNd secToral policies
In November 2014, the European Commission, led by its new president Jean-Claude
Juncker, announced an ambitious Investment Plan targeted at unlocking public and
private investment on the way to economic recovery. The Investment Plan for Euro-
pe (or “Juncker Plan”, as it was called) relies on an enhanced partnership between the
European Investment Bank, the European Commission and others, supported by a ne-
wly created ﬁnancial instrument, the European Fund for Strategic Investments
(EFSI). The main goal of the Plan is to contribute to the improvement of EU competi-
tiveness and boost the infrastructure and production capacity of the European economy.
The most important issue is to facilitate access to ﬁnancing for SMEs, households
and local communities, particularly for long-term investment projects. Since January
2015, the European Investment Fund (EIF) has signed investment agreements in equi-
ty worth over € 1 bn. Moreover, the development of a Capital Markets Union, which
is an integral part of the Plan, is expected to provide lower cost and diﬀerent sour-
ces of funding, unlocking new opportunities for savers and investors.
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However, in order to work, the plan requires signiﬁcant structural reforms and
adjustments in the EU member countries. Eliminating bureaucracy and red tape, re-
moving obstacles and facilitating access to credit, improving the quality of investment
projects, providing incentives and public guarantees, upgrading human capital and
ﬁghting corruption, promoting business innovation and technological change: the
tasks of national policies are complex and wide-ranging. In this context, the Natio-
nal Promotional banks have a fundamental role to play, particularly in relation to na-
tional and sectorial “platforms”.
Institutional capacity building is required at all levels of government, particularly
at the regional and municipal level. A re-visitation of the operation of the Europe-
an structural funds and their performance in relation to the European investment
strategy would also be of paramount importance. Therefore, the reform eﬀort should
be consistent and well coordinated between the European, the national and the sec-
torial levels. The European “strategy” should be capable of mobilising and harmo-
nising the many and diﬀerent relevant players and stakeholders involved, both pu-
blic and private.
smes aNd iNFrasTrucTure FiNaNciNg
For sTaBilizaTioN aNd loNg-Term growTh
The critical role of investments in small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and in-
frastructure – ﬁxed, network and social – for stimulating growth and competitive-
ness has been widely recognised by the literature and in policy discussions.
Investment in R&D, innovative infrastructure, the green economy, smart-grids
and smart cities, the digital economy, broadband and energy networks, as well as
transport infrastructure, education and energy eﬃciency, are key to consolidating
the supply side of the European economy and bringing the EU on the right track of
a stable and sustainable recovery.
In the SMEs sector, the implementation of both the Investment Plan and the Ca-
pital Markets Union (CMU) should reduce the obstacles to mobilising the resources
necessary to the full expansion of potential income and productivity growth. It would
be an example of how the ﬁnancial sector can act in support of all types and sizes
of companies and economic sectors.
Finally, there is now a new ﬁnancial instrument, the ELTIF (i.e. the European Long
Term Investment Funds), designed for investors willing to put their money behind
projects and companies that need long-term ﬁnance, which should make it possible
to increase the funding available for infrastructure, long-term projects and for SMEs
across the EU. Other important questions that should be addressed are the following:
the role of public guarantees; the regulatory and normative frameworks for infra-
structure and investment; how to improve the quality of the infrastructure projects
in the pipeline; how to standardise and disseminate information on SMEs; etc.
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FiNaNce For growTh: The capiTal markeTs uNioN
The Capital Markets Union is the new frontier in the realisation of Europe’s single
market. Its development is a key part of the investment strategy and Plan that the
Commission Juncker announced in November 2014.
The CMU, a single market project for all EU Member States, aims at deepening
and widening ﬁnancial integration in the EU, thereby increasing growth potential
and competitiveness, and strengthening the stability of the EU ﬁnancial system.
The challenges ahead have been widely analysed and discussed in the last few
months, leading to the Commission’s Action Plan issued in September 2015. The time
is now ripe for moving on from planning to concrete actions, and deliverables that
can produce measurable outcomes. Considering that investment in Europe remains
heavily reliant on banks, and that progress in opening up new sources of funding ap-
pears still patchy and uneven, the contributions in this part of the volume aim at di-
scussing the key learnings options and suggestions that can be drawn from the pu-
blication of the Action Plan. They aim in particular at giving a new sense of urgen-
cy to implementation and reform eﬀorts. This does not mean denying the ambition
and long-term nature of the project, but rather responding to the pressing needs of
the market players, and ultimately savers and job seekers.
iNvesTiNg iN susTaiNaBle FiNaNce
aNd social iNFrasTrucTure – puBlic privaTe parTNerships
The operation of the ﬁnancial services markets has been impaired by a fall in public
conﬁdence and reputation and a perception of widespread opportunism greed and
irresponsibility. The crisis has taken on an ethical and deontological dimension, which
has profoundly shaken the public opinion and the policy world. As a reaction, em-
phasis has been placed on more, and more stringent, regulation and supervision, more
controls and better compliance. The “ethical foundations” of business in general, and
ﬁnance in particular, gave rise to new approaches to ﬁnancing, capital markets and
public-private partnerships.
In that context, the importance of social infrastructure, and of investment in so-
cial infrastructure, has gained a central place. Social infrastructure is a necessary com-
plement to ﬁxed, network and intangible infrastructure. Human and social capital
need also to be strengthened and invested upon. Social infrastructure typically in-
cludes assets that accommodate social services, such as schools, universities, hospitals,
prisons and community housing.
More broadly, pressure on ﬁnance is growing to deliver equitable products and
services. Many initiatives have underlined the need to invest in sustainable ﬁnance,
in responsible patient capital with a long-term orientation. International organisa-
tions, such as the United Nations and the OECD, and religious leaders have attrac-
ted attention to the need to invest in “ethical capital”, as a foundation for regaining
public trust and credibility in the pursuit of the common good.
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iNvesTmeNT For poverTy eradicaTioN aNd susTaiNaBle developmeNT
Data show that the current crisis has not always, nor necessarily, been a “world cri-
sis”. During and after the crisis, growth rates have been sustained in Asia, North Ame-
rica, Latin America and in several African countries. Europe has been struggling with
its governance gaps and incomplete integration processes. And now emerging mar-
ket economies are facing restructuring and a slow down in growth and accumula-
tion. They do not seem to be able anymore to be the locomotives of global trade and
prosperity. Moreover, world growth has been sustained by accumulating increasing
trade productivity and ﬁnancial imbalances.
Investment is called upon to redress such large structural imbalances and de-
velopment gaps in the world economy. In some countries excess capacity, demand
shortages and environmental concerns require a new approach to investment, ba-
sed on reliance on domestic demand, social services and support for rural commu-
nities.
The world risk scenario presents new and formidable challenges: population aging,
urbanisation and changes in social and family structures, natural and man-made di-
sasters, climate change and environmental degradation, inequalities, conﬂicts, di-
scrimination, abuse of human rights and insecurity, the knowledge economy and the
new wave of digital innovation. Above all, poverty hunger and social exclusion still
plague a vast area of the globe, in spite of the signiﬁcant progress achieved since the
turn of the Millennium.
There are encouraging signs that a new awareness is taking shape that these chal-
lenges have to be addressed with determination. They require bold policy action and
business commitment, more and better international cooperation. They require vi-
sion and leadership.
2015 and 2016 have seen an unprecedented clustering of summits, internatio-
nal Conferences, oﬃcial pledges and statements, commitments on goals and targets.
Disaster risk reduction, sustainable development, ﬁnancing for development, climate
change, have been at the centre of intergovernmental discussions and agreements,
and of private sector initiatives mobilising business leaders, non-governmental or-
ganisations, civil society activists.
Investment in all these new global frameworks ﬁgures prominently and can play
a crucial role. However, it is time for action now. The focus has to be on how to tran-
slate commitments and a new spirit of cooperation into concrete outcomes and real
life improvements, particularly for the most vulnerable and the poor.
From December 2015 to December 2016, the Extraordinary Jubilee Year declared
by Pope Francis has taken place. This major event brought to Rome pilgrims, initiatives,
prayers, new ideas and good will. The “Holy Year of Mercy” intended to focus attention
– from believers and non-believers alike – on the need for a “spiritual conversion”,
i.e. a deep change of minds and hearts that is required also for social economic and
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The europeaN reForm ageNda: iNvesTmeNT For growTh
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Finance for growth revisited
Europe’s challenges – Europe’s growth and employment creation remains unsati-
sfactory. The ECB eﬀort is very welcome; however, it must be complemented by ac-
tion by member states and at the EU level. The European growth strategy continues
to rest on three pillars. A growth friendly ﬁscal consolidation; structural reforms and
investment support. In this contribute, I will concentrate on this last point. I think
we can all agree on one fact: that investment is insuﬃcient. That it is insuﬃcient one
may be aware in a number of ways. It is useful to interpret the large current account
surplus of the euro area as a clear evidence of lack of investment in the euro area it-
self. Investment is slow in spite of very low interest rates, so this to me, signals that
the search for proﬁts and for risk-taking remains below what is required. Investment
expenditure collapse in Europe, as we all know, in the aftermath of the global ﬁnancial
crisis, while gross domestic product and private consumption were in the second quar-
ter of 2014 roughly at the same level as in 2007, total investment was about 15% be-
low 2007 ﬁgures and 5 member states, France, Uk, Greece, Italy and Spain account
for around 75% of this gap. There are of course also huge infrastructure investment
needs in the EU. Two trillion euros until 2020 on transport, energy, telecommuni-
cation, water, waste and other utilities. But since the 1970s, public investment has
been declining in Europe, while the development of new ﬁnancing instruments has
been increasing. So mobilizing private capital on capital markets is key, particular-
ly in today’s environment. In addition, as we all know, compared with the United Sta-
tes, European SMEs receive 5 times less funding from capital markets. If our venture
capital markets were as deep as in the Unites States, more than 90 billion euros of
funds would have been available to ﬁnance companies between 2009 and 2014. If
EU securitization could be revived safely, to pre-crisis average-[ish?] level, banks would
be able to provide an additional amount of credit for the private sector of more than
100 billion euros. Promoting young ﬁrms is also a strategic goal because as we all
know they are the two engines of future job creation. According to OECD research,
for instance, young ﬁrms create about half of all the new jobs. In addition, these ﬁrms
have always been new net job creators throughout the business cycle. Even during
the ﬁnancial crises. The ﬁnancing and development of such young high growth ﬁrms
is therefore an essential challenge for the EU. Also, the larger are the more productive
ﬁrms, the greater the extent to which their good performance gets reﬂected in the
* Italian Minister of Economy and Finance.
overall economic growth. Unfortunately, the most productive and dynamic ﬁrms do
not always attract the necessary capital and labor to grow to optimal scale. In some
economies, including Italy, the most advanced ﬁrms have productivity levels close
to the global technology frontier; but they are undersized relatively to their peers
in other countries. Italy has a problem of ﬁrms size and access to appropriate ﬁnancing
sources, that the government is addressing with the Finance for Growth program on
which I will return in a minute. And with deep reform of the banking sector. On the
other hand, a so-called made in Italy, Italy’s comparative advantage, is changing its
identity. In recent years, an increasing number of Italian companies in mechanics,
nanotechnology, healthcare, aerospace, acquired a global role becoming crucial parts
of the international value chain.
So, Italy needs and healthy and eﬃcient ﬁnancial system to allow ﬁrms of all si-
zes to fully express their economic potential. And of course we cannot rely unique-
ly on the banking sector to address all ﬁnancing needs of all ﬁrms. The EU business
environment funding is dominated, not just in Italy, by the banking system and it is
largely organized along national lines. While banking will certainly continue to play
a key role; a better equity culture, a better culture of corporate governance and dee-
per and more accessible capital markets would beneﬁt investment, growth and jobs.
The government has introduced the Finance for Growth program, addressing the con-
straints on credit to business via the diversiﬁcation of ﬁnancing sources. Insurance
companies and credit funds can now lend directly to ﬁrms while the EU base inve-
stors no more pay a withholding tax. The Central Guarantee Fund program was ex-
tended to include mini-bonds, which are issued by SMEs meeting criteria. Therefore,
the system is now better at fueling long-term risk capital ﬁnancing also to small and
medium enterprises. The Finance for Growth program also provides incentives for
SMEs to expand their operations favoring stock market listing “cutting red tape” of-
fering shares with multiple votes and increasing votes. Also enhancing capitaliza-
tion to the allowance for corporate equity instrument.
Finance for Growth is also ﬁnance for innovation. Today we are in an extraor-
dinary innovation hub and I am conﬁdent that Italy can be a key player in today’s
global race to innovation. We support innovation through a tax credit strategy on
R&D to the patent box, but to the introduction of so-called innovative SMEs; which
are for us the building blocks of the new Italian economy. However, action at the na-
tional level must be complemented with action at the EU level. And here is where
Capital Markets Union comes in. The commission unveiled in September 13th this
year its action plan for the Capital Markets Union.
A ﬁrst set of measures aims at strengthening the link between savings and growth,
improving access to ﬁnance for companies, particularly SMEs. And mobilizing pri-
vate capital to support needed infrastructure investment. On November the 30th of
this year, the commission has proposed, as part of its Capital Markets Union action
plan, an overall of the prospectus directive. We strongly share the main objectives
of this revamp, by making easier and cheaper for smaller companies to access capital
markets by introducing simpliﬁcations and ﬂexibility for all types of issuers and espe-
cially for secondary and frequent issuers which are already know to capital markets
FiNaNce For growTh revisiTed30
by improving prospectuses for investors by introducing a retail friendly investor key
information. Therefore, in our view, Capital Markets Union should be designed and
thought of as a structural reform and as a transformation of the relationship between
ﬁnance and growth in the EU’s business environment. So, an intrinsic part of European
growth strategy. The Capital Markets Union of course is consistent with Italy’s ﬂag-
ship initiative Finance for Growth. Indeed, let me remind it, Italy supported vigorously
the Capital Markets Union during its presidency of the council of the EU and we are
deeply aware of the close relationship between national programs and EU-wide ini-
tiatives
To conclude, let me summarize by noting that when discussing about ﬁnance and
ﬁnancial markets and banks in Europe there are at least three dots, which should be
connected: Capital Markets Union, which I just mentioned, Banking Union and the
Juncker Plan. In Europe the completion of the Banking Union and the establishment
of Capital Markets Union and the Juncker Plan are all progressing in parallel. Ho-
wever, in my view, more needs to be done to unleash the interconnections and sy-
nergies between these three programs in ways, which of course require an overall
uniﬁed strategy. The Banking Union aims at restoring ﬁnancial stability in the Eu-
rozone and in the EU. Thus providing stronger banks to interact better in broader
capital markets. Of course, the Banking Union was established with the main pur-
pose of separating banks’ balance sheets from sovereign debt risk.
This important goal continues to be, of course, very relevant. It must be achie-
ved in an orderly and not mechanic fashion to avoid undesired consequences. Com-
pletion of the Banking Union in addition requires, as you all know, the introduction
of a third pillar. A common deposit guarantee scheme which has been now addres-
sed but the commission and I hope that there will be an agreement on a gradual and
ﬂexible and mutualized introduction of this third pillar. Capital markets Unions aims
at tackling investments shortages by increasing and diversifying the funding sour-
ce of Europe’s business and long-term projects. Therefore, Capital Markets Union helps
to provide more market based risk sharing which is one of the key features of a strong
monetary union and this is an example of how EU wide measures can complement
and support euro area measures and I think that more needs to be understood and
done in identifying synergies here. Finally, the Juncker Plan mobilizes investment
of at least 300 and 15 billion euros in three years; supporting investment in the real
economy and fostering an investment conducive business environment. So it aims
at providing more risk taking long-term. Throughout all this tools, we need to build
a real union for ﬁnancing and investment and to reach out to our companies; explaining
them that we are providing real opportunities for their international growth and for
employment. To conclude; in building this investment union and connecting the dots
between the three components; Capital Markets Union, Banking Union and the Jun-
cker initiative, we must take a uniﬁed view about risks.
There are some risks that need to be reduced and mitigated. Other risk like long-
term real investment in infrastructure based risk must be enhance because we need
more risk taking, as I just said. But also for the strong and and feasible Monetary Union
going forward we need, and we all know that from economics 101, more risk sha-
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ring. I am mentioning these issues because as many of you are aware this is a new
emerging ground for confrontation in Europe and I hope that we can reach a uni-
ﬁed view so that we can really put to the beneﬁt of growth and especially jobs the
European economic machine. That is the ultimate goal.
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Investing in growth
Investing in growth. This is nowadays the priority of those who govern Europe and
each single European State.
Europe must enable its enterprises to contrast American and Asian competitors.
It must defend European products. It must counter unfair competition. Perhaps, avoi-
ding recognising prematurely the Market Economy Status of countries such as Chi-
na.
It must relaunch growth by relaunching investments. Europe does not lack liquidity
but ﬂexibility: it lacks the will to ﬁnance risk, to help enterprises, especially SMEs.
I will now make an example.
In the United States, it has been possible to counter the recession also thanks to
the use of risk capital. If Europe had acted in the same way, between 2008 and 2013,
SMEs could have been provided with a further ﬁnancing in the amount of 90 billion
euro. And if bureaucracy had equipped itself in order to help enterprises, instead of
blocking and slowing them down, setting itself ﬂexibly at the service of growth, the
European economy would have suﬀered less the eﬀects of the crisis.
Unfortunately, the crisis has rendered us a great deal poorer: there has been a
loss of 300 billion in foreign investment; up to 4 million jobs have been lost; and the
manufacturing sector represents now just 15% of GDP.
For this reason, as European commissioner for industry, in 2012, I resolved that
the manufacturing sector should represent up to the 20% of GDP by 2020. The plan
was, and remains, to invert European industrial decline and industrialize Europe again.
An ambitious project that developed further in January 2014, when we assigned to the
industrial sector 150 billion euros, which equals to one sixth of the total EU budget.
The Juncker Plan proceeds along the same way. This project must, however, be
implemented rapidly and eﬃciently. I would like to quote, as a good example of pro-
viding incentives to investments, the second invitation of the European Commission,
last month, to submit proposals for the Mechanism to connect Europe (CEF), a plan
which involves key transport projects worth more than 7 billion euros
Therefore, the CEF supports the Juncker Plan, which should generate investments
worth over 300 billion all over Europe. But the multiplier eﬀect of the Plan can be
realised only under speciﬁc conditions, i.e. only if we will be able to solve certain pro-
blems as above all with regard to:
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- cutting red tape
- rapprochement between the public and private sector (in order for the former
to be at the service of the latter)
- easy access to credit for enterprises
- shortening the time for payments by public administrations
- an harmonised ﬁscal policy, that really encourages enterprises
- the completion of the bank sector reform, in order to permit an economic inte-
gration
I would like to underline that is necessary a mind change within national public ad-
ministrations. I am referring above all to Italy. European institutions are living a pha-
se of awakening, that shows they understood how necessary it is a political econo-
my able to face the crisis and the global competition.
It is important to go beyond the goal of stability and aim at ﬂexibility and growth.
We cannot lose opportunities, we have to be ready to exploit these new opportuni-
ties. We have to be able to exploit European funds establishing a collaboration bet-
ween private and public administrations.
We must shorten, while ensuring transparency, the length of processes to assign
public contracts, locate quickly and with eﬃcacy the ﬁnancial resources necessary
to realise public works and be able to rely upon certain laws Then, we need Europe
to solve problems such as those that are aﬀecting many Italian depositors, involved
in the resolution of four banks. Others EU States, such as Germany, have been able
to protect their depositors thanks to a strong intervention in Brussels.
I would like to quote three fundamental elements for the renewal of Europe.
The ﬁrst one is the Capital Union action plan, presented this last September to the
European Commission. It is one of the Juncker’s commission investment plan pillars,
and it aims to diversify the funding sources for enterprises and long-term projects.
Then, there are other complementary sources to bank loans, such as pension funds,
venture capital, crowdfunding and wealth management that are not used enough
in Europe. Those are useful for SMEs and Start-Ups, and will give stability to the who-
le ﬁnancial system. This action plan is necessary to encourage growth and to crea-
te jobs. This is our goal and to achieve this we need the collaboration between Com-
mission, Parliament and national governments.
The second point regards the banking system and the ﬁscal policy.
To relaunch our enterprises, we need to protect SMEs supporting factor and stren-
gthen the stability of our system. During the last years, we set new capital require-
ments, liquidity requirements and governance requirements through over forty le-
gislative acts. We created three agencies to supervise banks, insurances and pension
funds. We introduced criminal sanctions against those who take advantages in the
ﬁnancial sector.
We have also modiﬁed transparency rules and information duties for investment
advisors. But we cannot stop here. The ﬁscal Union is as important as the banking
union in order to beneﬁt enterprises and growth. We need a more equitable ﬁscal
policy. As president, Patuelli wrote in his last book, referring to Italy:
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“How is it possible to think to be an attractive destination for investors, or also
just a country with growth and employment prospects, if the very same entre-
preneurial activity is taxed 60% less in Mentone compared to Ventimiglia!”
The third point regards the future of European economic and monetary governan-
ce. This point will be discussed next week at the European Parliament in Strasburg.
The report of the presidents of the ﬁve most important European institution is
going in the right direction. It underlines some important goals, such as creating ’a
euro zone treasure’. But this report represents just the ﬁrst step towards a more in-
tegrated EU political economy. In the long-term, we need a uniﬁed governance sy-
stem with strong European institution and common rules. In this contest, we have
to empower the role of the euro in the global scenario. How is it possible that the euro
zone – having the second most important currency in the world – cannot speak with
a single voice about economic issues within international ﬁnance institution? We have
to grow and put our common interests before our national interests.
The euro-group president has to be the spokesman of the eurozone within in-
ternational ﬁnance institutions such as the IMF. We have to work to give trust to the
system again. Growing again is possible.
To help this recovery is a duty, ﬁrst of all for European institutions that have to
be more helpful to enterprises. My commitment, as European Parliament Vice-pre-
sident, will be strong to support the growth of investments in Europe and the Re-
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This is the second time that the European Commission takes part in this event. I would
like to start from our takeaway from last year: with no financial stability, no economic
growth is possible, but also the opposite is true, as the absence of economic growth
can indeed jeopardise financial stability. The important thing nowadays is to link the
three issues, i.e. make sure that the we reap the benefits that can be created by the
joint implementation of the Banking Union, EFSI, also known as the Juncker Plan,
and the Capital Markets Union.
The Banking Union created the ﬁnancial stability which was so much needed to
come out of the ﬁnancial crisis and it also contributed to reducing sovereign spre-
ads, cutting the so-called doom loop between banks and sovereigns. On its positi-
ve eﬀects, the 2015 EBA Transparency exercise report conﬁrms an overall continuous
improvement in the resilience of the EU banking sector, with stronger capital posi-
tions and higher leverage ratios. In fact, the majority of banks present a CET to RWA
capital ratio between 10% and 14%. Leverage ratios, represented by the ratio of Tier
1 capital over total leverage exposures, with no weighting for risk, have also increased
ranging between 3% and 6%. It is important to notice that while for the CET to RWA
capital ratio there is a binding regulatory prescription, nothing but a general indi-
cation that a requirement might be introduced in the future exists for the leverage
ratio. Asset quality remains an issue of concern. Non-Performing-Loans (NPL) remain
worryingly high compared to historical standards even if the majority of banks are
in a position to cover their NPL exposure with adequate provisions.
While the Banking Union clearly succeeded in making banks stronger and more
resilient, something is – we believe – still needed to complement it, and make sure
that the amount of funds going to the core credit of the economy are suﬃcient to ge-
nerate a solid level of economic growth in the EU. And this is where the Juncker Plan
and the Capital Markets Union come into play.
In relation to the Juncker Plan, let me recall that the 2007 ﬁnancial crisis dee-
ply aﬀected the European economy, and in particular its investments. Annual inve-
stment in the EU has fallen by about EUR 430 billion since its peak in 2007, with re-
ductions concentrated in countries like Italy and Spain. At the moment, investment
remains approximately EUR 230 – 370 billion below sustainable trends. The low le-
vel of investment is one of the main reasons why Europe’s economic recovery remains
weak, as rightly recalled by President Abete.
After only three weeks into oﬃce, the Juncker Commission in November 2014
announced an Investment Plan aimed at reducing the EU investment gap that ori-
ginated during the crisis and widened since then. Being the budget of the EU limi-
ted and in any case unsuitable for traditional demand policy, non-conventional ide-
as had to be put in place in order to ensure that investors can close an investment
gap of some €300 billion required to boost growth.
The European Investment Plan is an innovative example of a “leveraged demand”
policy, i.e. a demand policy which uses public money as a lever for private investment.
To do so, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Union will provi-
de guarantees for €21 billion, channelled into the European Fund for Strategic In-
vestments (EFSI). By leveraging 15 times on the EFSI, the European Commission ex-
pects to trigger around €240 billion of long-term investments and €75 billion of in-
vestments in small and medium enterprises and mid-cap ﬁrms between 2015 and 2017.
The truly innovative and creative nature of the Juncker plan depends on its struc-
ture that allows ﬁrst losses on public money, so as to change the overall risk perception
of long-term investments by private investors. Of course, the strong screening pro-
cess of investment projects that can be ﬁnanced, or be in the “pipeline” as someti-
mes jargonly said, is key to the success of the initiative.
The Capital Markets Union builds on the new regulatory framework of the ban-
king sector and extends its credit-supplying potentialities. It has three main moti-
vations:
1) the European capital market activity increased signiﬁcantly over the last two de-
cades. Nevertheless, market ﬁnancing is still quite in need of development in many
member States;
2) revamping the interaction between banks and ﬁnancial markets (for example sa-
fely restarting securitisation markets) can materially increase funding for EU non-
ﬁnancial corporations;
3) the cross-border integration of the EU ﬁnancial system is still limited. Retail ban-
king has remained national, while wholesale banking cross-border activities suf-
fered from the crisis.
The CMU will address these issues by facilitating the creation of European well-in-
tegrated and deep capital markets, by freeing resources for the real sector, by sprea-
ding country– and region-specific risk and thus smoothing the impact of recessions
on consumption, investments and banking sector activity.
The CMU Action Plan sets out a whole range of actions to increase funding op-
tions for Europe’s businesses, to increase investment, and to break down cross-bor-
der barriers to the free movement of capital. To improve the conveyer belt for fun-
ding of SMEs, as touched upon both by Minister Padoan and President Tajani, the
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Commission intends to remove barriers to small ﬁrms raising money from capital mar-
kets, and to better connect information on investment opportunities in SMEs to in-
vestors the world over.
EU ﬁnancial markets will ultimately become, in this way, deeper and more liquid
and therefore a credible alternative for any investment. Banking Union asks for more
equity investment in the banking sector; CMU makes sure that this equity investment
is properly priced and that the credit multiplier originating from more stable banks
is eﬀective.
All this is already taking shape, more quickly than one might think. Already on
30 November, the European Commission has proposed a revision of the Prospectus
Directive, with an overhaul of the rules that allow companies to raise money on pu-
blic markets or by means of a public oﬀer with potential investors. The newly pro-
posed prospectus rules will enable investors to make informed investment decisions,
simplify the rules for companies that wish to issue shares or debt and foster cross-
border investments in the Single Market.
We are also already acting to eﬀectively relaunch European securitisation mar-
kets, as asked in a truly European spirit by both the Bank of England and the Euro-
pean Central Bank in a joint paper presented at the Ecoﬁn Council of April 2013. This
initiative is not to encourage a return to the bad old way which discredited securi-
tisation in the past. On the contrary, the Commission aims at creating a new framework
to encourage the take-up of simple, transparent and standardised securitisation –
STS. This will deﬁne when a securitisation counts as STS and set lower capital re-
quirements that will apply when it meets those criteria. If we rebuild the securiti-
sation market to just half of the pre-crisis levels, it could amount to an extra EUR 100
billion of investment for the economy. It would help diversify funding sources and
free up bank lending for the wider economy.
The Commission Securitisation initiative was adopted on 30 September 2015 with
a package of two legislative proposals. First, a Securitisation Regulation that will ap-
ply to all securitisations and include due diligence, risk retention and transparency
rules together with the criteria for Simple, Transparent and Standardised (“STS”)
Securitisations. And second, a proposal to amend the Bank Capital Requirements Re-
gulation to make the capital treatment of securitisations for banks and investment
ﬁrms more risk-sensitive and able to reﬂect properly the speciﬁc features of STS se-
curitisations.
Already on 2 December 2015, the Council of the European Union agreed on Com-
mission proposal, which constitutes a good basis for speedy further discussions with
the European Parliament. The Capital Markets Union is indeed already taking sha-
pe now, as we speak.
Finally, as part of the Capital Markets Union, Solvency II implementing measu-
res have been amended in September to better allow investments from insurers in
infrastructures. This amendment will grant insurers a special predisposition to take
part in the Investment Plan for Europe, and therefore to invest in long-term assets.
To conclude, a more resilient economic EU can be obtained, in my view, by the
appropriate combination of mutually supporting initiatives that, while maintaining
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ﬁnancial stability thru initiatives like the Banking Union (and it completion as ne-
cessary), also ensure the activation of a suﬃcient volumes of public-private investments
like EFSI and ﬁnally also create the ﬁnancial market infrastructure needed for a real
diversiﬁcation of the sources of funding/smoothening of the funding ﬂows to European
enterprises, including SMEs, which is the main objective of the CMU.
This will need necessary time but – quoting a saying of a former President of the
European Commission – if a century is needed to grow an oak, then one better plant
its seed today rather than tomorrow.
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The European reform agenda, a view from the City
* Vice Chairman for the Corporate & Investment Bank at J.P. Morgan.
iNTroducTioN
The European Reform Agenda is such an important and timely issue for the City and
the EU, especially in the context of the UK’s reform agenda for the EU.
It’s important that the UK is at the table when rules are written in Brussels, and
even though it gets its way more often than not, sometimes we end up with rules that
don’t make sense, and don’t work in the sophisticated ﬁnancial centre that is Lon-
don. We all know the various examples: the bonus cap, the FTT, the ﬁrst draft of the
AIFMD, MiFID liquidity rules, Bank Structural rules. So, there are things that can be
improved and reformed at the EU-level. Here, I would like to highlight three areas
for reform; Job and Growth, the European Pensions space and EU Governance, espe-
cially regarding the UK’s reform priorities.
joBs aNd growTh
It is true that we have now created a more stable financial system in Europe. However,
we must remember that the objective of stability is to allow for growth. In that re-
gard, we believe measures to enhance the EU Single Market are vital. We need bet-
ter impact assessments, and cost-benefit analyses and they should be at the heart
of the rule-making process. No legislation should go through the Brussels and Stra-
sbourg machine without the right impact assessment having been undertaken and
published beforehand.
So, we also whole-heatedly support the UK’s push for better regulation, and bet-
ter processes for creating that regulation, (which, by the way, has been top of Pre-
sident Juncker’s agenda from the week he started in the job). In that context, we wel-
come the European Commission’s cumulative impact assessment in he context of the
Capital Markets Union, which is now underway. This gives policymakers the op-
portunity to take stock of the impact to-date of the post-crisis regulatory agenda and
gives the industry an opportunity to provide evidence to support these eﬀects. And
there should also be a greater focus on enforcement and implementation of the ru-
les. The ﬁnancial crisis showed that some of the regulation that was already in pla-
ce wasn’t being implemented evenly across the union. Now, with 45 or so new ru-
les from the last Commission either in place or being ﬁnalised, it is even more im-
portant that these measures are properly adopted and enforced. Both to ensure safe
markets but also to re-inforce a proper level playing ﬁeld.
peNsioN reForms
Another area of focus should be how Europe deals with pensions. We have pulled
down barriers at national borders to allow for the free movement of peoples. In ti-
mes of economic divergence, such as that which we are living through now, we can
see patterns of mobility from South to North and from East to West. But if we allow
for this free movement of peoples, it only makes sense that we allow them to easi-
ly bring their pensions along with them. This could be achieved through European-
level cross-border pensions
I welcome the attempts at addressing cross-border pensions in the IORP II Di-
rective, which is currently being debated in the European Parliament. We are also
supportive of the consultation from the European Insurance and Occupational Pen-
sions Authority (EIOPA) on the creation of a standardized Pan-European Personal
Pension product (PEPP). In continental Europe speciﬁcally, there is a real need to
increase the amount of private pension investment available. If pursued by the Eu-
ropean Commission, this measure has the potential to encourage EU citizens to en-
gage with long-term retirement savings. The long-term nature of this funding could
make it investable into infrastructure projects. While we understand the challenges
and that driving this agenda will take time, we believe it is necessary.
However, we favour the inclusion of life-cycling as these funds are more ame-
nable to the type of long-term multi-asset allocation that will support the objecti-
ves of the CMU than guarantee products would allow. Furthermore, consumers may
prefer to have the option of growing their pension pot rather than solely protecting
against the downside. By contrast, limiting to guaranteed products could have ne-
gative macro-economic consequences with respect to interest rates and consumption.
Also, from a balance sheet perspective, Solvency requirements would likely make it
challenging for insurers to manage the volume of assets PEPPs may produce.
eu goverNaNce
We trust the current review of the ESA’s will be an opportunity to reinforce their au-
thority. As regards Prime Minister David Cameron’s reform asks, it is reasonable and
important that the UK asks for further safeguards for the countries that are not in
the Euro vis-à-vis those who are in. When Banking Union was being created, the Chan-
cellor successfully negotiated powers of euro ‘outs’ for decision-making on the Sin-
gle rulebook (for example, voting rights within the European Banking Authority are
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set in such a way as the UK regulator can’t be outvoted in a discriminatory way by
members who look to the ECB for their supervision.); and we do need to ensure that
this model is set in stone.
So, the City would support the government in reinforcing the role of the Com-
mission as the guardian of the Single Market and the Treaties. And that we need cle-
ar provisions, or a new Single Market Protocol, that ensures that any future “Euro-
zone-only” measures cannot impinge on the operation of the Single Market or non-
Euro Member States. And that includes recognition of the principle of non-discri-
mination on the grounds of location. So all that means that we need equal treatment
between the euro “in’s” and “out’s”. So I’ve listed some of the things we think need
improving, and some of the safeguards that make sense, but it is also important to
send some positive messages in the renegotiation process about what the UK sup-
ports and needs the EU to continue to push for.
The most obvious is one of the most important initiatives to have come from the
Commission in decades, namely the Capital Markets Union project, with which many
in this room will already be familiar. This is a major eﬀort further to integrate Eu-
ropean Capital Markets and foster the contribution of market-based ﬁnancing to the
real economy. I.e. a project that plays directly to the strengths of the UK, home to
the world’s leading international centre for Capital Markets, and a way of ensuring
that ﬁnance helps support better the European economy and the livelihoods of its
citizens.
And we need the EU to continue to push for a Transatlantic Trade deal that will
beneﬁt the whole of Europe, but clearly is of particular interest to the UK, given its
role in the transatlantic economy. The EU continues to push for ﬁnancial services to
be included in the regulatory chapter of the deal, while the US refuses. Clearly this
is of particular relevance to the UK, and we are more likely to make progress on this
as part of the EU than on our own.
coNclusioN
So, in summary, the City wants the EU to:
- enhance the single market, for example by creating a truly European pensions
space,
- improve the rule-making process with better impact assessments; better imple-
mentation and enforcement of the rules; and robustly independent European Su-
pervisory Authorities;
- Ensure safeguards for the Euro “outs”
- Continue to focus on projects such as CMU, TTIP, Digital Single Market.
With those things achieved, the European Reform Agenda would be significantly fur-
thered. Furthermore, the majority of the City would be even more supportive of the
UK’s continued membership of the EU.
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Regarding the Capital Markets Union, it has to be said that we have been a par-
ticipant and supporter of a single European Financial Market for over two decades
and remain as committed as ever to its success. We therefore fully support the ob-
jectives of Capital Markets Union, and the recently published Action Plan in parti-
cular. We agree with the areas which the Commission has identiﬁed for immediate
action, especially the recently-published Prospectus Directive, which looks to reduce
barriers for accessing ﬁnancial markets. Securitization, the cumulative impact as-
sessment, infrastructure ﬁnance and covered bonds are also areas where the Com-
mission has alreadt taken action. We appreciate the focus of the Commission on mar-
ket-led solutions, where possible.
We note with interest the focus on the Giovannini barriers of Europe’s post tra-
ding landscape, including a new attempt to look at securities law legislation by end-
2017. Indeed, a Capital Markets Union could bring down the costs of capital formation
and investment by removing material barriers in the post-trade environment. Ho-
wever, we also think it is wise of the Commission to use the next 15 months to con-
sult with various stakeholders on how to translate the other elements of the action
plan into concrete policy actions. This extra time is necessary to tackle the many prac-
tical and legal challenges related to the completion of the single market in ﬁnancial
services. It also ﬁts within its overall aim to increase the overall quality (rather than
the quantity) of ﬁnancial services legislation.
With that in mind, I would like to concentrate on the development of CMU over
the next two years, speciﬁcally from a practioner’s viewpoint. J.P. Morgan is a ma-
jor player in the investment bank and asset management space. As such, I would
like to use our experience of the market to think about some of the more practical
realities of CMU, from a sell-side, buy-side and systemic perspective. In particular,
I will focus on infrastructure ﬁnance, asset management viewpoints and market li-
quidity.
coNcreTe implemeNTaTioN
We remain very supportive of the continued attention within the European Com-
mission for infrastructure finance. The creation of the European Fund for Strategic
Investments (EFSI) and legislative proposals to improve the prudential treatment of
the asset class were important milestones.
This is an area of growing importance for J.P. Morgan. In November, we announced
the creation of a new global J.P. Morgan infrastructure team, signiﬁcantly increa-
sing our focus on this market. We are looking forward to working with policymakers,
sharing innovative ideas to spur the development of this market. Other ﬁrms have
also created dedicated infrastructure debt teams (e.g. Allianz, AXA) or infrastruc-
ture debt funds (e.g. Macquarie, Hastings) that are seeking to target this area.
In that context, we are very happy with the work on infrastructure ﬁnance that
is part of the Action Plan. The European Commission has called for the recalibration
of capital requirements for infrastructure investment under Solvency II. We are very
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supportive of this measure and believe it has the potential create new business op-
portunities and to boost infrastructure ﬁnancing in Europe by making it more attractive.
However, in terms of good policy, the qualiﬁcation criteria may not be well deﬁned
and may even be considered too lenient: It does not specify a time limit on contracts,
and does not diﬀerentiate between regulatory jurisdictions in the OECD. For instance,
two assets, one with a 2-year contract and the other with a 15-year contract can both
qualify, but they present very diﬀerent risk proﬁles.
We are also supportive of the consultation from the European Insurance and Oc-
cupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) on the creation of a standardized Pan-Eu-
ropean Personal Pension product (PEPP). In continental Europe speciﬁcally, there
is a real need to increase the amount of private pension investment available. If pur-
sued by the European Commission, this measure has the potential to encourage EU
citizens to engage with long-term retirement savings. The long-term nature of this
funding could make it investable into infrastructure projects.
However, we favour the inclusion of life-cycling as these funds are more ame-
nable to the type of long-term multi-asset allocation that will support the objecti-
ves of the CMU than guarantee products would allow. Furthermore, consumers may
prefer to have the option of growing their pension pot rather than solely protecting
against the downside. By contrast, limiting to guaranteed products could have ne-
gative macro-economic consequences with respect to interest rates and consumption.
Also, from a balance sheet perspective, Solvency requirements would likely make it
challenging for insurers to manage the volume of assets PEPPs may produce.
Asset managers are already playing a key role as important alternatives to tra-
ditional bank ﬁnancing in Europe and globally. They serve as the crucial link between
savers and pensioners seeking steady returns, and the companies and projects across
Europe and the globe that need a stable source of funding to go about their business
of creating jobs, producing goods and providing services.
This is happening already but there is an opportunity for asset management to
play a stronger role in funding the EU economy. The CMU initiative can help. This
will require a combination of smaller ‘quick ﬁxes’ to existing rules and more ambi-
tious longer term commitments to resolving complex issues, all to help enhance and
complete the EU Single Market.
The Single Market in ﬁnancial services is beneﬁcial to investors but incomple-
te. There is a great deal of fragmentation across the EU’s Member States, which crea-
te hurdles to pooling of investments and the marketing and distribution of funds across
Europe.
UCITS are a global success story. UCITS are the most trusted investment vehi-
cles on a global, cross-border basis. Transparency, diversiﬁcation and stability that
UCITS provide have earned the trust of investors and regulators not just in Europe
but also in Asia and Latin America. Still there are barriers which make it diﬃcult to
distribute funds across borders even within the EU itself. Marketing restrictions im-
posed by host countries at national level. Local marketing documentation require-
ments lead to delays in distribution. As a ‘quick ﬁx’, CMU could seek to allow home
regulators to approve marketing materials when approving UCITS funds themsel-
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ves, or at the very least, impose stricter deadlines for Member States to give consent
to marketing materials for funds.
Retirement income is a signiﬁcant source of under-utilized capital in Europe and
pensions are an area where national markets in Europe are still very disjointed. Poo-
ling retirement saving across the EU bloc and channelling this investment into in-
frastructure projects, loans to small and medium-sized businesses and other long-
term growth and job creating initiatives should be a focus of CMU. This is complex
and would need a great deal of thought and consultation but we believe such a re-
gime is worthy pursuing as a longer term CMU goal. It would strengthen the Sin-
gle Market for pension provision whilst providing investors and savers with grea-
ter choice across a more competitive and cheaper (due to economies of scale) funds
range.
sysTemic viewpoiNT – markeT liquidiTy
We are encouraged by the Commission’s review of liquidity in the corporate bond
markets (with the potential of voluntary rather than mandatory standardization of
offer documentation). We believe that the role of market makers, which interme-
diate between buyers and sellers by trading from their balance sheet, is of particu-
lar importance for the provision of liquidity. Going forward, we will further deve-
lop our ideas on the topic and share these with policymakers ahead of the publica-
tion of the EC report in 2017.While noting that regulation is not the only cause of
changes in liquidity, there are several things that policymakers can do.
Policymakers should be ambitious. There is no a trade-oﬀ between prudential
safety/soundness and market liquidity. If carefully calibrated, policymakers can have
both. Policymakers should take pause and assess the cumulative impact of regula-
tory reform. Therefore, we applaud the launch of the important ‘call for evidence’
on the cumulative impact of current ﬁnancial rules, to which we will respond. Ho-
wever, we also note that many pieces of legislation will still have to come into (full)
eﬀect and their interplay and impact on market liquidity are therefore yet unknown.
Policy should aim to create a diverse market for greater resilience. In a diverse
environment, issuers can raise funds via their channel of choice (be that bank fun-
ding or market funding) and their instrument of choice (be that equity, a private pla-
cement or a bond). Furthermore, investors and dealers should be able to able to tra-
de using the execution method and venue which they ﬁnd the most suitable. This
creative process will lead to the most optimal results for market participants, in the
form of low borrowing costs and transaction costs.
Policymakers should ensure that bank intermediation will remain a powerful tool
for eﬀective capital allocation in vigorous public capital markets. Legislation should
enable market makers to provide liquidity. Collaboration between markets regula-
tors and prudential regulators should be increased. It is important for macroprudential
regulators to engage with markets regulators and practitioners alike.
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coNclusioN
In conclusion, we are very supportive of the Capital Markets Union initiative and con-
gratulate the European Commission on their work so far. As we move from the plan-
ning to the action phase, we must thinking about how we translate good ideas into
positive policy outcomes. For our perspective, being mindful of how the market works
from the sell-side, from the buy-side and from a systemic perspective will be important
in achieving these goals. The devil will be in the details and we are glad the Com-
mission has given 15 months to gather evidence from industry to hit the “sweet spot”




Juncker Plan, a multifaceted approach to investment in Europe
* Committee of the Regions, Chair of the ECON Committee.
A little over a year after the launch of the Investment Plan for Europe, EU Commis-
sion President President Juncker has seen this as an important time not to talk about
results or to draw conclusion, of course. It is still far too early for that. But it's an im-
portant time nonetheless to take a moment, to stop and look at what has been done
and what remains to do and most important to check that we are heading in the right
direction. I want to be cautious here, but I believe we are.
Before the Investment Plan, it had become clear that Europe was starting to emer-
ge from one of its worst economic downturns in recent history. A crisis that had so-
cial, economic and above all human consequences for many Europeans. But it was
becoming clear as well that this recovery was, and in too many places still is, much
too slow and much too weak. Boosting investment was seen rightly as one of the so-
lutions and as soon as the investment plan was launched, the cities and regions of
Europe expressed their support for this initiative.
One of the plan strengths that we saw in the European Committee of the Regions
was its twin focus based on long-term infrastructure investment on the one hand and
development funding for SMEs and mid-caps companies on the other. Indeed, at a
local level these are the two sides of the same coin; what is the point of ﬁnancing fast
growth or improve transport infrastructure, if not to allow well ﬁnanced companies
to take advantage of them to create jobs.
I am convinced that the topic of investment continues to be one of the deﬁning
questions for Europe’s economy. Furthermore in my capacity as the chair of the Eu-
ropean Committee of the Regions Commission for Economic policy, with one foot
in Brussels and the other in my region of Styria in Austria, I see that local and regional
authorities throughout Europe have a key role to play in answering that deﬁning que-
stion. In fact, the members of the commission for economic policy and myself agre-
ed that the promotion of long-term investment at regional and local level have to be
one of our key priorities for the coming year.
The deep integration of Europe’s economies, debates of its many beneﬁts should
not let us forget the diﬀerences that exist at national level and even more at the re-
gional and local level. We need European level strategies and coordination, cooperation
exchange and much more but we must remember that in spite of everything that we
do share not two European regions not two European cities are the same. This local
and regional diversity and richness need to be taken account at the level of the EU in
order for so necessary European strategies to make sense and eventually to succeed.
This is true for many policy areas, for example, economic government which we
were discussing yesterday at the Committee of the Regions and it is true also for in-
vestment. It's true for both public investment – 60% of which is done by cities and
regions in the European Union – and private investment, which is heavily determi-
ned by local and regional factors as well as constraints.
In Brussels, we discussed promotional banks for investment and growth and what
was very clear to me in the discussion with my colleagues of the committee of the
regions was that great diversity of situations. Firstly in terms of challenges and star-
ting points: if you look at gross ﬁxed capital formation as a share of GDP – which is
a useful measure of investment – the diﬀerences between countries are important,
but the diﬀerences at the regional level are even more startling. In some regions the
ﬁgure is below 10% while in others it is nearly three times as much. For example
27% in Valle d’Aosta in Italy.
At the same time the diﬀerences between regions and their capacity to tackle the-
se challenges is as striking as well. In some regions and cities there is very high-le-
vel expertise, there is experience in working with services at the European Investment
Bank. There is knowledge of how to use ﬁnancial instruments and some regions have
their own promotional banks for instance. In others, however we have seen none of
that. As a result, this question of capacity and that of capacity building for local and
regional authorities including in relation to investment has been highlighted as an
important concern for European investors in past years. It is an important issue for
the committee of the regions and indeed, I believe it is absolutely fundamental to
work on it if we really want to make investment work for Europe.
But what I really would like to emphasise, however, is how important it is not to
have a narrow view of the subject. If investment is really going to be the key to un-
lock a full return to growth, it must be tackled from the diﬀerent angles of and in-
tegrated within an overarching investment strategy.
In this respect, I am very happy to see this multifaceted approach to investment
in some of the latest work done at the EU level. In the Annual Growth Survey, which
it published just two weeks ago, the European Commission not only put relaunching
investment at the heart of its analysis, but it also looked much deeper into the chal-
lenges to investment in each member state. To do this it had to look at public pro-
curement, the insolvency framework, employment rules, taxation, education and much
more because all of these factors come in to play
I really welcome this excellent work and I want to point out that the European
Committee of the Regions is playing its part too. Earlier this year we worked with
the OECD on a joint consultation on sub-national governments challenges to inve-
stment in infrastructure which I think is fully complementary to the work done by
the European Commission.
Another piece in the puzzle of this overarching investment strategy is the Capi-
tal Market Union, for example, and that is true both from the perspective of business
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investment and infrastructure investment. Once completed the CMU will allow com-
panies to beneﬁt from more liquid and more integrated capital markets, meaning more
opportunities for access to funding and more attractive conditions. At the same time,
thanks to the new Solvency II rules, insurances and pension funds will have much
better incentives to provide long-term ﬁnance to infrastructure and investment pro-
jects, which was a real challenge up until now.
One more piece of the investment puzzle and one that is is particularly impor-
tant for local and regional authorities, is that of economic governance. The rules that
are now in place to coordinate economic and ﬁscal policy are of course necessary in
our economic and monetary union but we must look at the impact they have upon
Member States’ and also Regions’ and Cities’ capacity to invest, especially at a diﬃ-
cult time like this one.
At the level of the Committee of the Regions, we have welcomed the ﬂexibility
that has been recognised in the rules of stability and growth, backed as something
necessary. The commitment made by President Juncker for example, that contributions
to the European Fund for Strategic Investment would be excluded from the calcu-
lation of deﬁcit under the pact was a step in the right direction. However, some pro-
tagonists think ﬂexibility should even go further. It has been discussed if the same
logic should be extended to all national and regional co-ﬁnancing in the context of
the European Structural Investment Fund. In any case, these are worthwhile inve-
stments; that’s why it is being discussed how this extra ﬂexibility would allow Mem-
ber States but also Cities and regions to make the investments which is so badly nee-
ded to boost economic growth and job creation.
I know that the debate will be lively, well informed and constructive and as a re-
sult, I am hopeful it can represent a real step forward. The challenge is far from an
easy one, but with the involvement of all players and of all levels of governance wor-
king together, I am conﬁdent that we can achieve our common goal to enable Eu-




Is there a problem of short-termism in the corporate world?
* Chief Economist, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti.
1. See, Paolo Garonna and Edoardo Reviglio (eds), Investing in Long-term Europe. Re-launching
Fixed, Network and Social Infrastructure, LUISS University Press Rome 2015, and references
therein.
The question I would like to discuss in this brief note is the following: A good cor-
porate governance system can aﬀect “medium long-term value creation”? Is there
a problem of short-termism in the corporate world? Moreover, if there is one – how
can corporate governance eventually mitigate it?
Since the introduction of the “shareholders’ value” corporate model in the last
2-3 decades – not only in America, but also in many other jurisdictions of the world
– the question of short vs long-term has been widely discussed. After the crisis, it has
been placed even more at the center of the debate, especially in America and in Eu-
rope.
In America, where there is a large and well developed capital market and a smal-
ler banking system, the question has been focused on the role of investors (and spe-
culation) and the role of corporate governance in fostering short or long-term be-
havior in the management of public companies’.
In Europe, where the banking system is dominant, the question was addressed
more on the capacity of the ﬁnancial system to ﬁnance long-term investment – i.e.
to provide “ﬁnance for growth”. The eﬀects of deleveraging, balance sheet repairs
and Basel III have strongly reduced the capacity of European banks to ﬁnance long-
term. This is why the long vs short-term issue has become so important for EU po-
licymaking – and rightly so1.
For companies listed on the stock markets the short-term question is less dramatic.
Recently it has been raised at the high political level with Hilary Clinton saying, “We
should end quarterly capitalism” making of it a focal point of her tax reform platform.
Nevertheless, is there a real problem? On the issue, there is no consensus. Some claim
that the Short Term Argument is a false problem. Others believe that managers of
public companies are under constant pressure to meet quarterly guidance and ma-
ximize proﬁts, often at the expense of future proﬁtability. However, even empirical
evidence is not clear on the matter – depending on who is producing the evidence;
it may support one or the other view.
However, what do short-term and long-term refer to?
• Investor behavior (short-term traders versus long-term holders);
• Investor objectives (increases in portfolio value in the short-term at the cost of
foregoing better long-term fund performance);
• Corporate behavior (focusing on short-term proﬁtability to meet or better quar-
terly performance goals to the detriment of greater long-term proﬁtability); or
• Corporate objectives and strategy (engaging in ﬁnancial engineering to generate
short-term value creation, thereby precluding long-term investment in building
the business)2.
Moreover, what – according to the supporter of the Long-term Argument – is driving
short-term behavior?
• Activist hedge funds that agitate for immediate shareholder value. This is only
partially true: in fact, their holding period, for any given equity portfolio, may
range from days to years;
• “Quarterly capitalism” preoccupied with the next earnings report;
• Executive compensation design that does not encourage a “buy and hold” men-
tality;
• Changes in capital markets in which trading has supplanted investment;
• Fund managers with a primary focus on short-term trading gains have little rea-
son to care about long-term corporate performance or externalities3.
According to supporter of the Long-term Argument, much can be done to avoid ex-
cessive short termism.
• Abandon quarterly bottom-line earnings guidance and focus on communicating
metrics that are material to long-term value creation;
• Revamp executive compensation to reward longer-term thinking;
• Oﬀer extra dividends or enhanced voting rights to reward longer-term investors
(additional voting rights, tax incentives, loyalty dividends, or loyalty shares);
• Adopt capital allocation policies to ensure the long-term interests of the company
are not sacriﬁced to the pressures of daily business activity;
• Develop a capital allocation policy which takes into account excessive stock buy-
backs and timing of stock buybacks purchase to enhance capital eﬃciency;
• Adjust the capital gains tax rate to reward longer-term investments4.
2. Nathan, C., Observations on Short-Termism and Long-Termism, in Harvard Law School Fo-
rum of Corporate Governance and Financial regulation. October 12, 2015.
3. Martin, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds, in Harvard Law
School Forum of Corporate Governance and Financial regulation, June 2, 2015.
4. Martin, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Is Short-Term Behavior Jeopardizing the Future Pro-
sperity of Business, in Harvard Law School Forum of Corporate Governance and Financial re-
gulation, October 30, 2015.
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These are all reasonable recipes – if properly implemented they would create more
incentives to “medium long-term value creation”.
However, we should avoid an over simpliﬁcation of the issue. The duration of any
investor’s holding period in a company’s stock is simply not relevant to issues involving
corporate value creation. In today’s equity markets, there is virtually no end of in-
vestment styles and goals, which vary greatly on many levels, including projected
or actual duration of discrete portfolio positions.
• For instance, index funds must remain invested (directly or synthetically) in eve-
ry equity within their index. These types of quantitative funds are the epitome
of long-term investors.
• Other quantitative investors, such as high frequency and other program traders,
may trade in and out of a speciﬁc security multiple times in one day or even in
an hour or minutes, creating a new epitome of short-term trading. However, it
is hard to see how such avowedly short-term traders have a meaningful eﬀect on
corporate behavior and strategy.
• Actively managed portfolios, unlike index funds, partake of both long-term in-
vesting behavior (e.g., establishing and maintaining a position in a desired stock
often for years) and short-term buying and selling (e.g., to adjust the size of a
portfolio position in reaction to one or more macro and micro factors aﬀecting
the portfolio company)5.
Finally, and most telling, there is simply no connection between an investor’s hol-
ding period for a given stock and the behavior of the issuer. Of course, issuers may
wish to build a base of long-term holders to reduce volatility in their stock price and
to facilitate investor relations and relationships. However, their underlying concern
is to create more buyers and fewer sellers of their stock. Companies are concerned
principally with buying and selling imbalances in the market, which cause increa-
ses, or decreases in the price of their stock. It is not the duration of the buyers’ and
sellers’ holding periods that matters to the issuer—it is the act of buying or selling
that matters, without regard to the holding period objectives or practices of the in-
vestor.
So then, what is the long-term, short-term debate about? It is not about dura-
tion of implementation, but rather it is about evaluating competing agendas that fre-
quently have diﬀerent time horizon. Much is about the challenge to determine net
present value of a given corporate business initiative. Reasonable people can and will
disagree about its calculation. Activist campaign, for instance, are typically cha-
racterized by competing investor presentations on diﬀerent ways to demonstrate the
value creation superiority of its business plan.
The importance lies in striking the right balance between short and long-term.
To this end, corporate governance can be a strong ally in achieving this goal.
5. Nathan, ibidem, p. 2.
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To conclude.
It is almost impossible to imagine Long-Term Investors to exist without Short-Term
Investors. In fact, they contribute to:
• Manage liquidity in the ﬁnancial system;
• Smooth peaks as well as bottoms towards the real long-term economic and ﬁ-
nancial path;
• Short-termism is become almost the catchall term to embody negative behaviors
in ﬁnancial market activities – so we should not confuse corporate bad behavior
with short-termism – bad behavior could be long-term or short-term:
• Markets undershoot and overshoot, as one should expect. There is considerable
evidence with the likelihood that a major source of short-term focus originates
inside the corporation and not outside in ﬁnancial markets.
Let us not stigmatize Short-Tem Investors a priori
• Against speculative, ineﬃcient and distortive short-sighted investment activities;
• Pro an eﬃcient and dynamic investment approach.
An exclusive buy and hold investment strategy could prove not only “boring” but abo-
ve all ineﬃcient and unproductive.
If Long-Term Investors can be appropriately thought of strategic and patient in-
vestors, Short-Term Investors can be deﬁnitely regarded as eﬃcient and dynamic in-
vestors.
Hence, for Long-Term Investors could be much wiser to cooperate in a produc-
tive way with eﬃcient and dynamic Short-Term Investors in order to enhance long-
term growth strategies.
Let me conclude with two ﬁnal suggestions. First, listed equity should be inclu-
ded – also in the European debate – in the long-term investment policy agenda. Se-
cond, Short Term Investors may have an important role to play also in Long-term In-
vestments.
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What is the Juncker plan and what is that the idea associated with the Juncker plan
can do? The European plan for Europe was conceived at a point in time when Eu-
rope was coming out of – no was coming out, after seven years of recession – and
with the awareness of many long-term challenges ahead of us; and when I say long-
term challenges I’m not referring to demographic challenges, I’m referring to the fact
that we have all realised that the crisis we have all been going through was not cy-
clical, but it was structural. We have seen economic data, we have seen the status
of the banks, banks leveraging, we have seen the limitation of monetary policies, we
have seen the constraints of ﬁscal stimulus and so forth. We come from a period whe-
re spending has been very low in spite of a number of manoeuvres made at policy
level. This genesis I don’t think has changed very much.
There are three components that are associated among themselves and I think
must be looked at one in conjunction with the other. One is the ﬁnancial dimension
of that and is the notion of ﬁnancing additional trend of 315 billion and I will come
back to that in a second.
And this goes hand in hand with a notion of reform and with the notion of trying
to build a pipeline, which is the third component – the notion of advisory, suppor-
ting, capacity building and so forth.
On the ﬁrst one – and maybe I try to answer your question – 315 billion is no-
thing when you compare the needs of Europe. 315 billion over a period of three ye-
ars is very little. Certainly, this is a ﬁrst step. We were asked to assess what is the in-
vestment gap in Europe. We have done this in November of last year and we came
up with a number which was close to one trillion per year. How did we come to that
number? We just looked at where we stood in terms of investment level before the
crisis (2008) and looked at where we wanted to be in some sectors like education
and so forth for which we had some reference investment rates.
So we came up with a number of 780 billion of extra investment on a yearly ba-
sis – clearly we are far away from the 315 billion. However, these 315 billion are very
important because these are new investments, new projects. There is clear com-
mitment, a mandate given to the bank. The bank is there to support additional in-
vestment on top of what the bank would do in any case, to the tune of 315 billions.
What is that meaning? It does not mean that the EIB would create on its balance she-
et new assets for 315, but it would generate new operations, in the course of three
years, around 45 billions of new generations, which would have the quality to ena-
ble the crowding in of private investors. And this is important, these are new pro-
jects capable of bringing in new investors and because of the guarantee that we be-
neﬁt from, in terms of products this must be funded by products which – as far as
we are concerned – are in the high risk range of what we do. This is really the chal-
lenge we are confronted with. Products are products we know already about: inve-
stment funds, junior lending, quasi-equity, subordinated lending, it is about project
ﬁnance where can now come as a senior lender, a junior lender.
These are projects where the scale is much higher, so we can look at every tran-
saction even when they are risky, assess them, and ﬁnance them no matter what is
the risk content. This is the prerogative and this is what we have been doing.
We started already in January of this year, even before the regulation was ap-
proved by the Council. We have been already piling up a number of projects. Some
of them are being ﬁnanced; as of now, we think that at year-end – I do not want to
make any announcement but that will be new projects in the tune of 45 billion that
would have enjoyed the support of the Investment Plan for Europe.
But of course it’s work in progress. It is an eﬀort that will need to be measured
during the space of these three years. It must be assessed with the operators wor-
king on the ground, it is something that we intend to do. We need to work with ope-
rators on the ground, i.e. banks, national promotional banks.
This is something that we are doing. For us it means going into new products,
scaling up tremendously these new products, revising our credit policy guidelines,
developing platforms to work with the others.
What can we do when we work together with national promotional banks and
commercial banks? We can do many things. We can co-invest. We can develop in-
vestment platforms. What is it, investment platforms? Essentially, it is a fund whe-
re we funnel, via which we widen and cover a number of operations which we could
otherwise not reach. It is about developing a range of quasi-equity products at which
we are now looking at. That is where we are, it is work in progress, it is a complex
process but we are conﬁdent that this will yield its results.
As I mentioned before. It is not all about ﬁnance. I have to stress that. It is also
about reform. There are many sectors we can speak about, I have in mind the elec-
tricity sector. I suppose we all agree that we all agree that what is missing is not ﬁ-
nance, is certainty. I am looking at many countries in Europe, not just one in parti-
cular: what we need is certainty. Is very important, we are trying to work with au-
thorities at national level to address what is missing because as I said this is what is
missing, this is the missing link.
A last word on advisory because we all talk about ﬁnancing new projects but so-
metimes we forget the necessity of supporting the pipeline.
We go to meetings and what I often hear from institutional investors is “We do
not need cash. What we need are projects” It is true, it is a fact that in many coun-
tries in particular the eﬀort that needs to be done is at the level of generation of pro-
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jects. And that – I go to the third leg of the Juncker plan – that is – as far as we are
concerned – the development of an advisory hub. That is an important initiative that
has been developed.
Of course we are not the only player, we cannot address all the problems, but –
and this is a number that I see rarely being mentioned – we have 200-250 people that
are fully devoted to advisory, which is a lot.
We join forces with local partners, with commercial banks because clearly when
it comes to origination, origination in particular, we do need to join forces with lo-
cal partners.
We have the case of an agreement we signed a few years ago with Cassa Depo-
siti e Prestiti, it is an important agreement. We have worked together with MPBs across
Europe in the context of a working group which was set up around a year ago and
we have regular meetings which are meant to yield new forms of cooperation: staﬀ
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Does the Juncker plan work? This is the question that we have to answer after the
launch of the European Investment Fund. And the answer is: “yes, but”. And I will
focus on “the but”. This does not mean that I put aside everything which is working
quite well.
I think that we can do more with the National Promotional Banks and Institu-
tions (NPBI). What are we? we are long-term investment public bodies which have
important amount of money ready to invest for the long-term and ready to work to-
gether. The names can diﬀer from one country to another (France Caisse des Dépots,
Germany KFW, Italy Cassa di Depositi e prestitti…)
So what are the “but”?
The ﬁrst one is, “what is the impact of the Juncker plan on the daily life of the
European citizen?” At the present moment I think that the impact is very small.
It is small because as Helmut Schmidt used to say “the proﬁt of today are the in-
vestment of tomorrow and the jobs of the day after tomorrow”. But the problem is
that people are looking for a job today! Thus, the impact of the Juncker plan is qui-
te small and this is a big issue.
The other point regarding the daily life of our citizens is the fact that we are all
speaking about ﬂexibility but in the meantime, we are considered – probably rightly
– to be rigid about the constraints. For example, Maastricht’s criteria are not really
considered as very ﬂexible… The very people speaking about ﬂexibility are those who
are the most rigid about certain issues. This paradox undermines our credibility.
Infrastructures are another point where people have “great expectations” but it
takes time when you want to do something about housing, energy eﬃciency, wind
farms…
On all of the above, we need and we can do more if we are able to support local
projects.
Local mean small and medium projects. This cannot be done only from the top.
We need the Juncker plan to be implemented at the local level and this need a kind
of delegation to the NPBI.
Second “but”: did we change our vision of risk? The answer is maybe.
Why? Because we are still thinking at the risk in the short term while we are in-
vesting in the long-term. Therefore, the risk will come before the outcome of the in-
vestment. This is one of the paradox we have to deal with. And for this we need to
change our vision of the risk. It is necessary to have a vision of risk, because we are
just getting out of an economic and ﬁnancial crisis but the risk we know is always
the one coming from the past.
To make another example, which is not from the Juncker plan. Is there any rea-
son for the development banks, which are lending money, making loans to develo-
ping countries, to have the same prudential ratio as commercial banks?. No of cour-
se. When you make loans to developing countries of course this is more risky than
making loans for customers in a commercial bank. But, one size ﬁts all cannot work
everywhere.
Therefore, we need to change our vision of risk. We need not only to say that we
are taking more risk. All countries in Europe are asking EIB to take more risk. But
are the shareholders of EIB saying the same thing when they are discussing on the
board of EIB? I am not completely sure. Sometimes some of them could say “I’m the
shareholder of EIB, so please be careful on this or that and don’t take too much risks”.
The third but is linked to the means and tools. Do we use everything enabled by
the Juncker plan to make it the success we are looking for.
The answer is probably “not really”. We are using a lot of them, but we are not
using all of them. Let’s have a look at the platforms. When we have projects in diﬀerent
countries, or in one country at diﬀerent places, about the same theme. It could be
about digital, renewable energy, housing...
They are small projects; the ﬁxed costs for any project could be reduce if we ga-
ther them in a platform. To implement this we need to have a form of delegation.
We need the Juncker plan to have a form of delegation from the Commission to the
EIB, from the EIB to NPBI. It is important to have this kind of delegation if we want
to implement it at the local level. We cannot have a world in a way where we say it
is important to delegate in management aspects, while we do not delegate in ﬁnancial
aspects. Another example, we have a tool: Margaret fund. Margaret was created to
fund some European infrastructures. It is a European fund; it is funded by ﬁnancial
institutions coming from diﬀerent Member States, Caisse de Depots, Cassa Deposi-
ti e Prestitti, KfW, EIB and the European Commission. A Margaret 2 Fund would be
an important signal for the future. It is a sort of platform.
I would like to conclude by reiterating that Juncker Plan is a great idea, it works
but it could do better. The success depends in our ability to be more ﬂexible and to
develop cooperation based on some delegation. As someone said sometimes ago: “we
can do it”!
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1. With a few additions and integrations, this is the text of my introductory speech at the 4th
Annual Conference of the Financial Institutions with a Development or Public Mandate (D20
Annual Conference 2016), Organized by China Development Bank, Beijing, 27 May, 2016.
* Long-term Investors Club (LTIC).
Some years ago, when the last systemic ﬁnancial crisis reached its peak (zenith), the
G20 identiﬁed the achievement of a strong, balanced and sustainable growth as a
key global strategic objective together with the need to prevent the ﬁnancial crisis
and assure the ﬁnancial stability.
Since then, much has been done to improve the ﬁnancial regulatory framework
and to deﬁne and implement policies and instruments aimed at sustaining growth
and jobs’ creation. However, although some key results were accomplished, the ﬁ-
nal goal is far from being achieved. The last World Economic Outlook released in April
by the International Monetary Fund highlights that global growth will remain sub-
dued in 2016 at a mere 3.2%. The title of the Outlook, “Too slow for too long” lea-
ves no room for interpretation.
Growth in advanced economies, shaped by unfavorable demographic trends, low
productivity growth and legacies from the global ﬁnancial crisis, is projected to re-
main modest, in line with 2015 outcomes. Growth in emerging markets and deve-
loping economies remains geographically uneven and generally weaker than over
the past two decades, although still accounting for the lion’s share of projected world
growth in 2016.
International trade in 2015 has grown less than GDP. Usually it grows at a much
faster rate thus functioning as the locomotive of growth. No surprise that the crui-
sing speed of global economy is at the weakest point since 2009 and that forecasts
for the next few years are gloomy.
In fact, at a global level uncertainty has increased, renewed episodes of global
asset market volatility and ﬁnancial turbulence have materialized and risks of wea-
ker growth scenarios are becoming more tangible.
There are two main instruments to support growth and they have now to be used
together. The ﬁrst is to support the domestic demand and consumption worldwide.
Both are today not suﬃciently strong: that seems to be due, ﬁrst of all, to the persi-
stence of wide areas of poverty and of strong inequalities across the world and wi-
thin major countries. In many advanced economies, the weakness of domestic de-
mand and consumption seems also due to the growing impoverishment of the mid-
dle class. Poverty alleviation (and social infrastructures ﬁnancing) seems to be a cru-
cial way to support growth, on the demand side, and also to defend the social co-
hesion and the democratic values threatened by populisms.
The second main instrument to support growth and jobs is to speed up recove-
ry by giving a real boost to investment at the global level. This is why long-term in-
vestment is a top priority in the agenda of policy makers.
Investment is indeed one of the great challenge of our century. In general, more
investment has a positive eﬀect on current demand and productivity growth in the
future, which is key for competitiveness. Stronger investment is crucial also to face
the transition to a low-carbon economy.
Investment, and in particular long-term investment needed to promote sustai-
nable growth and to ﬁnance the energy transition are still largely insuﬃcient. In many
countries, ﬁscal consolidation and deleveraging, needed in order to bring public debt
down to manageable levels, has led to scarce public investments (particularly in Eu-
rope, where the short-termist rules of the Growth and Stability Pacyt do not distin-
guish between investment and current expenditures). The huge mass of private ﬁ-
nancial resources is today almost totally directed towards ﬁnancial investments, mo-
stly short-term and often speculative. The estimated gap in economic infrastructu-
re over the next 15 years is estimated to be $15-20 trillion.
In fact, much progress has been made on the regulatory ground and in the de-
velopment of adequate rules, tools and instruments to prevent and tackle systemic
ﬁnancial crises and to assure ﬁnancial stability. On the contrary, the necessary eﬀorts
have not been put in place in deﬁning the rules, the policies, the tools and the in-
centives to sustain and boost growth and jobs, both on the demand and supply side.
This is true, in particular, if we consider the real dimension of the objective of
a strong, balanced and sustainable growth: a growth which cannot be measured only
in term of GDP, but must be declined and built in term of wellbeing, quality of jobs
and management and conservation of the scarce natural resources of the planet. Which
is, moreover, the only type of growth able to deal with the major challenges that the
world is facing: poverty/inequalities, environment/energetic transition, ageing of
population/sustainability of welfare systems, immigration/migrants integration and
so on. The above-mentioned scarcity is even more evident for investments aimed at
ﬁnancing material and immaterial infrastructures, at promoting innovation, te-
chnology, research and education, and at ﬁnancing SMEs and start-ups (venture ca-
pital).
There is an increasing and incumbent need for policies, rules and instruments
suitable to boost such investments. However, public policies are mostly still natio-
nal (or regional); instruments can be developed by national Governments, but also
by multilateral, international or national institutions; and rules are largely, although
not exclusively, deﬁned at a global or regional level.
Coordination tools among national public policies are thus necessary and poli-
tical institutions (governments, UN, G20) are in charge of setting them up.
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Obviously, an important role must be played by regulatory authorities and pri-
vate ﬁnance actors; however that role is not always consistent with the political di-
rections established or suggested by the political institutions.
Looking at rules and instruments, given the important role that the above-men-
tioned political institutions are required to play, the institutions within the D20 and
the LTIC can and must provide a key contribution (in terms of proposals, advice and
execution).
Allow me now to submit to you some reﬂections for our debate and our ﬁnal D20
Statement:
a. Liquidity and ﬁnancial resources are now abundant worldwide, savings are co-
pious in many areas, and central banks’ expansionary monetary policies have con-
tributed to raise liquidity. But these resources are predominantly directed towards
short-term investments, still in large part speculative in nature, with a very poor
impact on growth and job and important pro-cyclical eﬀects. It remains diﬃcult
to direct a satisfactory share of these great resources towards the ﬁnancing of me-
dium to long-term investments that bring along key positive externalities for a
strong, balanced and sustainable growth, such as the investments in infra-
structures, R&D, technologies, human capital, innovation, start-ups and SMEs.
b. In the draft of our D20 Statement and in the proposals contained therein, we hi-
ghlight the negative eﬀects caused by the persistence of marked and relevant ine-
qualities and of wide poverty areas. These factors translate into a global weak-
ness on the demand side, which consequently, turns into a subdued economic
recovery.
c. Together, we should emphasize the opportunity for new policies, rules and to-
ols for the adoption and implementation of advanced welfare systems and we
should advocate the importance of the role that institutions, to which we belong,
together with national governments and other international organizations, can
play in promoting social infrastructure and investment with a social impact.
d. In the D20 Statement, we particularly stress the positive impact of investments
in innovation, technologies, human capital and infrastructure. Most of these in-
vestments provide economic returns only in the medium to long-term, involve
a high level of risk, or produce positive systemic externalities without necessa-
rily providing economic returns to investors: that is the reason why they may re-
quire instruments of public risk mitigation.
e. If we want to increase investment in infrastructure, we need to enhance the te-
chnical quality of pipelines and to create the right ﬁnancial instruments to make
a full-ﬂedged “asset class” of its own. Now, the lack of a clear deﬁnition of an as-
set class of infrastructure investments practically translates into an incon-
gruous accounting regulation and higher ﬁnancial transaction and capital
costs for long-term investors. Thus, to increase long-term investors’ asset allo-
cations, infrastructure needs to be transformed from the realm of an ‘alternati-
ve’ investment category into a real ‘asset class’, subject to ad-hoc regulations and
with its own capital absorption ratios, supposedly lower than the actual ones.
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The regulation should recognize that debt for infrastructure has lower default
rates and higher recovery rates than corporate bonds, which means lower pro-
bability of capital loss. The goal should be to create a new class of activities in
the accounts of institutional investors, which could be placed in between sove-
reign and corporate bonds. Thus, the aﬃrmation of an asset class for infrastructure
would directly translate into lower transaction costs for players in the market.
f. Long-term institutional investors have globally over 100 trillion of asset under
management. Today only 1% is invested in infrastructure. Central banks have
soaked most of high rating sovereign bonds. According the OECD recent estimates,
there is today over 5 trillion dollar gap in search for investment with long-term
and stable risk-proﬁle. Infrastructure and securitization of SMEs loans, if properly
structured have all these features. Therefore, we need to favor this transition:
long-term institutional investors will become major investors of ﬁnancial products
backed by real economy assets.
g. Public authorities should facilitate the development of ﬁnancial innovations, such
as risk-mitigation and credit enhancement schemes, that enable private ﬁnan-
ce participation in infrastructure. The Juncker Plan in the EU represents a best
practice in this respect.
h. Moreover, we should consider that investors and sponsors take their decisions
to ﬁnance infrastructures and long-term investments based on their perceived
level of riskiness of the underlying project. Such risk heavily depends on the le-
vel of uncertainty of the projects, including regulatory uncertainty. As we claim
in the draft of the D20 Statement, projects would therefore highly beneﬁt from
an appropriate guarantee scheme backed by governments that would ring-fen-
ce projects with a well-recognized impact to growth and employment from the
regulatory changes (such as change in tariﬀs or concession conditions) which
could undermine the economic viability of these projects Such product or vehicle
could involve public international ﬁnancial institutions to ensure that needed cri-
teria are met and economic impact is expected.
i. A much more active presence of the public sector can indeed signiﬁcantly foster
liquidity in the ﬁeld of infrastructure sector, not only by actively participating in
the project capital but also acting as anchor investors to attract private partici-
pation in infrastructure investment (through the use of appropriate ﬁnancing and
PPP models). By means of public contribution, or public guarantees schemes, pri-
vate participation can substantially be leveraged. The eﬀect could be extreme-
ly desirable: increasing institutional investors’ infrastructure allocations could
provide an extra $5-8 trillion for investment in economic infrastructure (exclu-
ding real estate, oil & gas and mining) between now and 20302.
l. As far as climate change is concerned, we acknowledge with enthusiasm the gre-
at strategic commitment showed by all actors in the Paris Agreement of COP 21.
Enormous amounts of investment, especially long-term investment, are requi-
2. B 20 II TF (Turkey 2015).
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red to ﬁnance the energetic transition. After the Agreement, policy makers are
accelerating the low carbon economy transition, with diﬀerent approaches. De-
carbonization is taking place in the ﬁnancial sector.
m. There is a very strong climate policy risk for investors. There is large consensus
that markets’ short-termism has not yet priced the forthcoming taxation on pol-
luting companies, or the costs and risks of the decommissioning of nuclear plants.
Regulation, ﬁscal policies and pricing mechanisms (i.e. carbon pricing) are re-
levant risks. It is hence of key importance that investors act timely by divesting
polluting companies, decarbonize their portfolio and proactively invest in the low
carbon economy transition.
n. Our institutions can play a leading role in all the above-mentioned aspects, not
only as direct actors, but also as catalyzers and anchor investors for other private
or public stakeholders, by acting in complementarity with respect to the banking
system and to the others long-term investors (insurances, pension funds, sove-
reign funds, institutional investors).
o. Moreover, long-term Development and Promotional Banks and other long-term
non-banking ﬁnancial institutions should contribute to assist countries with their
own expertise and knowledge to facilitate development planning, consulting, edu-
cation and training in poverty-stricken areas, and assisting the local governments
in drawing up a well-deﬁned roadmap, setting out development targets, pand
progressively enhancing own local capabilities whenever needed. D20 Institu-
tions are also well placed to assist public and private investment project promotors
in terms of technical assistance and ﬁnancial advisory, again one of the pillars
of the Investment Plan for Europe.
To conclude, a few reﬂections on the regulatory framework.
Our institutions are not of course entitled to intervene directly in political or re-
gulatory decision-making processes. However, since we respect this regulatory fra-
mework within our public or development mandate rather than only with a limited
proﬁt objective, we can certainly invocate a proper and well-shaped treatment for
our institutions in light of our business models.
On the other side, it is equally of our interest that the regulatory framework for
commercial banks, insurances, pension funds and other institutional investors does
not result to have undue penalizing eﬀects for long-term investment. Of course, we
are not in the position to do everything by our own. We can be catalyzer, but only
if, together with us, other players are ready to take the role of long-term investors.
To that end, a friendlier and fair regulation is necessary.
We surely acknowledge that the prudential regulation, set up in the aftermath
of the ﬁnancial crisis, made the ﬁnancial global system much more resilient and sta-
ble. However, we must keep in mind that the relation between growth and stabili-
ty is not one-way: growth surely needs ﬁnancial stability, but stagnation and reces-
sion seriously undermine stability. Authorities and regulators have sometimes fai-
led to recognize the reciprocity between growth and stability and have often unde-
restimated the negative impact that a low growth can have for ﬁnancial stability, by
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giving priority to the achievement of ﬁnancial stability at the expense of growth and
jobs and by neglecting rules capable to harmonize the two aspects. On this basis, we
believe that it is now becoming a priority to strike for a better balance between the
stability of the ﬁnancial system and its capacity to ﬁnance long-term investments.
It is the time to accelerate the analysis of the impact of ﬁnancial regulation on
the ﬁnancing of infrastructure, R&D, innovation, SMEs and, in general, long-term
investments. In the case that we discover that such an impact is signiﬁcantly nega-
tive, I think that political and regulatory authorities should be ready to re-calibra-
te and ﬁne tune the regulatory framework so that it can achieve both the two non-
conﬂicting goals: ﬁnancial stability and long-term investment.
Some robust empirical evidence has already been produced to show, for instance,
that loans to project ﬁnancing have better recovery rates and lower default rates than
corporate bond. But, still corporate bond with same ratings and duration have much
lower capital absorption.
To be clear. I am not asking for a preferential treatment. I am asking for a pro-
per measurement of the risks underlying these asset classes. We should avoid “ha-
zard”. But we should take into consideration the “business model” of long-term in-
vestors; and we should also take into consideration the role played by public credit
enhancement mechanism on the risk proﬁle of the investment.
Finally. Of course political Authorities must delegate the deﬁnition of the regu-
latory framework to technical regulators: but too often they do it, without bothering
too much to check and monitor whether their strategic policy directions are inde-
ed followed and respected by the technical regulators. Their strategic directions re-
quire to combine the objective of ﬁnancial stability with the objective of a long-time
global growth. The regulations, often, do not.
We believe that it is now time for the political authorities to take on this issue
their responsibilities. They have the legitimacy and the power to ask international
regulators to seek better ﬁne-tuned solutions to harmonize the need for ﬁnancial sta-
bility with the need for a strong boost to long-term investment. Better regulation can
do and should do a lot: in order to avoid that the goal of a strong, balanced and su-
stainable growth will remain just a noble but unattainable aspiration.
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The evaluation of the possible future macroeconomic eﬀects of the Juncker Plan for
the euro area is neither clear nor simple. From the perspective of public-private ﬁ-
nancial resources, the Juncker Plan displays two strengths and at least one weakness;
other strengths and weaknesses also emerge when the plan is further evaluated from
the perspective of private ﬁnancial resources.
The ﬁrst of the two strengths lies in the fact that the today’s weak economic re-
covery would only gain traction in the foreseeable future if public and private in-
vestment demand reaches pre-crisis levels and follows pre-crisis dynamics, leading
to eﬃcient allocation of new productive resources. The recovery, however, cannot
rely upon national stimuli alone; it requires systemic initiatives at the European le-
vel. The only European investment project available at this time is, indeed, the Jun-
cker Plan.
The second strength of this Plan, lies in the fact that its design is backed by pu-
blic-private ﬁnancing; and the public source of ﬁnancing allows the escape from re-
cession and stagnation to be driven not only by a problematic market-led resurgence
in private investment but also, if not mainly, on a prioritized introduction of public
incentives or direct public investment.
Unfortunately, the Juncker Plan’s second strength also causes one of its major
weaknesses. Public-private ﬁnancing usually starts from a foundation of public re-
sources that serve as a multiplier of various other public-private resources. In the case
of the Juncker Plan, it is well-known that this leverage is based on the constitution
and initial ﬁnancial endowment of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI)
by the European Investment Bank (EIB).
The EFSI has the duties, among others, to evaluate and select the most eﬃcient
investment projects and to track down additional public-private ﬁnancial resources
in order to fund and implement the selected projects. These duties, however, risk being
inconsistent each other and could thus lead to an impasse. Indeed, in order to allo-
cate productive resources eﬃciently, the selection of investment projects to be ﬁnanced
cannot be impeded by the need to appease diﬀerent Member States; it has to exclusively
respect eﬃciency and eﬃcacy criteria at the European level. On the other hand, the
full potential of the EFSI’s ambitious leverage rate can only be reached if the selec-
ted investments are funded by public-private ﬁnancial sources from all Member Sta-
tes; however, the latter potential investors will only make their funds available if the-
re is a more or less explicit understanding that investment projects from their own
country will receive ﬁnancing at least equal to what they put in.
This contradiction risks condemning the Juncker Plan to two suboptimal choi-
ces: sacriﬁcing eﬃcient allocation of investments in favour of catering to national
interests, thus maximising available ﬁnancial resources, or adhering to eﬃciency cri-
teria when selecting investment projects, which tend to lead to a drastic reduction
in available ﬁnancial resources.
There is already empirical evidence that this dilemma is not an abstract dan-
ger but a very concrete possibility. The main eurozone Member States recommen-
ded ﬁnancial institutions under their control (in particular, the savings and loans
banks such as Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau in Germany and Cassa Depositi e Pre-
stiti in Italy) to contribute to the Juncker Plan. However, each of these contributions
did not occur as direct ﬁnancial transfer to the EFSI, but rather materialized in the
form of co-ﬁnancing for investment projects selected by the EFSI and originating
from the same country of the co-ﬁnancer. It is not diﬃcult to extrapolate how this
co-ﬁnancing mechanism might exert, ex ante, a powerful and distortive inﬂuence
on the selection of investment projects. The EFSI’s investment choices are, in fact,
condemned to favour not the best investment projects, but rather those more likely
to be co-ﬁnanced based on national interests. This creates tension between the pu-
blic-private nature of the ﬁnancing scheme and the European nature of the Juncker
Plan.
This mixed bag of strengths and weaknesses forces me to give an ambiguous an-
swer to the initial question posed by Dino Pesole. It is not at all clear whether, put-
ting various aspects of its character on a balance, the Juncker Plan provides an ade-
quate framework for the implementation of that European investment project, which
is essential for sustaining structural growth in the Eurozone. There are, however, ad-
ditional issues compelling me to see the glass as half empty rather than half full: the
trade-oﬀs, already mentioned during our discussion, between Juncker Plan, Banking
Union, and Capital Markets Union.
3. The mentioned trade-oﬀs derive from a factor set aside thus far because it is
mainly pertinent to the private side of investment ﬁnancing. This factor can be ar-
ticulated as follows: actually implementing a European investment plan is contin-
gent upon a uniﬁed and profoundly restructured European ﬁnancial market. In this
regard, I am not such optimistic. One must consider the fact that, until today, of the
three pillars making up the Banking Union, only the ﬁrst and half of the second have
been completed. Such incompleteness represents an important obstacle to the buil-
ding of a European ﬁnancial market. Moreover, even if the Banking Union were com-
pleted, it would not be enough to realise the European ﬁnancial market, but would
only be one piece of the puzzle. The other, probably even more important piece, is
the creation of an eﬀective Capital Markets Union which is still in its nascent stages.
In order to explain why the restructuring of the European ﬁnancial market is es-
sential for the success of the Juncker Plan, I am obliged to brieﬂy digress in order
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to better justify an aspect that has thus far been considered obvious: the central role
of European investment projects.
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) remains one of the dominant
economic areas at an international level; therefore, it cannot solely rely on a conti-
nuous increase in its net exports to the rest of the world as a basis for its structural
growth. There are cyclical factors supporting this view. The current diﬃculties in emer-
ging markets and the diﬀerent role the United States assumed in the international
trade landscape after the international ﬁnancial and ‘real’ crises exposed the vul-
nerability and instability of an export-driven growth model during the second half
of 2015. Further, there are less contingent factors showing that this growth model
is, at best, a zero sum model because the EMU’s increasing trade and current account
surpluses imply increasing trade and current account deﬁcits in the rest of the world.
More probably, this is a “negative sum” growth model because the rest of the world
would react to the imposition of an export-driven growth by a dominant area with
currency wars and other initiatives leading to further economic distortions.
This conclusion implies that the EMU must base the relaunch of its growth in the
short term on stimulating aggregate demand in the internal market, and it must con-
solidate this growth in the long-term through an ever more competitive supply struc-
ture in its diﬀerent Member States. Investments represent the connection necessa-
ry for harmonising EMU’s short and long-term objectives.
The importance of investments for the Eurozone is reinforced by two additional
considerations. The ﬁrst is that each Eurozone Member State suﬀers a strong path
dependence incompatible with the establishment of a single model for all diﬀerent
national economic systems. If “one size does not ﬁt all” in EMU, complementarity
among Member States must be developed. Complementarity, however, is not free
of challenges. Since the EMU can neither be treated merely as a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime nor as a monetary union equipped with robust risk sharing mechanisms, com-
plementarity is not compatible with competitiveness gaps above a critical threshold.
The second consideration is thus that, if we do not want to condemn the Eurozone
to ﬁnancial and real instability, this threshold cannot be exceeded. Consequently, a
balance between competitiveness and complementarity must be found. This makes
it even clearer that Eurozone’s growth cannot stem only from a relaunching of ag-
gregate demand in the internal market; the supply side must also be strengthened
through the spread of innovations and consequent reduction of competitiveness asym-
metries between Member States. European investment projects, with an asymme-
trical impact on diﬀerent countries (i.e., favouring the EMU’s peripheral countries
vs. core countries), are therefore crucial.
This last point brings us back to the Juncker Plan and the viability of its levera-
ge rate, but with an important qualiﬁcation. In order to make a European investment
project with asymmetric impact and public-private ﬁnancing successful, it is not enough
to confront and resolve the already diﬃcult problems posed by the use of resources
originating, directly or indirectly, from the public sphere (cf. section 2); we must also
ask ourselves which conditions need to be satisﬁed in order to obtain eﬃcient ﬁnancial
resources from the private sector. One of these conditions is the presence of ﬁnan-
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cial markets able to oﬀer an adequate set of ﬁnancing instruments. In this respect,
the current state of the European ﬁnancial markets does not make me optimistic.
4. In order to justify my previous statement, it is convenient to consider the un-
resolved problems in the Banking Union process. I do not want, however, to be mi-
sunderstood. I share the opinion of those who earlier stated that the Banking Union
is the most important reform for the EMU after the constitution of the single monetary
area. Further, I agree that the partial realisation of the Banking Union halted a very
serious threat that came out of the international ﬁnancial crisis and the subsequent
European crises — the vicious cycle between the sovereign debt crisis and the liquidity
or insolvency crises of the European banking sector. However, part of the problem
derives directly from the incompleteness of what has already been realised.
As mentioned above, the Banking Union process resulted in the completion of
one and a half pillars out of the three in its original design. The lack of a public back
stop in the resolution of banking crises (the missing half of the second pillar) and
the lack of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) for bank deposits lower than
EUR 100,000 (the missing third pillar) prevented a complete removal of the underlying
cause of the vicious cycle between the sovereign debt crisis and the European ban-
king crisis, that is, the national fragmentation of the European banking market.
This incompleteness was combined with other elements characterising the se-
cond pillar of the Banking Union and the unconventional measures adopted by the
ECB. In particular, the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), under terms deﬁned
by bail-in, requires shareholders and a substantial part of private creditors of a fai-
ling European bank to ﬁrst cover its losses before the single resolution fund or its tem-
porary national branches can be utilised. The involvement of the private sector had
an important eﬀect, above all on the riskiness of non-subordinated bank bonds. Star-
ting from 1 January 2016, all bank bonds, including plain vanilla ones, will become
a sort of structured product with an implicit option characterized by the riskiness of
their issuer. These bonds will, therefore, be very diﬃcult to price for a professional
investor and, even more so, for a retail investor. It is thus not surprising that, since
the beginning of 2013, regulatory changes and a stronger risk-aversion on the side
of savers caused a drastic decline in retail demand for this type of ﬁnancial asset.
I do not intend to repeat here my long-held position that the allocation of illiquid
and relatively low-yield bank bonds to the ﬁnancial portfolio of households caused
a signiﬁcant distortion. Let me only recall that, in the years preceding the Europe-
an crises, this phenomenon was very widespread, above all in Italy. In the coming
years, European banks (Italian ones in particular) will thus have diﬃculties main-
taining a quasi-monopoly on the intermediation of household ﬁnancial wealth and
ﬁlling the structural funding gap deriving from the high incidence of loans they lent
to the ﬁrms and the same households. This means that it will become impossible to
reproduce the peculiar form of bank-centrism typical until the recent crises. Hence
a large part of European ﬁnancial markets will need to undergo profound restruc-
turing
The persistent fragmentation of the European ﬁnancial market and the loss of
centrality by banks in many national segments of this market pose binding constraints
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to the supply of private ﬁnancing in favour of European investment projects. The pro-
blem obviously aﬀects the Juncker Plan.
5. This conclusion explains two of my previous statements: European ﬁnancial
markets oﬀering an adequate set of ﬁnancial instruments are essential for obtaining
private sector resources for the Juncker Plan; in order to strengthen the supply of
various ﬁnancial assets, a single European ﬁnancial market must be built modifying
its past characteristics. In this regard, it would be unrealistic to use the US or UK stock
markets as possible models for the EMU; the ﬁrst realistic step would be to create a
European market for corporate bonds.
Although more realistic, this aim poses several issues. Here, I will mention only
the ones most relevant for Italy and the other peripheral countries of the EMU. In
these countries, corporate bond markets are very “thin” and dominated by too few
and big issuers. The majority of potential future national issuers will be, instead, small
and medium ﬁrms (SMEs). The question becomes, therefore: can the objective to
build and empower a European corporate bond market coexist with the current di-
mensional structure of the European productive system? The hope is that the solu-
tion might lie in the rapid construction of the Capital Markets Union (CMU) and in
the ECB’s quantitative easing (QE).
Among the main objectives of the CMU is the strengthening of an eﬃcient and
well-regulated European market for securitization; within the QE program, the ECB
provides for the purchase of corporate bonds and asset-backed securities (ABS) with
an adequate rating. An eﬃcient European market for securitization would allow the
aggregation of small scale corporate bonds issued by homogeneous small and small-
medium ﬁrms. In particular, it would become possible to place the bond issuances
of each small ﬁrms in special purpose vehicles (SPVs), which would in turn transform
a combination of these assets in tranches based on their risk level. The resulting dif-
ferent types of ABS, sold on the ﬁnancial market by various SPVs, would reach the
amount necessary for satisfying a minimum eﬃciency scale and could also meet the
rating levels required by the ECB.
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The motto of the day is how to ﬁnance Europe, which is only the way to put fuel on
our bigger and broader idea, which is building Europe and building Europe together.
Something that is in the interest of citizens, of institutions, of corporations. And we
are going to be talking now a little bit about means of infrastructure ﬁnancing as part
of this issue.
Coming to Rome is a living testament of how infrastructures can help you build
an empire, expand an empire and consolidate an empire. It puts you in a very posi-
tive mood. Also coming to Italy in general is living evidence as well – my compliments
to the country for that – you can translate excellent ideas into things, tangible out-
comes and beauty. Normally you are extremely good at doing the two of them to-
gether. But I was also reminded this morning that I come from Spain, a country whe-
re we have done everything that we shouldn’t be doing when it comes to infra-
structures, from airports and airports and airports to roads and roads and roads. You
need to ﬁnd a balance between the one and the other. And I think this is exactly what
I would like to do and would like to share with you on a very personal basis becau-
se “io lascio tutto, Paolo”, exception made for my own ideas and thoughts and so-
metimes my political incorrectness.
So lets talk a little bit of what we are aiming for, how we would like to get it and
who is going to be the main actors of this whole exercise. Well, what we want is growth
but not any kind of growth. Sustainable growth, it is not the same and by the way
it is interesting that we are focusing on only one of the elements that is a driver for
growth. If we compare the situation between Europe and the U.S and the increasing
gap between the one country and the other, the main driver has not been innova-
tion, has not been infrastructures. Infrastructures in Spain are much better than in
the US – between you and I. It has been demographics, an area on which we are pro-
bably not putting suﬃcient focus but needs to be part of the solution.
On the “Who” before this element of banking or ﬁnancing was about banks and
there was a simple reason for that, it was called business. They were good at credit
risk but then crisis came and we started using a word, which is called “deleveraging”.
That means reducing the level of risk. First politically incorrect question, what are
we doing with this risk? Are we addressing it or are we trying to put the same risk
without changing it, into a diﬀerent part of the economy into a diﬀerent part of the
ﬁnancial sector. If we don't give the right response to this, the only thing we are going
to be doing is yes, we are going to have growth but it is not going to be sustainable,
in the same way it was not sustainable in 2005 2006 2007.
The second point now comes to “If it is not banks, who can do it?” Well, many
people now are looking at insurance companies and pension funds. And you could
say there are good reasons for that. Yes, but yes if and only if we understand the num-
ber of elements which in my opinion – and that goes to the third element, not the
What and the Who but the How – are the key success. The ﬁrst one is we need un-
derstanding two things. First, the insurance and pensions business and reality. Se-
cond, today’s reality. The second element we need to succeed is to prioritize.
When I was reading the preparatory papers provided – I very much like this coun-
try – there was a question that I have had missing for the last 5 years in this whole
debate. What type of infrastructure do we need to prioritize? And I think this is ex-
tremely important.
The third point is a clear proposal, a clear proposition with two dimension: a sta-
bility on the one hand, a clear framework, trust, and secondly with good products
because part of the issue that we are witnessing that has to do with the supply side
and that is I think something relevant. To make the long story short and that applies
to every area of life of business. If the product is good it sells. If the product is not
good, either you don’t sell it or you need to put a lot of sugar coating – incentives –
in order to make it sell. So if we are thinking for a second about the business of in-
surance, insurance is not an NGO. It is there to do two things: fulﬁl promises to po-
licyholders ﬁrstly, and secondly to pay a dividend to the people and this rightly so
if they all put in their money there. If I am investing money, I want a return; if I want so-
mething diﬀerent, normally I go to Caritas. It is a completely diﬀerent thing. So if
we do pretend that insurance companies are going to put their money only becau-
se growth is in everybody's interest, we are wrong. When you look at a road as a nor-
mal citizen, you see it as something you use to drive. When you look at it as a com-
pany you see it as an asset class, and it is not the same. Take the example of the hi-
ghways in Spain: its great, they are empty, they are driving. That’s easy. But if you
are an investor and you have a business proposal which is based on the number of
cars driving there everyday, is it the same approach? I would say no. So if we look
at it from an asset class we need basically that three elements ﬁt. If those elements
ﬁt, then everything will be ﬁne.
The ﬁrst element is risk and you need to understand it. The second one is return
for that risk and the third one has to do with liquidity. When we consider the insu-
rance business model, we say that it is a modern version of risk, we should be good
at that. But perhaps another provocative question is: “Are we equally good at all the
risk? How good are we at liquidity risk?” “Good!” “How good are we at credit risk?”
“Not as good as banks”. Let’s not forget that it is a long-term business so there is a
clear ﬁt between long-term assets and liquid assets and the long-term business it is
based on sound ALM and it is a very diverse business. We cannot pretend that all in-
surance companies are the same, and we cannot pretend to treat them the same or
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expect they have the same level of knowledge. When we translate this into the rea-
lity of what we are talking about – risk, return, liquidity – what we do see is that some
products ﬁt in this equation and some products don't ﬁt in this equation. But what
we also see – let us be very clear – and this is an element of concern, is that some of
the products that don't ﬁt into this equation are equally being bought.
I was talking not only on the business reality, I was reﬂecting also on today’s rea-
lity. Today’s reality is basically driven by a very strong monetary policy with very low
interest rates with a low of liquidity in the market and with something called quan-
titative easing which to a certain extent was relatively new. How does this aﬀect the
types of assets that I can buy? Well, so much liquidity, quantitative easing means more
volatility for certain assets on the one hand and on the spread of the risk that you
are being paid for taking a contraction. In other words, you are getting the same risk
for less money. If you think on long-term assets, there is clearly another dimension.
Insurance and pension funds because their ALM has to understand that they are a
bit like drugs addicts. They need long-term assets. So what do we do as a supplier?
Well, you contract also the liquidity premia; you have to make sure you are able to
combine these two dimensions in order to ensure that the risk, return and liquidi-
ty components do and still ﬁt in your model. Because if not we are only going to be
facing potential problems. With these elements, what have we done from our regulator
point? Because we are regulators and supervisors. Firstly, we are following a request
from European Commission to analyse whether there were obstacles, artiﬁcial ob-
stacles to invest in the infrastructure. I am talking about obstacles, not incentives and
we have seen that for example when it came to calibration, you could say that we
get in more granular that you were given evidence by which you could reduce some
calibration but we have seen that the knowledge and the know-how particularly on
this driver for this reduction of calibrations – for examples high recovery rates whe-
re one of these products default. It is very much linked with one area of expertise
which has to do with counterparty default management, credit risk management,
which is not embedded in the DNA of the insurance companies. And in that situa-
tion we have to make sure that we are setting criteria and establishing risk mana-
gement and due diligence requirements to make sure that insurance companies do
something which I would say is basic: know the product you are buying, know the
risk you are taking and know the return you are getting for that risk. More granu-
larity can mean more complexity, yes, but it is also fair to say it is the only way to ad-
dress the fact that some of these products are very good and make a lot of sense and
you should go on and buy them and some other products simply do not and you re-
strain to get them. We are talking about infrastructure criteria like stable cash ﬂow,
robustness under stress, strong security, more simplicity. Discussing this with a ma-
nager of insurance companies, this person was telling me “Well, you are just asking
for something that in any case is coming from common sense”. Well, the problem with
common sense is that it is less common than all other assets and attributes that we
human beings do have. Two ﬁnal points: one has to do with SME ﬁnancing – an in-
teresting experience I have been confronted with – and one more coming this mor-
ning again with the work that we are trying to do setting up a pan-European personal
81
pension that can be a clear strong call for making the diﬀerence – both giving the
European citizen something that we take for granted and which is a safe, adequate
pensions and by the way we shouldn’t take for granted. And secondly, by setting a
European hypothetical that through ideas like simplicity and value for money can
certainly beneﬁt from investing in some of these products because they are cross-
country type of products.
When it comes to SME funding, EIOPA was probably in terms of regulatory per-
spective a pioneer in coming with the idea of high quality securitization for exactly
the very same reason that we are discussing for the last 10 minutes. Not all assets,
not all securitisations embed the same risk. And some do a lot of sense, particular-
ly in a situation where from an asset side the returns you get are so low that if you
don’t do a bit of search for yield you are going to be out of the business. But to a si-
tuation as well where we need to set the clear line between what is search for yield
– and that is good – and what is hunt for yield and that is not necessarily good. That
has been the approach that we have been taking; we set a number of criteria, we have
reinforced the idea of simplicity, we have tried to ensure that the risk is understan-
dable and when the risk is understandable at it ﬁts from a ﬁnancial viewpoint, why
not getting in to it?
Final point: we are talking in insurance sector and also ﬁnancial sector a lot about
digitalisation, big data and so on. And another interesting way we have seen insu-
rance companies, in particular big insurance companies, are ﬁnancing start-ups espe-
cially in this area, through venture capital which are focussing on potential deve-
lopments and potential solutions and can help them in this new reality that we are
facing, addressing some of the challenges and some of the business opportunities
that they are doing. That makes a lot of sense.
But allow me end up in the same way that I started. Insurance is a business; le-
t’s not forget that otherwise we will fail. Is not an NGO. If we give them something,
that is ﬁt good for their business they will get and they will be part of the solution.
On a second reﬂection, there is no such a thing as a cross opportunity – I am sure
you Mario have the same ideas. Insurance companies are not the European Central
Bank, they have not a money making machine. In other words, when they are investing
one Euro of their asset portfolio in a certain asset category, they are disinvesting it
from another one. And please share with me if you know any single asset in which
an insurance company is invested – equities, corporate bonds, sovereign bonds – which
is directly or indirectly, in one way or the other, also not ﬁnancing growth. We are
already there.
Now what we want to make sure is that we are there in a way that ﬁts the ALM
and the business reality of the companies.
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When we try to stimulate private investment in Italy, particularly from SMEs, we should
start from one aspect: the fabric. We should analyse and understand the texture of
the Italian business environment: how the Italian companies work, their strengths
and weaknesses. Looking at those aspects, it comes out very clearly that Italian com-
panies hold signiﬁcant market shares in several productive sectors, but they also have
weaknesses in two areas: governance and capital. They hold signiﬁcant market sha-
res because they are innovative, they always bring out new ideas and products. This
is the way they survived to the crisis, at least many of them. They are now even stron-
ger than before, as they have been exporting and they keep on doing it also in the
present hard environment.
As I said, companies lack in capital and governance. They miss the equity because,
on the one side, the system of Italian companies is too small, and on the other, they
rely on bank credit as their almost sole source of ﬁnancing. They are undersized to
be competitive global players even if they can compete in speciﬁc product markets.
They cannot have an active role in mergers and acquisitions market. Sooner or la-
ter, if you are too small, you will crowded out of the market.
This is why the Government has been promoting a new approach to industrial
policy through the “Finance for Growth” programme, which consists in pushing Ita-
lian businesses, including the medium-sized ones to grow in size. Obviously, they
can now count on more sources of funding which are alternative to banks, in parti-
cular with respect to credit. This also increases the level of sophistication and mo-
dernity of companies, as moving from a relationship with a local bank to, for instance,
a global investor entails a signiﬁcant step ahead. Being scrutinised every day by in-
vestors from around the world provides a stimulus for management, which the lo-
cal bank cannot provide. In that sense, we really see the capital market as a very im-
portant leverage for the development of Italian companies.
This speciﬁc measures that we have taken are probably known but let me just re-
mind some of them.
Firstly, I would like to cite the introduction of “mini bond” and the opening of a
speciﬁc market, that is worth more than 6 billion euros. A subset of minibonds also
enjoys the state guarantee from the Central Guarantee Fund. Wee have reviewed some
elements of corporate governance introducing multiple voting shares and the so– cal-
led ‘voto maggiorato’, which facilitates the psychology will to maintain control by
traditional owner in case of listing. We strengthened the “ACE” (Allowance for Cor-
porate Equity), perhaps the most eﬀective measure in terms of capitalisation, from
which 350 thousands companies have beneﬁted. This is an important ﬁscal incen-
tive to invest in companies’ capital structures. We keep on taking initiatives in this
sector, as we want to be consistent in our policy strategy. The Budget Law 2016 has
also introduced an important measure that has been not suﬃciently discussed and
highlighted.
The amortization of goodwill has been halved from 10 to 5 years, in order to ﬁ-
scally incentivise companies engaged in process of acquisition. Investors and en-
trepreneurs should carefully look at this intervention. Clearly, there is not a silver
bullet facilitating aggregation, which is also a matter of tradition, psychology, history.
Nonetheless, the Government is strongly committed to one point: Italian companies
have to become stronger, more capitalised, they have to go to the capital market and
go abroad, not only to export but also to invest. These are the key elements for a path
that will change the face of Italian capitalism.
Italy is not alone in this process, because some of the issues I have just mentio-
ned are common to most other countries, at least in continental Europe. We are en-
gaging in discussing this issue with the French and the German governments, as well
as at European level. I would like to stress one last point, as already outlined by the
Minister. We really look at the Capital Markets Union as the missing element. Ne-
vertheless, this is not going to miss for long as we are working for its completion, lin-
king these three elements: the banking union, the capital market union and the Jun-
cker plan. If we connect these dots, we may really achieve a wide European Union
of ﬁnancing and investment.
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oF a ‛geNuiNe’ ecoNomic aNd moNeTary uNioN
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aBsTracT
The objective of a European EMU of stable prices, open markets, shared prosperi-
ty, employment and sustainable growth was deﬁned in a Summit meeting of 1969,
and has been actively pursued as a primary goal of the Union ever since. Signiﬁcant
results have been achieved, but the 5 Presidents’ Report (5PR) of June 2015 fran-
kly admits that a ‛genuine’ EMU remains an unaccomplished endeavour: divergen-
ces create fragilities for the whole Union which must be rapidly corrected. A criti-
cal analysis of the results so far recorded in the euro zone comes also from other re-
cent documents of the ECB and the IMF.
The 5 Presidents indicate a roadmap covering the next decade to ensure a genuine
EMU: they argue that progress must be simultaneously made towards economic, ﬁ-
nancial, ﬁscal and political union. All Unions are mutually interdependent and must
develop in parallel. Financial Union, which comprises the launching and achieve-
ment of a Capital Markets Union (CMU), receives speciﬁc attention.
The aim of this paper is to oﬀer a critical assessment of the Report, in the analyti-
cal framework of a system-wide perspective on ﬁnancial and economic stability oﬀered
by the macro prudential policy approach. Purposely, the quantitative evidence pre-
sented to illustrate the shortcomings of the EMU building process so far comes ex-
clusively from oﬃcial documents/papers of the ECB, the EC and the IMF.
The “traverse” to the 4-Union EMU is especially complex partly because it goes be-
yond economic analysis and policy. The crucial role of CMU requires clariﬁcation,
also in terms of the legal approach to be adopted. More generally, the intertwining
of economic policies and the role of fallacies of composition/division must be ana-
lytically developed. The 5PR requires detailed speciﬁcation of these medium-term
processes to become operational and to achieve its declared goals.
iNTroducTioN
The objective of a European EMU of stable prices, open markets, shared prosperi-
ty, employment, innovation and sustainable growth has been advocated and actively
pursued for a long period. The oﬃcial approach to EMU dates back to the Summit
Meeting in the Hague in 1969. The Monetary Union was achieved at the end of last
century, after the signing of two Treaties with a strong economic and ﬁscal content
(Maastricht, 1992 and Amsterdam, 1997). The thirty years between 1969 and 1999
cover what I call here Phase 1 of EMU (Appendix 1).
The following ﬁfteen years (2000-June 2015) span Phase 2, which refers to the
operation and workings of the independent monetary policy of the ECB, the signing
of many Pacts of economic nature, the build-up of the Great Financial Crisis (2007-
2009) and a subsequent repair and recovery period, notably with the creation of the
Banking Union (BU) (2013).
Much has been achieved and major diﬃculties were overcome during the past
half century. But the track record, especially in Phase 2, makes it legitimate to ask
whether the policies adopted, in particular during the operation of the euro, have
been appropriate and, if not, what changes are required. In any event, the task of en-
suring a true and genuine economic union overcoming the diﬃculties of monetary
uniﬁcation in a non-optimal currency area has not been accomplished. This strong
proposition is, somewhat paradoxically, a conclusion which can be found in an oﬃ-
cial, highly important document of the EU: the “Five Presidents’ Report” (5PR) of
June 2015 (Juncker et al., 2015). This paper frankly recognises that the euro area,
as of today, does not represent a genuine EMU, fulﬁlling the aspirations and ex-
pectations repeatedly expressed, since 1969, by the Council, the Commission and
the European Parliament:
«Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) today is like a house that was
built over decades but only partially ﬁnished. When the storm hit, its walls and
roof had to be stabilised quickly. It is now high time to reinforce its foundations
and turn it into what EMU was meant to be: a place of prosperity based on ba-
lanced economic growth and price stability, a competitive social market economy,
aiming at full employment and social progress. To achieve this, we will need to
take further steps to complete EMU» (Juncker et al., 2015 p.4).
The uNsaTisFacTory ecoNomic record oF The euro zoNe
An open admission of the lack of overall success of the euro area economic policies,
after the creation of the common currency and, even more, after the Great Financial
Crisis, comes from a EU oﬃcial. Peter Praet, member of the Executive Board and Chief
Economist of the ECB, recently produced quantitative evidence in this regard – no-
tably in a comparison with the United States. The following four charts (Figures 1-
4) are taken from his study (Praet, 2015). They do not require explanatory comments.
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They show not only the need to enact diﬀerent policy actions and mixes for the
euro area as a whole, but also the necessity to develop an eﬀective policy framework
to correct fundamental diﬀerences between strong and vulnerable countries in the
area1. In particular, the evidence presented highlights that EMU growth should be
anchored to sustainable expansion of domestic demand in the internal market, not
on net exports (and on a depreciating Euro). It also clearly indicates that key accepted
paradigms of the political economy of the Eurozone must be critically reviewed.
Figure 1 – Total Factor Productivity. Source: Praet (2015).
Figure 2 – Real domestic demand. Source: Praet (2015).
1. “Vulnerable euro area countries” refers to CY, GR, IE, ES, IT, PT & SI.
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Figure 3 – Bank loans to private sector. Source: Praet (2015).
Figure 4 – Impaired loans of euro area banks (percentages of gross loans).
Source: Praet (2015).
Notes: Based on an unbalanced sample of 32 euro area banks for vulnerable countries and 25 euro area
banks for less vulnerable countries. The charts represents ratios of gross impaired customer and bank
loans over gross loans.
The charts provides clear evidence of: the unsatisfactory overall results of the eco-
nomic policies adopted in the euro area after the creation of the single currency; the
inability to correct structural diﬀerences between strong and vulnerable countries;
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the diﬃculties encountered in activating the bank credit supply process, notably af-
ter 20092.
As is well known, the ECB monetary policy framework was built on the heritage of
the Bundesbank, and notably on the basis of a relative stability of the money supply pro-
cess and hence on a reliable relationship between monetary base, M3 and inﬂation, for
projected output changes (Issing, 2008). This simpliﬁed “monetarist” approach no lon-
ger holds. Here again, the evidence comes from the ECB itself (Constâncio, 2015).
Figure 5 – Monetary base and broad money. Source: Constâncio (2015).
Figure 6 – Ratios of broad money and credit to the monetary base.
Source: Constâncio (2015).
2. “For an analysis and explanation of these shortcomings in a macro prudential framework, see
Masera (2012).
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Figure 7 – Real GDP and CPI inﬂation. Source: Constâncio (2015).
The evidence provided by Constâncio (2015) is also indicative of the inappropria-
te monetary/ﬁscal policy mix which led to the double dip in the euro area. The eco-
nometric results obtained from the Commission Eurozone model show clearly the
negative impact of simultaneous ﬁscal consolidations from 2011 to 2013 (Table 1),
and the perverse debt/GDP, negative growth loop, which was at the heart of the so-
vereign/bank crisis.
Table 1. Fiscal policy: GDP losses in relation to baseline,
resulting from simultaneous fiscal consolidations in seven euro area countries
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The data collected do not identify the depressionary consequences of the enactment
of CRR/CRD IV in the credit supply mechanism for the euro area (de Larosiére, 2013
and Masera, 2012 and 2015).
The 5pr proposals To eNsure a ‛geNuiNe’ emu
The 5PR states that the gradual evolution of the euro area towards a ‘genuine’ Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union requires a shift from a system of rules and guidelines for
national economic policies to further sovereignty sharing, with institutional chan-
ges and full political endorsement3. More speciﬁcally, it aﬃrms that non-binding in-
tergovernmental agreements should be superseded:
«Instead of further ‛pacts’, concrete progress on the basis of EU law is needed to
move towards an Economic Union of convergence, growth and jobs».
Two stages are identiﬁed to reach EMU. But, it would be only at the end of the Fi-
nal Stage (by 2025) and once all steps are fully in place that a deep and genuine EMU
would be created and would provide a stable and prosperous place for all the euro
area. The (network) architecture of a genuine EMU envisaged in the 5PR is graphi-
cally depicted in Figure 8. It must be observed that complex adaptive systems based
on strong interrelationships are robust during normal conditions. At times of
stress, they can become fragile with statistical distributions shifting from Gaussian
to power laws (Helbing, 2010).
Figure 8 – The Five Presidents’ Four interdependent Unions to transform the euro area
into a ‛Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’*.
3. Similar conclusions can be found in Capriglione and Sacco Ginevri (2015).
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* «All four Unions depend on each other. Therefore they must develop in paral-
lel and all euro area Member States must participate in all Unions for the euro
area to gradually evolve towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union…
After many years of crisis, governments and institutions must demonstrate to
citizens and markets that euro area will do more than just survive» (Juncker
et al., 2015 p.5).
The “Union Approach” has its interest and validity, but – perhaps as a consequence
of the brevity of the 5PR – has also evident shortcomings and points which need cla-
riﬁcations.
To start with, it does not address the fundamental issue of a recognition of the
ﬂaws of the analytical and policy paradigms which led to the Great Financial Crisis,
and of the appropriate road to repair. In the second place, it diverts attention from
a critical analysis of the policy actions taken after the crisis and does not provide sa-
tisfactory explanations for the unsatisfactory results documented by the ECB itself,
summarised here in the data taken from Praet (2015) and Constâncio (2015). Fi-
nally, it neglects the need for an interactive macro prudential policy framework ca-
pable of identifying the links between monetary, credit, ﬁscal and structural policies
and their fallacies of composition/division (Masera, 2015).
This is paradoxical because the 4/6 Union Model is itself based on these premises:
«All Unions depend on each other and must develop in parallel…». Without a com-
plete analysis of the theoretical framework and the policy interactions, especially un-
der stress, the proposed Union model may convey the wrong impression that insti-
tutional and political changes would automatically lead to the goal of a genuine EMU.
The fragility under stress of complex systems has led to the development of ma-
cro prudential policies to cope with the system wide perspective on ﬁnancial and eco-
nomic stability. Priority was given to avoidance of systemic risks. The new framework
has been adopted in similar ways both in Europe and in the U.S. (de Larosiére, 2009
and Dodd-Frank, 2010). A representation of the relationships between macro pru-
dential and other economic policies in the new framework is oﬀered in Figure 9.
The macro prudential paradigm gives prominence to the prevention/containment
of systemic risk and is characterised by the analysis of a double order of intercon-
nections. First, reference is made to the links/mixes of diﬀerent economic policies.
Secondly, light is shed on the complex process interactions between the micro and
the macro levels (with possible fallacies, but also synergies of composition). Final-
ly, the conceptual framework of crisis as a medium-term process requires a corre-
sponding approach to a coherent framework of political economy (Scazzieri, 2015).
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The key role oF The FiNaNcial aNd capiTal markeTs uNioNs (cmu)
aNd The issue oF The righT approach: law chaNges (5pr)
or BoTTom-up model (commissioNer hill)?
The 5PR correctly underlines the need to ensure a true ﬁnancial union in the euro
area. This requires completion and integration of the Monetary and Banking
Unions and construction of the CMU, covering the whole EU.
On Monetary Union, the Report is vague on important points, perhaps because
it was thought that these issues would be taken care of by the ECB itself. Three key
questions should however be mentioned: i) is the current institutional set-up ap-
propriate for the ECB to fully cope with renewed instances of ﬁnancial instability;
ii) how can the de facto overlap between the ECB and the ESRB be corrected, should
more independence/immediate power be given to the ESRB to cope with systemic
risk; iii) what should be done to overcome the dangers of intertwining of moneta-
ry policy and capital standards (respectively under the responsibility of the ECB and
the EC) in the shaping of the credit process? All these points have an obvious bea-
ring also on the workings of the CMU.
With reference to Banking Union, the 5PR rightly recommends completing the
Union by moving to a common back-stop to the Single Resolution Fund, and by re-
forming the European Deposit Guarantee Scheme, by gradually setting-up a com-
Figure 9 – A complex system (network) representation of macro prudential
and other economic policies. Source: Masera (2015)
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mon deposit insurance scheme. Both issues are crucially important and the medium-
term process outlined in the Report should be fully endorsed4.
We come now to the CMU itself (EC, 2015a): the priorities and the complexities
of the launching are well recognised and analysed, but some critical issues require
clariﬁcation, also to guide the Action Plan initiated by Commissioner Hill (EC, 2015b).
The 5PR underlines that a primary function of a well-functioning, integrated and ba-
lanced CMU is to permit risk diversiﬁcation across countries of the euro zone and
of the EU. The other side of the coin of free, unimpeded movements of capital through
banks, insurance companies and capital markets is, in fact, the reallocation of coun-
try-speciﬁc shocks across the whole area. This by itself reduces the burdens of ﬁscal
policies which can used with clear limitations in the euro zone, given the institutional
set-up of the various Compacts.
Financial Union and CMU have therefore two main positive features which ex-
plain why it is of paramount importance to ensure their rapid completion. The most
common type of argument is represented by the need to ensure a level common pla-
ying ﬁeld for the external ﬁnance of the corporate sector, and notably for growing
innovative medium-sized companies sector and for the investment in infrastructu-
re. This point was highlighted in Lord Hill’s Action Plan. In the euro zone a very lar-
ge share of credit ﬂows is intermediated by the banking system: more balanced sour-
ces of ﬁnance are necessary. This implies a greater role for capital markets in the ﬁ-
nancing process of companies and, in particular, more equity ﬁnance. The United
States oﬀer clear evidence that highly developed economic system beneﬁts from ba-
lanced and well-integrated relationships between credit markets and ﬁnancial in-
termediaries.
It must however be underlined that in the US, on the one hand, the largest ban-
king/investment conglomerates play a fundamental role in the “market” sector (Ce-
torelli, 2013) and, on the other, local banks continue to account for a signiﬁcant sha-
re of external ﬁnance of micro and small enterprises, largely because of a “tiered”
approach to regulation and supervision of the banking system (Tarullo, 2015 and
Yellen, 2014 and 2015). Due account should also be taken of the fact that in the U.S.
oﬃcial guarantee schemes for securitised bank loans, and notably for SMEs, have
been and are being actively used (Fannie, Freddie and Small Business Administra-
tion) after 2008. These approaches are not part of the current CMU/BU schemes in
Europe, as should be the case5.
But, as already indicated, the Financial Union is also important as a cushion for
asymmetric/country-speciﬁc shocks, which command three main types of respon-
se: from intermediaries, capital markets, ﬁscal shock-absorbers. Clearly, if inter-
mediaries, markets and ﬁscal responses have mainly national features, the diversi-
ﬁcation of risks across countries is necessarily limited. There is therefore the need
4. A proposal for an integrated European Deposit Guarantee Mechanism has been recently ad-
vanced by the Commission (EC, 2015c).
5. On these points see Bassanini et al., 2014 and FeBAF, 2015b.
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to encourage the development of a fully integrated CMU, but also to foster the de-
velopment of truly pan-European intermediaries (as against national champions).
Here again the US system of regulation and supervision should be carefully consi-
dered.
Beyond ﬁscal buﬀers at the national level, according to the IMF (Allard et al., 2013)
in the euro area only 40% of country-speciﬁc GDP shocks is smoothed by cross-coun-
try risk-sharing insurance mechanisms: 30% comes from the operation of banking
and credit markets and 10% from capital markets; there is no “federal” ﬁscal cushion.
In the US, instead, the corresponding ﬁgures are 80%, 45% coming from capital mar-
kets, 20% from banking and credit markets and 15% by federal stabilisers (Fig.10).
Figure 10 – Risk sharing: Insurance against income shocks in EMU remains low.
Source: (Allard et al., 2013)
It is, therefore, clear that the development of a truly integrated, eﬀective and eﬃ-
cient CMU has positive macroeconomic eﬀects and fosters economic/ﬁnancial sta-
bility, thereby preventing and/or limiting systemic risk.
A relevant open question concerning the creation of the CMU is whether a top-
down (legislation based) approach should be followed or a bottom-up (market ba-
sed) model should be adopted. A combination of the two schemes is naturally re-
quired6, but it should be underlined that the Hill/EC Green Paper (February 2015)
6. See, for instance, FeBAF (2015a).
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and the 5PR give very diﬀerent answers. The EC favours a non-legislative model, ap-
parently as requested by market operators. The Report indicates, instead, that the
objective is to create a Single European Capital Markets Supervisory Authority, in
analogy to the Banking Union (Single Supervisory Mechanism, entrusted to the ECB).
Even before this medium-term objective, many important changes to be rapidly achie-
ved require legal action7:
«A true Capital Markets Union also requires other improvements, some of which
can only be achieved through legislation, such as simpliﬁcation of prospectus re-
quirements; a revived EU market of high quality securitisation; greater har-
monisation of accounting and auditing practises; as well as addressing the most
important bottlenecks preventing the integration of capital markets in areas like
insolvency law, company law, property rights and as regards the legal enforceability
of cross-border claims».
The lack of harmonisation of company and insolvency laws represents a crucial im-
pediment to the full realisation of CMU, which feeds back on the Banking Union it-
self. A notable example is represented by the eﬀective implementation of the Bank
Recovery and Resolution Directive8, especially with reference to the Intragroup Fi-
nancial Support Framework (Lamandini, 2015).
The current EC Action Plan is based on a public consultation and an impact stu-
dy, without setting apparently a time limit for the legal changes which are advoca-
ted in the 5PR. There is a clear risk of delaying the decision-making process at the
EU and national levels.
coNclusioNs
It is obvious that a sound house must be built on good foundations, notably on so-
lid cornerstones: the 5PR admits that this is not yet the case for EMU. The Report
provides a time table and a road map to the ﬁnal goal, but at the same time it crea-
tes a conundrum of joint decisions to be taken in various areas, and notably as re-
gards the CMU and the Political Union. The traverse is therefore especially complex
because, beyond economic, monetary and ﬁnancial issues, political decisions are re-
quired, which go over and above the Fiscal Union itself. But, as is indicated, it is only
7. The relevance of the choice between the two diﬀerent approaches had been anticipated and
rightly stressed by Véron (2014), who argued correctly in favour of addressing from a legal
point of view the development of market segments, with policy initiatives graded according
to impact and political diﬃculty.
8. Directive 2014/59/EU and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/81 of 19 Decem-
ber 2014 specifying uniform conditions of application of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the
European Parliament and of the Council with regard to ex ante contributions to the Single Re-
solution Fund.
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the Political Union which should provide the cornerstone for all the other Unions,
by oﬀering democratic accountability, legitimacy and institutional strength9.
The complex network approach adopted in this study, notably in respect of the
intertwining of economic policies in a macro prudential framework and the need to
allow for fallacies of composition/division, is therefore stretched to the extreme. This
is especially worrying because of the insuﬃcient clarity on the macro prudential ap-
proach adopted in the Report and, more speciﬁcally, on the role and prerogatives
of the ESRB. It must also be stressed that the decision model is extended to socio-
political factors, which will require, even before the 10-year deadline indicated, in-
stitutional, legal and Treaty changes.
In conclusion, the ‛genuine’ EMU target requires success of common cooperati-
ve eﬀorts in economics, law and politics over a relatively short time horizon, com-
pared to the length of the two phases from 1969 to 2015.
9. The ideas expressed in 1991 by the Chancellor Kohl to the Bundestag should be carefully re-
considered: «It cannot be repeated often enough. Political union is the indispensable coun-
terpart to the economic and monetary union (EMU)… Recent history, and not just that of Ger-
many, teaches us that the idea of sustaining an economic and monetary union overtime wi-
thout political union is a fallacy».
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Phase 1 (1969-1999)
1969 Hague Summit decided that a plan should be drawn to create in sta-ges an Economic and Monetary Union.
1970 Werner Report presented a plan for the attainment of EMU.
1972 Creation of the “snake” exchange rate agreement.
1979
Creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the European Cur-
rency Unit (ECU).
1985
The Single European Act set out a programme to create a uniﬁed eco-
nomic area with freedom of movement of persons, goods, services and
capital.
1988
The European Council conﬁrmed the goal of EMU and mandated a Com-
mittee chaired by Jacques Delors to propose concrete stages leading to
the Union.
1989
The Delors Report proposed that EMU should be achieved in three evo-
lutionary stages, leading to strengthened economic and ﬁscal conver-
gence and ultimately to the introduction of the Single Currency.
1991 Maastricht meeting of the European Council which drafted the Treatyon the European Union and on European ﬁscal convergence.
1992 Maastricht Treaty signed on 7 February.
1997 Treaty of Amsterdam signed on 2nd October. The Treaty contains the Sta-bility and Growth Pact (SGP).
1998-99 Preventive and Corrective Arms of SGP.
1999 The ECB was created and the euro established with 11 initial participatingnational currencies.
appeNdix 1 –
The loNg road To ecoNomic aNd moNeTary uNioN (emu)
iN europe: 1969-2015, key sTeps.
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Phase 2 (2000-June 2015)
EU Treaties aﬀecting EMU
2001 Treaty of Nice
2007 Treaty of Lisbon
2012 Treaty establishing the European Stability MechanismEuropean Fiscal Compact











Capital Requirements Directive IV
Capital Requirements Regulation
Single Supervisory Mechanism
Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive*
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014*
Note *To be completed
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expaNd FuNdiNg opporTuNiTies For smes
Alberto Baban*
* Chairman Piccola Industria, Conﬁndustria.
I am going to bring here the Italian SMEs business point of view, standing back from
a pure ﬁnancial approach.
From one side we ﬁnd a large availability of liquidity and the willingness of the
European Union to promote the growth of enterprises, with a focus on SMEs, from
the other side the same Union has worked to reduce the risk that weigh on traditional
investors, in particular on the system banking.
This situation causes a credit crunch to businesses, that in a bank-oriented sy-
stem as the Italian one also aﬀects the growth of the country.
The ﬁrst goal is to expand the funding opportunities for SMEs, simplifying the
access to alternative instruments now available, and make them accessible and usa-
ble from every enterprise. SMEs have a strong interest to diversify their sources of
funding, but are held back by diﬃculties and complexities they usually face making
use of them.
The 2008 crisis has also led, in a perspective of system protection, to a more re-
gulated banking system. Although we believe these actions are correct, it must be
said that they have produced the eﬀect of slowing down the credit supply, since the
ﬁrm is, and remains, a risk system.
To overcome this problem, to support the banking channel and to ensure the right
level of risk for everyone involved, it is important to strengthen the guarantee in-
struments even in their economic disposable.
At the same time, the government should aﬀect the tax lever, modifying ﬁrst IRAP,
which also weighs on ﬁnancial burden. It would be an important measure which would
help to stimulate and to support investments, together with the measures already im-
plemented as the ’super ammortamento’ and the tax credit for research and development.
Italy has accumulated an economic upturn delay and this is, paradoxically, a gre-
at opportunity. Italian SMEs have got a great potential for development, as export
data conﬁrm, and right now their ability to innovate and to rethink their strategies
and dynamics represents a key facor.
Our enterprises are much more ready than is statistically detected and, we be-
lieve, now the Italian factory is capable of supplying a very positive reaction to in-
vestments.

The role oF BaNks iN The iNFrasTrucTure FiNaNciNg
Federico Cornelli*
* Italian Banking Association, ABI.
In the ’60 Italy has got a strong growth: thanks to the infrastructures the National
Work Bank and IRI had build, the country started growing thanks to investments and
private demand.
With the Marshall plan ﬁrst and the Juncker plan now, the aim remains to re-
launch the economy, and everyone hopes to start again with investments, after eight
years of passive investments.
What is the role of banks?
We are looking to a big paradox. On one side italian banks have increased their
capital for ﬁfty billions and they are able to support the real economy – even in this
global crisis – on the other side there is an european lawmaker, who ask for rules al-
ways more strict.
There is another paradox, because the accounting standard IFRS9 asks the banks
to record even negative estimates. Induce all of this is not easy, but the banking sy-
stem is stronger now and we must focus over two points:
- SMEs: SMEs represents the italian and european economy strenght, but the cre-
dit demand is oriented to the working capital, but the demand for capital inve-
stment is poor. In this regard, I would like to remember the importance of con-
ﬁrming the SMEs supporting factor, the weighting factor which compensates the
increased capital requirements imposed by the new regulationsin case of loans
aimed at SMEs.
- Reviving the infrastructure: should be necessary to play what happened in Ita-
ly in the ’60, but to do this is important to have players who can make accurate
assessments. We have seen that in italian banks there are at least 40 teams ca-
pable of making project ﬁnancing, all very well prepared.
It is important to replicate success stories, like that of the italian Investment Fund.
Historically for SMEs should be preferred long-term loans, now available with
greatly reduced rates. Then it would be appropriate to have the rules that promote
ﬁnancial research particularly on those SMEs, something that is still in thee last ver-
sion of the MiFID is not yet present.
It is therefore clear that the banking system is ready for new challenges and it
is strengthened; there are signs of tangible recovery: about that just see the data on
mortgage loans that are very positive in the last nine months.
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The eFFecTs oF The curreNT regulaTory Framework
oN loNg-Term iNvesTmeNTs
Long Term Investors Club*
* This Position Paper has been prepared by the Long Term Investors Club – with the technical
assistance of KPMG – as discussion material for the Annual D20 Meeting help in Beijing at the
China Development Bank, May 26-27 2016. The paper has been coordinated by Alessandro
Carpinella, Franco Bassanini and Edoardo Reviglio.
aBsTracT
In the aftermath of the crisis, ﬁnancial and prudential regulation has been strengthened
in most jurisdictions of the world. In particular, Basel III and changes in IFRS have
been applied to most banking systems of G20 members. This has strongly helped an
ordered deleveraging process and made the ﬁnancial global system much more re-
silient and stable. However, the application of the new rules may have had some unin-
tended consequences on the capacity of the ﬁnancial system to provide more ﬁnancing
for growth. Long-term investment may have been penalized. Infrastructure and SME
ﬁnancing are the sectors of the economy which have suﬀered the most.
We believe that the relationship between ﬁnancial stability and growth is crucial
in order to achieve a strong, balanced and sustainable global economy. However, this
relation is not one-way: growth needs ﬁnancial stability, while stagnation and recession
undermine it. To reach the objective of strong and sustainable growth, without jeo-
pardizing long-term ﬁnancial stability, we need more long-term investment in in-
frastructure and the real economy. Therefore, we believe that it is now becoming a
priority to strike a better balance between the need to assure the stability of the ﬁ-
nancial system and that of providing ﬁnancing for long-term investment.
In this paper we try to highlight some of the unintended consequences of the new
regulation on long-term investment and we try to make a few proposals to re-cali-
brate or better ﬁne tune the global accounting and regulatory framework and to crea-
te a more favorable and appropriate regulatory environment for the ﬁnancing of in-
frastructure and SMEs worldwide. The aim is to help properly re-direct at least a part
of the global ﬁnancial resources currently allocated in short-term (often nonproductive)
investments towards the ﬁnancing of infrastructure, SMEs, as well as research and
innovation (more generally for the “real economy”); and to restore the appropria-
te attractiveness of LTIs in these areas/sectors by leveraging on their main positive
and very speciﬁc features, such as steady and predictable cash ﬂows or potential te-
chnological breakthrough.
The main objective of prudential and accounting regulations is to ensure ﬁnancial
stability. The primary objective of ﬁnancial reporting is to provide a true and fair view
of information for making economic decisions. The question we wish to raise in this
Paper is whether the new ﬁnancial regulatory framework is weighting properly all
asset classes and whether there is a negative bias, in particular, towards infrastruc-
ture and SMEs ﬁnancing. We do not advocate treatment (incentives) for these as-
set classes. Incentives by policy makers maybe be ﬁscal or of another kind, but not
of an accounting nature. Accounting regulation should be objective and neutral in
respect to policy objectives. This general principle inspires this contribution.
Moreover, we understand that we lack, so far, a robust empirical analysis of whe-
ther the still rather low level of LTIs provided by the ﬁnancial system is due to the
lack of demand or of supply. After ten years since the explosion of the crisis, we be-
lieve that such empirical evidence should be a major object of enquiry by interna-
tional regulators.
1. iNTroducTioN
The world economy is slowing down. The objective of a global strong, balanced and
sustainable growth, planned by the G20, is far from being achieved. Re-launching
investments at the global level is crucial. Public and Private ﬁnancing of investment
– in economic, social and urban infrastructure, energy, digital communication, edu-
cation, R&D, innovation and socio-environmental investment – and SMEs ﬁnancing
must be revisited. A new global plan to support these key drivers of the global eco-
nomy must be brave and must have a long-run perspective (the Juncker Plan in Eu-
rope may be a good model to start with). In this context, we need to reconsider if
there are regulatory disincentives and obstacles which may be slowing down the pro-
cess of re-launching investment at the global level.
We need, among other things, to tackle the accounting and regulatory frame-
work which may hinders the ﬁnancing of the “real economy”. This includes Basel III
for banks and new regulation for insurance companies, pension funds and other long-
term institutional investors, as well as some of the recent changes in the International
Accounting Standards (IAS-IFRS).
We need to avoid the paradox that some of the rules on capital and liquidity may
hinder new lending needed for growth, neutralizing the impulses coming from the QE
implemented by many Central Banks. In the context of the Chinese G20, the B20 Task
Forces on Infrastructure and on SMEs also recommended to ensure continued parti-
cipation of the banking sector, as a key source of infrastructure (and SMEs) ﬁnancing.
Bank lending comprises around 63% of global project ﬁnance. Overall, data on loan
supply shows that the relevance of the banking sector in infrastructure ﬁnance is li-
kely to remain high. Further, banks play an important role, particularly in emerging
countries, by providing strong credit underwriting and supervision skills; and by pla-
ying a catalyzer role in bringing non-bank long-term private investors to the table. Ho-
wever, Basel III regulation of banks' capital, leverage and liquidity seems to make it
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harder and more expensive for banks to issue long-term debt, such as project ﬁnan-
ce loans.
Furthermore, preliminary discussion within the B20 Task Force on Infrastruc-
ture, held under the Chinese Presidency of G20, highlights again the need that Mi-
nistries of ﬁnance, in collaboration with ﬁnancial regulators, review the eﬀects of
prudential ﬁnancial regulations and other investment regulations to reduce impe-
diments to regulated long-term investors’ participation in infrastructure. In eﬀect,
the B20 Task Force underlines the fact that institutional investors have $90 trillion
at their disposal, with only a very small portion allocated to infrastructure. Many mar-
kets are still limited by early maturity constraints, such as the limited availability of
risk-mitigation instruments, low liquidity and inadequate investment regulations.
To sum up, there is growing consensus at the Global Level on the need to review
the impact of accounting and prudential regulation in ﬁnancing investment in in-
frastructure and SMEs. In this context, and far from being a comprehensive review
of the evidence available or to dig down all technical aspects – which would inevi-
tably imply a diﬀerent kind of analysis – the aim of this Paper is to review some of
the main issues and to make a few concrete proposals.
2. The role oF lTic iN promoTiNg BeTTer regulaTioNs
For loNg-Term iNvesTmeNTs
The Long-Term Investors Club (LTIC) was created in 2009 with the aim of bringing
together major worldwide institutions to emphasize common identity as long-term
investors, to encourage cooperation and to foster the right conditions for Long-Term
Investments (henceforth, also LTIs) in promoting growth.
Since its foundation, the LTIC has done much progress to foster LTIs not only in
the EU but globally. Cooperation among members has developed sensibly and po-
licy makers, at the European and G20 level, are increasingly aware of the role LTIs
can play.
We believe in a long-term vision of ﬁnance and the economy, where ﬁnancial sta-
bility is a key factor of growth but where, yet, growth is a crucial condition for ﬁnancial
stability in the long-run. This long-term vision represents a real change of paradigm
to achieve a strong, sustainable and balanced growth in global economy.
Since the beginning of the crisis, the LTIC, in several occasions, has posed the-
se questions to policy makers and international organizations.
In 2010, at the European level, four prominent European long-term public in-
vestors founding members of the Club (EIB, KfW, CDC and CDP) presented a wor-
king paper entitled “Conclusions of the European long-term ﬁnancial institutions’
working group on banking supervision”. In this paper, the Group commented on the
proposed changes to accounting principles (IFRS9) and prudential regulation (Ba-
sel III).
Since then, both projects have progressed, albeit quite diﬀerently. While Basel
III has been ﬁnalized and adopted with relatively few changes with respect to the
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2010 proposals, IFRS 9 has followed a less straight path: some important parts, con-
cerning hedge accounting, have been transformed into a separate project.
Along with IFRS 9 and Basel III, several other important regulations are resha-
ping long-term investment and lending environment. Most notably, the BRRD, RLAC,
Solvency II implementation and EMIR have brought important changes to the way
banks, insurance companies and other players interact within the ﬁnancial system.
If growth does not materialize as needed, stability is not going to become a per-
manent feature of the system. This is the reason why we think that the G20 summit
in China (September 2016) should launch a project of in-depth assessment and re-
view of the global ﬁnancial regulatory framework. As already stated, this Paper does
not have the ambition to carry out this in-depth assessment, but rather stimulate the
discussion and provide the G20 summit with a few relevant inputs for discussion,
then to be assessed in an analytical way.
3. opeN quesTioNs aNd “uNiNTeNded coNsequeNces”
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) established after the 2009 G-20 London Sum-
mit has been promoting international ﬁnancial stability, providing studies and re-
commendations to Finance Minister and Head of State of the G20. The FSB repre-
sents the ﬁrst, major institutional innovation undertaken by G-20 leaders. It has been
described as the fourth pillar of the architecture of global economic governance. Sin-
ce then, the FSB has been assigned a number of important tasks, working alongsi-
de the IMF, World Bank, and WTO.
In February 2013, the FSB provided an initial report to G20 Finance Ministers
and Central Bank Governors, which identiﬁed a series of market and regulatory re-
forms as changes which may signiﬁcantly aﬀect the provision of long-term investment
ﬁnance. Namely, Basel III, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market reforms, and
the regulatory and accounting framework for diﬀerent types of institutional investor.
Since then, the FSB has undertaken many initiatives, including a few recommendations
reports submitted to G20 leaders.
According to the FSB, “it is too early to fully assess the eﬀect of regulatory reforms
on the supply of long-term ﬁnance investment since many of the reforms are still in
the early stages of implementation and some are still in the process of being deve-
loped. Moreover, it can be diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀects of regulatory changes
from other broader economic factors that aﬀect the supply and demand of long-term
ﬁnancing investment.”
However, FSB members have focused on potential unintended consequences ge-
nerated by regulatory reforms that may aﬀect long-term ﬁnancing investments, which
can be clustered into the following groups:
(i) Possible negative eﬀects of Basel III on long-term bank credit;
(ii) Potential eﬀects of Basel III liquidity framework (LCR and NSFR) on the provi-
sion of long-term ﬁnance investments;
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(iii)Lack of proper incentives for long term institutional investors, who are the na-
tural providers of long-term funding;
(iv)As regards the accounting standards, possible introduction of an additional ca-
tegory for ﬁnancial assets, which does not fall within the deﬁnition of amorti-
zed cost or in that of fair value;
(v) Asymmetries in the application, and consequently in the eﬀects, of regulation
on national and/or regional ﬁnancial systems.
To mobilise these investors we need that the FSB and, in general, regulators at the
highest level, direct their eﬀort on a much more adapted and well-focused analysis
of the regulation for the ﬁnancing of infrastructure and SMEs, considering, moreover,
the speciﬁc business model of the real long-term investors (such as life insurance com-
panies, pension funds, development and promotional banks, etc.). Only by doing so,
they will be able to decide whether is the case to undertake speciﬁc re-calibrations
within the global accounting and regulatory frameworks needed to overcome excessive
penalization – not justiﬁed by a correct and objective probabilistic analysis of risks
underlying certain classes of LTIs.
As OECD Secretary General Angel Gurrìa recently suggested, we need “an eﬀort
so detailed, so granular, so targeted as it has been for example for the capitalization
of institutions or the OTC derivatives. It has to be that speciﬁc, that important, that
ambitious because it is holding us back…”.
4. prudeNTial aNd accouNTiNg regulaTioNs as parT oF The soluTioN
We are still facing many asymmetries in the ways countries apply prudential regu-
lations, which are, as we are going to argue later on in this Position Paper, still not
well-tuned. The lack of viable ﬁnancing tools for long-term investments and for SMEs,
coupled with an inappropriate risk-assessment framework, might indeed lead to exa-
cerbate the trade-oﬀ between the need for stability, on one hand, and much needed
investments, on the other.
This trade-oﬀ can certainly produce “unintended consequences” and distortio-
nary eﬀects, hindering competition among countries and aﬀecting the “real economy”.
Moreover, the current regulatory framework does not address the fact that diﬀerent
countries have diﬀerent economic and ﬁnancial structures and industrial speciali-
zations, which imply diﬀerent business models, strongly inﬂuenced by: i) the size
of enterprises; ii) the industrial sectors and (iii) the size of banks vis-à-vis the size
of the capital market. And diﬀerent business models may require diﬀerent, tailor-
made regulatory tools, together with appropriate industrial policies and (project)
ﬁnancing tools.
In synthesis, our assessment highlights a lack of consistency across countries. Al-
though rules should be diﬀerent in light of diﬀerent business models and their pe-
culiarities, they should be, in any case, consistent within entities operating in diﬀerent
countries but following the same business model.
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Infrastructures investments and industry-speciﬁc policies can certainly be en-
couraged and can provide all economic agents involved with the correct incentives.
To reduce uncertainties and to kick-oﬀ long-term investments, we need to work,
both at the G20 and regional (EU) level, on re-visiting ﬁnancial regulation, with re-
spect to which we certainly need bolder actions. Better and more focused ﬁnancial
regulation can do a lot. We hear so much about infrastructures becoming an “Asset
class” within the global ﬁnancial system, for example. To achieve these goals, spe-
cial regulations and new ﬁnancial instruments are crucial.
Overall, the ﬁnal aim of these proposals is to remove current obstacles built by
ineﬀective and “distortionary” micro-prudential regulation; and by doing so correcting
potentially biased incentives and market for LTIs.
5. our proposals
Attention should be focused on the following themes, around which the LTIC is for-
mulating a series of concrete proposals.
(i) Revisiting Accounting standards: introducing a new classiﬁcation category and
extending the low credit risk exemption.
The goal of most long-term investors is to generate steady returns by managing fi-
nancial instruments for their contractual cash flows and/or by holding those assets
in portfolio in the medium-long term.
Today, this speciﬁc business model, adopted by most long-term investors, is not
fully reﬂected in the current accounting and regulatory proposals.
Accordingly, this proposal aims at discussing possible approaches to overcome
the issues faced by Long-term Investors with respect to IFRS 9. The classiﬁcation and
measurement of ﬁnancial instruments should be based on their liquidity and inve-
stors’ holding horizons, taking into account valuation uncertainty. However, IFRS
9 does not give enough importance to the investor’s holding horizons criterion yet.
In order to reduce excessive volatility due to Fair Value classiﬁcation and to avoid
the undue transfer to Stage 2 (impairment requirements), for assets measured at amor-
tised cost and therefore increase the appetite for investments in infrastructure, it is
suggested to introduce a new classiﬁcation category for ﬁnancial assets and extend
the ‘low credit risk’ exemption. Both proposals should remove undue penalisations
that currently hinder infrastructure investment. The ﬁrst proposal addresses issues
aﬀecting investment in equity and hybrid instruments; the second attempts to pro-
vide a more appropriate approach to debt instruments.
The new classification category
Signiﬁcant long-term investments are needed by both Developing Countries and Coun-
tries in the OCSE Area. The former are characterized by a lack of infrastructures and
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a fast growing demand for goods, whereas the latter faces the challenge of infra-
structure impoverishment and lack of maintenance as well as the impact of aging po-
pulation. Both need signiﬁcant investment to face climate change and to build a low-
carbon economy. To increase the appetite for such investments, making it attracti-
ve to a broader range of investors, by means of innovative ﬁnancial instruments and
proper national ﬁscal and regulatory incentives is, of course, one of the major poli-
tical issues of many governments worldwide.
Therefore, notwithstanding an objective analysis of the risks underlying diﬀe-
rent asset classes which require LTIs, we propose to introduce a new classiﬁcation
category. This new classiﬁcation category, to be eﬀective, should become an element
of discussion with respect to a new regulatory framework. It will need to be focu-
sed on equity and hybrid instruments that are held as investments in a long-term per-
spective, especially in Infrastructures (both tangible and intangible).
Often, LTIs translate in holding a portfolio of assets, which is managed with a
long-term view. In these instances, the aim of the entity would be to generate stea-
dy returns and thus contributing to a speciﬁc part of the ﬁnancing of economic de-
velopment. Under IFRS 9, equity instruments, hybrid instruments and subordina-
ted instruments will be recognised at fair value through proﬁt or loss, even if they
are held on a long-term basis in line with the business model of the holder. The IFRS
9 classiﬁcation criteria do not adequately reﬂect the purpose of the entity in holding
the instrument, thus leading to an unjustiﬁed volatility of the income statement and
a consequent bias towards pro-cyclical behaviours.
The standard, prohibiting to “recycle” fair value changes from Other Compre-
hensive Income (OCI) to proﬁt or loss for equities measured at fair value through
OCI, ultimately introduces additional costs for those providing equity for infrastructure
projects.
In the case of equity instruments held on a long-term basis, it is suggested that
the mixed measurement model should be kept. It should also be composed of three
categories, based on a business model criterion:
(i) amortised cost category: ﬁnancial instruments that the entity holds (or issues)
for the purpose of collecting (settling) contractual cash-ﬂows;
(ii) fair value through proﬁt or loss category: actively traded ﬁnancial instruments
which are held for trading purpose by the entity;
(iii)a third category: equity and hybrid instruments that are held as investments in
a long-term perspective.
For this third category, the measurement model should be based on the lowest of the
acquisition costs and values in use, assessed according to the holding horizon and
management judgment (with adjustments recognized through proﬁt or loss).
The concept of “value in use” could be based on the one deﬁned in IAS 36.6 (i.e.
“The value in use is the present value of the future cash ﬂows expected to be deri-
ved from an asset”). In this speciﬁc case, the present value could be estimated by ta-
king into account the overall prospects of business development of the issuer and the
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holding horizon of the holder. This estimate could be based on criteria such as the
average quoted prices on a long period, the level of equity, the proﬁtability or the
forecast of proﬁtability, the economic environment, and so on.
One other option would be to consider the possibility of recording hybrid in-
struments in long-term investment in infrastructures and SMEs sectors within the
already existing category of “amortised cost”. This option would allow us to exploit
the current normative structure, while making results less volatile, and avoiding a
potential drop in the credibility of accounting statements.
Extension of the ‘low credit risk’ exemption
The IFRS 9 impairment principle creates a bias by requiring that in some circumstances
lifetime expected loss is recognised in proﬁt and loss. This bias originates from the
fact that this expected loss is already incorporated in the asset credit spread, and,
although it can be justiﬁed by prudential reasons, it creates unintended consequences,
in particular for investments in SMEs and Infrastructures. Currently, IFRS 9 states
that the credit risk of securities diﬀerent from equities and hybrids is low if the bor-
rower has a strong capacity to meet its contractual cash ﬂow obligations in the near
term and/or if the instrument has a low credit risk of default. As an exemption, this
classiﬁcation allows to disapply a lifetime deterioration of the credit risk of an in-
vestment grade asset as long as it stays within the IG scale. It is suggested to extend
this exemption to:
(i) loans to SMEs with no rating;
(ii) loans to infrastructures.
The infrastructures, for instance, display a positive expected rating drift over time
and a recovery rate that tends to improve after the construction period.
The exemption should be based both on low external and internal grades; the
general rule being that the entity management needs to assess whether or not a si-
gniﬁcant increase in credit risk has occurred to determine if lifetime expected loss
should be recognized at proﬁt and loss (instead of the 1-year expected loss).
(ii) Conﬁrming, extending and making permanent the SMEs Supporting Factor, and
introducing a new Infrastructure Supporting Factor.
In Europe, among the measures aimed at supporting the access to credit by SMEs,
a crucial tool has so far been the SMEs Supporting Factor. A concrete proposal, used
to reduce the restrictive eﬀects of higher capital requirements under Basel III, con-
cerns the conﬁrmation of the SMEs Supporting Factor, and the decision to make it
permanent and to extend it to infrastructure companies, setting up a new instrument:
the 'Infrastructure Supporting Factor’.
Given that the SMEs Supporting Factor is applicable to the European context only
and as a temporary measure, we suggest, ﬁrst of all, to extend this instrument to the
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global regulation framework making it permanent. The ﬁnal aim would be to free
up regulatory capital to be deployed for additional SMEs lending and to improve SMEs
lending conditions.
When and where applied (although as a temporary measure), it allowed enter-
prises facing increasing issues in accessing credit, to be eligible for loans from banks.
Such loans could be more easily issued if, with regard to provisions, they envisage
less stringent risk budget criteria.
However, in the current context, due to several interventions on the regulation
of the banking system that required banks to hold even higher levels of capital, in-
vestments in infrastructure are also negatively impacted by stricter credit access
criteria. In order to combine the “need” for growth with the “need” for financial
stability, we must recognise that a strategic role is played by companies that de-
velop infrastructures for Local and Global growth, such as Transport, Communi-
cations, Networks, Power Plants, etc.... Infrastructure can indeed reduce the cost
of delivering goods, facilitate the physical mobility of people and products, and re-
move productivity constraints. Infrastructures also matters for education and he-
alth outcomes. Therefore, a concrete proposal, in order to reduce the restrictive
effects of higher capital requirements under Basel III, concerns the extension of
the SMEs Supporting Factor to these companies: the 'Infrastructure Supporting Fac-
tor’.
Our goal is to consider adequacy of the risk weights applicable for loans to In-
frastructure Companies, by lowering risk weights. Capital charges for exposure to
Infrastructure Companies should be reduced through the application of a reasona-
ble Infrastructure Supporting Factor, so to allow credit institutions to increase len-
ding to these companies.
It is recommended to conduct an empirical study to investigate the correlation
between the growth in lending to Infrastructure Companies and the growth of World
GDP. The Infrastructure Supporting Factor would probably show observable and mea-
surable impact on economic growth, without undermining the soundness of banks
themselves. This instrument would reduce the regulatory capital provision made by
banks for the portfolios of loans granted to companies in the ﬁeld, pursuing the de-
velopment of infrastructure, representing a crucial factor in encouraging and sup-
porting long-term economic growth.
(iii)Improving risk-management quality to relieve regulatory capital requirements.
As pointed-out by the recent consultation papers published by the Basel Committee,
many diﬃculties need to be faced when developing internal models with satisfac-
tory performance and then comparing their results in a meaningful way. This is main-
ly due to the subjectivity in the application of the legislation across diﬀerent juri-
sdictions that makes comparison of the risk proﬁles of institutions hard, and is un-
favourable to competition.
Future prudential regulations will likely impose the use of simpliﬁed “standar-
dised” approaches for the asset classes and/or risk types that appeared diﬃcult to
117
model.
The consensus is that the alternatives currently under discussion will lead to a
substantial increase in capital to be held against risk; along witha decrease in risk-
sensitive components developed in the last decade by the risk management units,
even with large investments. Although the aim is to try to take a step forward towards
standardisation and comparability of capital requirements, the importance of hol-
ding an increasing share of capital as a “guarantee” of the stability of the economic
system, is emphasised.
One of the likely (although not desirable) eﬀects of the simpliﬁcation and stan-
dardisation of internal models is a reduction in the commitment of ﬁnancial insti-
tutions to invest resources in the control, management and mitigation of risk. This
could lead to serious consequences for some types of risks, such as the Conduct Risk,
which, by contrast, requires control tools allowing for rapid and eﬃcient mitigation
strategies.
A clear indication is required as to the need of including an incentive mechanism
in terms of capital for those institutions that demonstrate a high level of risk ma-
nagement and mitigation culture, pervasively on all business processes.
The concept of high level Risk Management should encompass the independence
of the Risk Management function within a strong governance policy. In this scena-
rio, risk managers should report directly to a board composed of independent and
competent members, who pay particular attention to risk-appetite matters.
Moreover, an incentive system has to be deﬁned in order to judge the risk ma-
nagers performance and competences, addressing at the same time their accountability.
Such measures would have the advantage, at least theoretically, to beneﬁt in-
vestments by freeing capital and at the same time to pursue the necessary conditions
for growth: stability of the ﬁnancial system.
(iv)Easing capital requirements of high-risk investments in infrastructure.
In Europe, the Regulation EU 575/2015 (Capital Requirement Regulation), in the
implementation of Basel III, has considered a new regulatory portfolio related to “Items
associated with particular high risk”.
A 150% risk weight is assigned to all the items included in this portfolio, inde-
pendently of the risk analysis actually connected with such operations. In particu-
lar, reference is made to:
(i) investments in venture capital ﬁrms;
(ii) investments in private equity.
Bearing in mind that venture capital and private equity are among the most popu-
lar forms of LTIs, this regulatory provision might discourage many growth-enhan-
cing investments.
So, considering the Capital Requirement Regulation, it is suggested, as policy mea-
sure, to reduce the unintended eﬀects of the 150% risk weight assigned to high-risk
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portfolios in the context of infrastructure development. In more general terms, a lo-
wer risk weight may be applied at national discretion to a bank’s exposure in inve-
stments in Venture Capital ﬁrms or in Private Equity, if the exposure is to an entity
which was created speciﬁcally to ﬁnance and/or operate physical assets and is aimed
at sustaining Long-term Investments.
(v) Promoting long-term Investment of Insurance Companies and Pension Funds:
Jurisdictional harmonisation, Governance frameworks, and Solvency II.
The patchy Jurisdictional and Governance frameworks within which Insurance com-
panies and Pension funds operate might aﬀect long-term investments to a greater
extent than banks’.
Reducing Jurisdictional Fragmentation
Compared to the banking sector, the insurance industry will face even more signi-
ﬁcant challenges due to jurisdictional fragmentation and its peculiar business mo-
del.
In fact, the attitude of the Basel Committee and other regulators is to focus (in
terms of capital charge) on the ﬁnancial instruments which are also used in the con-
text of long-term investments (equity, venture capital, etc.), regardless of the underlying
business model.
Insurance companies (especially those focused on life insurance) and pension
funds build their business models primarily on long-term investments. The diﬀerent
business model, together with the application of capital requirements based on Ba-
sel Committee principles, and accounting standards skewed towards fair value mea-
surement can lead to a reduction – a much greater one than that experienced by the
banking sector – of investments of such companies aimed at ﬁnancing infrastructures,
as well as long-term innovation, research and technologies, hence boosting growth.
Moreover, the Banking sector is regulated by guidelines that are “global” (set by
the Basel Committee), whereas insurance companies and pension funds are not sub-
ject to common regulatory standards. Regulatory diﬀerences often lead to arbitra-
ge aimed at ﬁnding competitive advantages in the various geographic areas where
companies operate.
Insurance Capital Standards (ICS), proposed by IAIS’ (International Association
of Insurance Supervisors) and updated during 2015, will only apply to internatio-
nal groups and could just add another layer of complexity and do little to address
this issue. This is because its application is solely at the group level and legal enti-
ty regulatory requirements will be unaﬀected. Since the ICS will not apply at a le-
gal entity level, groups will face additional challenges in managing both solo and group
requirements. Moreover, the current IAIS proposal adopts a market-adjusted valuation
approach as the basis to develop the capital standard. This approach attempts to brid-
ge the gap across jurisdictions, but it is not consistent with European Solvency II re-
gulation or capital regimes in the US.
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Despite wide recognition that supervisors need to “have a common language”,
countries are concerned about creating a new regime that is incompatible with exi-
sting ones. Regulatory regimes in Europe have committed to market-based valua-
tions, while regulators in other parts of the globe, including North America and Asia,
take a diﬀerent approach. The gap between the US and Europe is signiﬁcant. One
of the examples is the diﬀerence between the US ‘windows and walls’ approach and
the European group supervisory approach under Solvency II. Within Europe, the
ICS developments will present an opportunity for debate on the role of the Euro-
pean Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) in relation to the group-
wide supervision of European IAIGs. In the meantime, countries in Latin America,
Africa and Asia are looking at both Europe and the IAIS for guidance on reforms.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank’s Financial Sector Asses-
sment Program (FSAP), based on the Insurance Core Principles (ICP), are doing much
to encourage changes in the areas of risk-based supervision, better governance and
increasingly conduct risk. Currently, however, there is little consistency in conduct
regulation and consumer protection measures, either within Europe or across glo-
bal geographies. Such inconsistency in regulatory approaches is unhelpful, espe-
cially as what drives regulatory action (particularly in times of crisis) is often dic-
tated by the need to protect local policy holders, disadvantaging competition and
then growth.
Therefore we suggest that:
- before attempting to introduce global solvency standards – such as ICS – accounting
standards are modiﬁed according to our proposals set forth in proposal (i);
- any global regulatory framework should incorporate at least the following main
aspects (that in the EU are part of the amendments to the Commission Delega-
ted Regulations published in the EU Oﬃcial Journal on 2nd April 2016):
a) introduction of a new category of “Qualifying infrastructure investments”,
intended to encourage insurers to invest a greater proportion of their inve-
stments into this asset class;
b) adoption of signiﬁcantly reduced capital requirements for “Qualifying in-
frastructure investments” (for example, the solvency capital requirement (SCR)
charges under the standard formula which apply to qualifying infrastructure
investments from 2 April are signiﬁcantly reduced, both for equities and bonds)
c) adoption of the same SCR charges as equities traded on regulated markets
for European Long-Term Investment Funds (ELTIF) and equities traded on
multilateral trading facilities (MTFs).
Enhancing Governance Frameworks
Instead of increasing regulation layers ad imposing higher capital and liquidity re-
quirements, eﬀorts should be directed to better supervision and better governance
frameworks.
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As a matter of fact, regulators, led by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), are trying
to push companies to develop a more eﬀective corporate risk culture, including a cle-
arly deﬁned risk-appetite framework.
In principle, boards must be able to demonstrate that their risk governance pro-
cedures, with regard to risk culture in particular, permeates all levels of operations,
sales and management. The practical impact of regulatory eﬀorts, however, have not
been successful: as stated in paragraph (iii), more demanding capital and liquidity
requirements tend to catalyse the attention of board members, who strive to reach
the short-term goals of fulﬁlling new regulatory requirements while maintaining a
decent proﬁtability. Thus, the ability of boards to focus on managing risks with a long-
term view is seriously impaired.
As a policy measure to address the bias for pro-cyclicality and short-term risk ma-
nagement goals in current and perspective regulations, we propose to relax and sim-
plify quantitative investment restrictions and allow institutional investors to invest
in less liquid, long-term assets.
Improving Solvency II
Within the EU, the eﬀects of Solvency II and the completion of its legislative process
are currently underway. There is still room for avoiding a few of the unintended con-
sequences on long-term investments though. In particular, we suggest amending sol-
vency regulations through the introduction of a preferential treatment for long-term
equity investments:
- a 22% shock should be applied to equity and hybrid instruments that are held
as investments in a long-term perspective, thus qualifying for the new accoun-
ting category we propose under proposal (i);
- an even lower shock, (e.g. 16%) should be applied to qualifying infrastructure
equity investments.
(vi)Changing Liquidity Standards for Project-ﬁnancing assets.
As long as the rules to deﬁne Liquidity Ratios (henceforth, LRs) as established by the
Basel framework III are concerned, it would be desirable to make a few changes to
current factors, with regard, in particular, to rules aﬀecting project bonds, as one of
the main tools to support LTIs.
In more detail, it is suggested to revise current rules by taking into account the
following guidelines:
- for Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) purposes, project bonds with public or internal
rating at least BBB, or guaranteed by sovereign underwriting, may be included
in the asset “Level 2A”;
- for LCR purposes, project bonds with public or internal rating at least BB+, or
guaranteed by sovereign underwriting, may be included in the asset “Level 2B”
with a 75% factor;
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Consequently, for Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) purposes, the two categories abo-
ve should have a Required Stable Funding (RSF) factor of 15% and 50% respecti-
vely.
Finally, in order to extend preferential treatment even to funding on a project ba-
sis, in the NSFR context, the following elements could also be considered:
- in case of internal or public rating at least BBB, RSF factor should be equal to 50%;
- in case of internal or public rating at least BB+, RSF factor should be equal to
65%.
Due to the fact that the proposed percentage cuts are signiﬁcant cuts, and may make
an important diﬀerence to some institutions, it is also suggested to conduct empi-
rical studies to assess the impact of these measures.
(vii)Recalibrating or eliminating the M factor for long-term projects.
Since 2004, the advanced internal ratings-based approach (A-IRB) has been requi-
ring that an unexpected loss (and, therefore, required capital) should be adjusted
using the “M” factor, which is a parameter that depends on the loan term and the
probability of default (PD). This did not change in Basel III.
At that time, the rationale to the introduction of such a factor was that it would
be more likely for the rating of a company to be revised if the loan term were lon-
ger. It is expected that companies with low associated PDs (that is, better quality cre-
dit) tend to have a higher potential to see their risk assessment be downgraded than
companies with a higher PDs (lower quality credit) at the time they are classiﬁed.
In light of this, when loan terms are extended, the requirement for capital in Basel
II (and in Basel III) increases too. However, this requirement increases proportionately
less than it would do for companies with higher risk, since it implies the chance of
a better rating, over the loan term.
The issue to be raised is that, while it seems intuitive that a longer term implies
higher risk, the existence of longer credit relations between banks and clients (which
tends to occur in the case of loans for infrastructure) tends to reduce default, per se;
this is due to the fact that the ties of interdependence grow and the ﬂow of information
between debtors and creditors improves. Besides this, institutions lending credit for
infrastructures, in general, also have in place mechanisms to raise funds in the long
term, so they can reﬁnance debt, in case of short-term changes to the current eco-
nomic context, without aﬀecting their ﬁnancial health.
Lastly, there are issues related to establishing the weight of the “M” factor so as
to take the peculiarities of the diﬀerent countries into account. The shortaverage term
for credit operations is a standard characteristic for several emerging countries and
should not be treated internationally using the same parameter that penalises long-
term ﬁnancing. In reality, one proposal is to calibrate or, at most, eliminate the “M
Factor”.
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(viii) Introducing a special treatment for Micro and Small Companies in lilght of low
correlation with systemic risk.
The internal credit rating-based models (IRB), in Basel II and III, are “portfolio inva-
riant”. The speciﬁcation of the model assumes that there is a large number of small ex-
posures spread across each sector and region, in such a way that idiosyncratic risks as-
sociated to individual exposures tend to cancel each other out. With this, there is one
sole factor for correlation among the assets, which is the systemic risk of the economy.
One argument used in 2004, which could be of use, to defend the idea that MSMEs
should be given diﬀerential treatment is that these companies are less susceptible
to “systemic risk”. MSMEs are less vulnerable to the risk of the economy slowing down
– and more vulnerable to idiosyncratic risks than other exposures (corporate/so-
vereign/banks). Since in the Basel for credit risk the sole factor for relevant weighting
is the idiosyncratic and the systemic risk, MSMEs could be given a lower weighting
factor.
(ix)Mitigating capital overload due to portfolio concentration.
The Basel capital framework implicitly assumes that a bank holds inﬁnitely granu-
lar portfolios, i.e. no form of concentration risk is considered when calculating ca-
pital requirements. However, large exposures to individual counterparties may be
present in banks’ portfolios. A supervisory review process (Pillar 2) of concentration
risk (which could be sectorial, per economic group, regional etc.) adjustments could
be made to mitigate this risk and more capital would be needed.
The problem is that infrastructure projects, as is their nature, tend to be served by
oligopolistic sectors (construction companies/developers) and can also result in re-
gional or sectorial concentration, carrying out national infrastructure plans or pro-
grams. That is to say, in addition to being penalised by the “M” factor, banks oﬀe-
ring substantial support for infrastructure would also be penalised through “adju-
stments for concentration”, established in Pillar II of the Basel.
As a matter of fact, BIS (2014) includes a general limit applied to all of a bank's
exposures to a single counterparty, which is set at 25% of a bank's Tier 1 capital. This
limit also applies to a bank's exposure to identiﬁed groups of connected counterparties
(i.e. counterparties that are interdependent and likely to fail simultaneously). A ti-
ghter limit will apply to exposures between banks that have been designated as glo-
bal systemically important banks (G-SIBs). This limit has been set at 15% of Tier 1
capital. The framework is scheduled to take eﬀect as of 1 January 2019 and will su-
persede the Committee's 1991 standards for this topic.
It would be important to consider mechanisms and mitigating factors that can
avoid an overload of capital, without aﬀecting the ﬁnancial health of these institu-
tions. A proposal could be to exempt development banks and other institutions that
are involved heavily in infrastructure from additional capital so as to deal with con-
centration, while placing limits and maintaining strict regulatory supervision.
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(x) Reducing the risk weight factor for the issuer of guarantees so as to encourage
other oﬀers of guarantees.
Currently, the weight for a letter of guarantee (50%) is similar to an indirect ope-
ration for the Bank which uses guarantees to mitigate its credit risk. Nevertheless,
for the ﬁnancing agent providing guarantees, the impact on the balance sheet is iden-
tical to a conventional credit operation (100%). This impact has reduced the incentive
for banks to oﬀer guarantees. The Bank that receives the guarantee beneﬁts (gene-
rally speaking) from a 50% saving in allocated capital, while the agent providing gua-
rantees suﬀers a 100% impact. In the system, there is a 150% risk weight – which
is excessive. The proposal is to reduce the factor (how much is yet to be discussed
by the group) from 100% for banks that provide guarantees.
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Towards a capiTal markeTs uNioN
For loNg-Term FiNaNcial sTaBiliTy
Marek Belka*
* President, Bank of Poland.
Why is the Capital Market Union necessary, and what is the idea that appear some time
ago in Europe, about the sustainability of the Eurozone. We all know that to have a
common currency without a state as the US puts the bar about the sustainability much
higher. The problem is that the individual elements of the currency union have to con-
form to each other to much higher degree that in a state. Other words, we can aﬀord
diverce between Louisiana and Massachusetts, the Eurozone much less so, and it is
not really a problem of Fiscaly Union, Banking Union whatever union, is about divergence
in how to limit divergence, with the Union, with the Currency Union. We strated with
the idea of ﬁscally union as the most natural straight forward way of naturalizing pro-
blems, well than it turn out that this is politically and socially hard to swallow.
Well if the public money cannot be use freely to feel the gaps than lets turn pri-
vate money, than the natural step was to think about banking union well we have
made a big progress in building up banking union bit we are still far from the get-
ting the real objective of making european banks paneuropean banks and and not
national banks with paneuropean or brother activities as it is now; well I am talking
as a pole, which is probably a good example of banking union in the working, most
of our working system is dominated by foreign ﬁnancial groups so we in fact have
an economy is already subject to a working better or worse Banking Union in a way
that our authorities our activities cannot control even in directly our banks. Well in
than the next stepp is credit Market Union well what is the objective of the Credit
Market Union from our perspective.
It is to implement the Banking Union well the long-term prospective is about chan-
ging or modifying the structure of the European ﬁnancial sector from entirely bank
based to more balanced bank based market based capital market; but really, what
is the core of the capital Market Union? Is to facilitate the cross border capital ﬂows
from surplus economies to deﬁcit countries especially as concerning smaller medium
size enterprises a long-term objective a long-term project with the British of cour-
se being in front of this, because of the they want to seat to the initiative of this pro-
ject, however there is some inconsistent in this. The UK is clearly against the notion
of ever-closer Union, because to implement Credit Market Union you have to be very
intrusive, you have to intervene in the internal issue of the European countries that
are threatened as the core of national sovereignty, legal system including the ban-
kruptcy, lose taxation. Well ok good luck credit market union this is something we
like on Poland at least most of us every thing that help Europe to become a sustai-
nable entity Eurozone is good for Poland. Well why and then a few remarks, few par-
tizan remarks of representative of a country like Poland what I would say like Po-
land it is valid for other countries in the rich.
Why should we happy with the idea of the Credit Market Union? One, because
we are usually being a country importing capital, Poland use to have what we threa-
tened as a structure of current deﬁcit of 5% of GDP, it is gone now, but it was like
this for 15 years or so but it was good, capital ﬂowing downhill is something that eve-
ry book dreams of, and it never happened in other parts of the global economy af-
ter the crisis of asian crisis in the late ’90. But in Europe it is hold up, well but it has
changed after the big crisis and now this capital ﬂows are much smaller there is some
retrenchment here in there for some countries but all in all this is an idea that faci-
litate credit ﬂows from surplus countries to deﬁcit countries, is something very at-
tractive for a country like Poland, that need more capital.
So we should be happy, so what is the problem? The problem is that the most na-
tional way to deal with decreasing capital inﬂows from abroad is to look into dome-
stic market and to develop it, the worry is that Capital Market Union would pull down
to concentrating the capital ﬂows at the cost of sprouting young National Capital Mar-
kets, so this is one concern that comes to our mind when we think of credit market union.
Second, what is the ﬁrms hat will beneﬁt from those capital inﬂows? Well, if you
look at countries in centre and Eastern Europe, one of the main characteristic is that,
there ﬁrms are ten times smaller than in the western part of the continent. At least
between Poland and say Italy if you look at the blue chips, well even not the blue chips,
on the Warsaw stocking exchange of the west european stock exchange, the market
capitalization of our ﬁrms about ten times smaller. So when we talk about SMEs in
our countries they are probably micro ﬁrms in old terms.
Are those companies mature enough to take advantage of capital markets in the
same way that your SMEs; have a potential to use it. Well, probably not, but it does
not mean they are interested in market ﬁnancing. What is then interested in capi-
tal markets union idea for us? Of course is the prospect of making securitization avai-
lable option for european markets, whatever market based ﬁnancing we have for SMEs
is through private placement for bonds an those bonds are held to the majority by
the banks underwriting the emission and that is 95% the turn over on the market
is minimal, many reasons, but one of the reasons is that this issue is so small that in-
formation assimetry makes too expensive for investor to be interrested in this. Ho-
wever if we make securitization safe, simple than even those small by your standards
mid-size by our standards companies could use capital market ﬁnancing as a avai-
lable option, these are the bank credit.
So yes there are things that are interested in the idea, we think that the size of
the company issue can be mitigated by some of the objective of the capital market
union but still this seems to me a long-term project with a potential only appearing
in the long-term because of the structure of the ﬁnancial market in Europe.
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I would like to comment on the proposal for a capital markets union (CMU) by rai-
sing three questions, and giving some tentative answers to all of them.
The first question is: do we actually need a CMU in Europe? Should it really be a
priority in the European policy agenda?
My answer is a resounding ‘yes!’. The question may seem rhetorical, given the tide
of apologetic documents, papers, and seminars (including perhaps this one) that have
been dedicated to the project since its oﬃcial launch last year. However, I think it's
important to keep in mind the reasons for that ‘yes’, because hesitations and even
open dislike are quite widespread in some countries and sectors.
The fact is that the European economies, with the partial exception of the UK,
are strongly dependent on banks for their ﬁnancing needs. Too dependent. Let me
explain why.
A wide literature (I have in mind for example a very recent piece of empirical re-
search by Langﬁeld and Pagano, 2015), shows that economic growth tends to be lo-
wer in economies with a bank-based ﬁnancial structure, particularly at times of fal-
ling asset prices, and systemic risk to be higher. A ‘bank bias’, as L&P dub it, is bad,
in any circumstance.
But even if we believed, just for the sake of the argument, in the optimality of ban-
king dominance in our ﬁnancial systems, here comes another hard fact: also as a con-
sequence of the new regulatory and supervisory framework, banks are less and less
willing to lend money to risky borrowers such as SMEs, because of the heavy burden
of non-performing loans which is the legacy of the crisis; because more capital is re-
quired against risky assets, and capital is costly. Requests for more capital buﬀers come
from all international regulating bodies, both at the global level (Financial Stabili-
ty Board, Basel Committee) and at the European level (Single Supervisory Mecha-
nism – SSM), as a shield against a new, devastating ﬁnancial crisis. Up to now, in Eu-
rope the eﬀect has been procyclical: notwithstanding the cheap, abundant liquidi-
ty supplied by the ECB, banks are reluctant to increase lending to the real economy.
The corporate sector, especially in southern Europe, is mostly made up of SMEs,
for which access to ﬁnancial and capital markets is diﬃcult, if not impossible. Hen-
ce, we have an inconsistent trio: an economic structure mostly requesting bank ﬁ-
nance, regulators concerned with the risks posed by banks' activity, and banks con-
sequently stepping back from ample parts of the credit markets.
How to sort ourselves out? One way is to move the European ﬁnancial structu-
re from intermediaries towards markets (Visco, 2015). This will indeed require na-
tional eﬀorts, but more is needed: an integrated European-wide capital market, with
harmonised and SME-friendly rules. In other words, a CMU.
The second question is: can we consider a European CMU a realistic project?
This time my answer is much more doubtful.
The idea for a CMU was ﬁrst put forward by the President of the European Com-
mission before the European Parliament in July 2014 (Juncker, 2014), in very am-
bitious language. Last September the Commission presented an action plan to tran-
sform that enlightened vision into reality (EC, 2015). From one document to the other
the degree of ambition was apparently scaled down. As Nicolas Véron (2015) recently
noted, the plan ‘mostly boils down to pruning existing rules and correcting some of
[the] EU's own recent regulatory overreach’. But this is supposed to be the normal bu-
siness of the Commission. Let's check whether this harsh judgment is well founded.
What does CMU mean in substance? It means creating a single market of non-
bank ﬁnancial services: the belated completion of the Single Market project of the
‘80s. A ﬁrst attempt at merging European ﬁnancial markets ﬁfteen years ago did not
succeed. In the goods market the main obstacles to integration were technical stan-
dards: harmonising them was the crucial move. In the ﬁnancial services market, ob-
stacles are of various kinds: every country has its own legal system, tax treatment,
accounting standards, and prudential regulation (Danielsson et al., 2015). These spe-
ciﬁcities are entrenched with local costumes and traditions, and in some cases they
protect national champions. Harmonising the myriad of laws, taxes, and regulations
in a short period of time, as the urgency of the matter would require, is extremely
challenging.
The most delicate problem has to do with the UK. It's quite obvious that a Eu-
ropean CMU excluding the City of London would have little sense. But the UK Go-
vernment is highly sensitive about London's competitive advantage as the ﬁnancial
hub of Europe, and the issue will remain almost intractable until the referendum on
the UK remaining part of the European Union is held.
The third question is: what can be done to facilitate/accelerate the process of
creating a pan-European CMU?
The approach followed by the action plan is a step-by-step one. Such an appro-
ach was recommended, not by chance, by most of the stakeholders involved in a wide
public consultation held by the Commission in the ﬁrst half of this year. Is it the right
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approach? In principle, one might have preferred a bolder attitude, one that addressed
simultaneously and directly all the needed harmonisation in the ﬁelds, for instan-
ce, of bankruptcy laws, taxes, investor protection and market infrastructure regulations:
a Thatcher-like ‘big bang’. But that would have been deﬁnitely unrealistic.
What the action plan intends to do, and I quote a key passage of the document,
is to proceed ‘from the bottom up, identifying barriers and knocking them down one
by one, creating a sense of momentum’. Among those to be knocked down ﬁrst are,
according to the plan:
• red tape and information asymmetries making it too costly for SMEs to list on
equity and debt markets;
• speciﬁc rules in both the new European insurance regulatory framework (Sol-
vency 2) and in the capital requirement regulation for banks (CRR) preventing
insurance companies and banks from getting more involved in the business of
ﬁnancing infrastructure investment;
• a sort of damnation still weighing on securitisation after the global ﬁnancial cri-
sis (asset-backed securities were labelled ‘toxic sludge’), while, if simple and tran-
sparent, it could be a fundamental tool to bridge the gap between SMEs and ﬁ-
nancial markets.
These are all good intentions. Are they suﬃcient to create a ‘sense of momentum’?
We will see.
The risk is that we fall into a sort of ‘Ten Little Indians’ trap. A risk still present,
for example, in the banking union story.
Banking union was conceived as an institutional framework with three pillars (Ros-
si, 2015): an SSM, a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), and a Single Deposit.
Insurance Scheme (SDIS). The three pillars were originally meant to be concurrent,
symmetric, and logically connected. But the outcome has been diﬀerent. The SSM
was swiftly realised because it was seen as a prerequisite for restoring mutual trust
among countries after the sovereign debt crisis. But mistrust has remained. On the
crucial issue of bank resolution, after long and tiresome negotiations it has been de-
cided that sharing the cost of a banking crisis among all the eurozone countries is
not for now; it is foreseen as the ﬁnal step in a process lasting many years, and in any
case it will involve private funds only (the Single Resolution Fund, ﬁnanced by all
the eurozone banks). The use of money from the taxpayers of countries other than
the one where the bank’s head oﬃce is located has been ruled out – contrary to the
original intention (anyhow, the use of national public money is in general forbidden
by state aid rules). As to the SDIS, it was ﬁrst postponed to an indeﬁnite future; more
recently, a timid proposal has been presented by the European Commission, but en-
visaging the same many-year process before reaching a mutualisation such as the
one established for the Single Resolution Fund.
The CMU, needless to say, is a totally diﬀerent endeavour. Still, overcoming the
variety of national habits and interests will be a formidable task, the inherent diﬃ-
culty of which must not be underestimated if we want CMU eventually to succeed.
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a view From The europeaN parliameNT
Roberto Gualtieri*
* Chair ECON Committee, European Parliament.
The Capital Market Union represents an essential element of a European strategy for
growth and stability; the European parliament and the committee which I chair stron-
gly supports it. I use the word “element” because I think that the Capital Market Union
has to be considered as part of a wider strategy that perhaps should be more consi-
stent and coherent and that can be summed up well with the formula “finance for
growth” and I also add “finance for stability”.
We have two big questions, two big issues concerning ﬁnance and the stability.
The ﬁrst is that Europe grows poorly, has a unique active current account and an equal-
ly extraordinary excess savings on investment. And to grow, modernize itself, Eu-
rope must ﬁll this gap, and in particular strengthen the long-term investments and
receivables from small and medium-sized enterprises.
The second question is that a single market and, a fortiori, a common currency,
require full and well-regulated ﬁnancial integration in order to diversify risks and
absorb shocks. The dynamic of the crisis has shown that this was a central element
in triggering the events of the crisis and boosting the crisis. And to address these two
issues, we must measure ourselves against a series of obstacles and against various
general problems, including some from outside Europe: the so-called “short-termism”
in corporate governance with a high level of dividends and pay-backs leading to an
excessive cost of capital, reducing the correlation between low interest rates and in-
vestments; the incomplete integration level of the economic monetary union that
limits the ﬁscal space for public investment at both national and European level, as
well as a space for ﬁscal mechanisms of shock absorption.
Third, the contradiction between the inherent increased risks of the investments
that are necessary to achieve that innovation which is necessary to increase our growth
potential on the one hand and on the other the growing aversion to risk of indivi-
dual savers.
Fourth, a regulatory framework with accounting and capital requirements that
cannot distinguish suﬃciently between short and long-term liabilities, including li-
quidity risk level of an asset and thus slows or will not follow enough the necessa-
ry process of transformation and modernization of our ﬁnancial instruments.
Fifth, an insuﬃcient level of ﬁnancial integration and an excessive ﬁnancial mar-
kets fragmentation along national lines that produces an insuﬃcient allocation of
savings, a diﬃculty in channelling them where they are most needed and insuﬃcient
shock sharing capabilities.
Europe is working to address these issues and to address a broader strategy, pre-
cisely ﬁnance for growth is taking shape and, the capital market union is indeed a
key component of this strategy. There is no doubt that the action plan does not have
the same level of ambition of the ﬁrst document, but nevertheless, I believe, it has
a level of organic unity and strength that should not be underestimated and in any
case it is also the result of a speciﬁc political dynamics, i.e. what you can do and in
this sense there would be nothing worse than not start moving to try to build a pro-
cess, despite all the limitations that I, of course, admit are present.
The European plan is ambitious, as me, as us have been when we approved the
texts. We are also working for a new regulation to make the administrative burdens
more proportionate for small and medium businesses, looking to ﬁnance themsel-
ves on the market and we are also pleased of the delegated regulation “Solvency 2”
that for the ﬁrst time introduces the category of “qualiﬁed infrastructure Investment”,
ﬁrst step for the necessary creation of a true “asset class”.
And then, of course, it is important the parallel consultation on the equivalent
change in the prudential treatment. Then, beyond these legal issues, there is a mat-
ter of broader regulatory framework that the Commissioner has launched a deba-
te; I hope that in addition to a reﬂection it will also produce concrete actions to avoid
famous “unintended consequences”.
Then there are other less big issues that can be important, I think, talking to this
audience, as the need to have a deferral of the application of the FR9 for the insu-
rance industry until 2021 which is a more comprehensive solution than the over light
approach which must address the issue of the temporal symmetry with the entry into
force of F4, to avoid a asymmetry between “asset and liability”. And then, these very
important regulatory issues that also concern the banking sector, which as I will ex-
plain in a moment, however, can not be considered as a separate solution because
the two issues are linked, and here's the issue that we are very determined in respect
of Eba, a balanced matter, an intelligent approach, to national and optional description
and also avoid some treatment asymmetries, I also think about the insurance industry.
I do not understand why the conglomerate should have a treatment mode and
the non-conglomerate another one and then there is a matter not only about CNU
but on the overall structure of the regulatory system on which we must act with the
necessary consistency, naturally with good sense. There are, then, ambitious posi-
tive elements in the action plan that I would ask you not to underestimate: the an-
nounced support package of “venture capital” including the creation of a fund of funds.
The announced measures, the support for the creation of a European market for
private placement of securities, up to the more ambitious initiatives, nevertheless
explicitly announced in the action plan, such as the deﬁnition of a standardized pan-
European pension product and insolvency legislative initiative and failures and then
the question where instead I do not see suﬃcient clarity for greater convergence of
the supervision system, because it is clear that the capital market union is hardly com-
patible with a national supervisory mechanism.
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And the question of the removal of the national barriers to permit a free capital
movement and ﬁnally get the most practical tools for achieving eﬀective dissemination
of information to credit for small and medium-sized enterprises, and yet there is a
path to CNU with elements of short period, perhaps not decisive, and some ambi-
tious elements of the long-term, where we await the commission and invite you to
be consistent and timely, but of course, since the role of the banks and their action
of maturity transformation is, and will remain, central. Then the analyses, we read
Pagano, are correct, interesting, but still no one – rightly so – thinks about going be-
yond a greater enhanced complementarity between the market and the banking sy-
stem capital.
The Banking Union is very important in the ﬁnance strategy for growth. I would
like to emphasize too how important is the issue of setting up a European deposit
guarantee system to complete the System Banking Union.
I ﬁnd, on the contrary, Commission’s proposal ambitious and in fact is raising un-
derstandable objections in some Member States, although it is a gradual proposal.
It provides a gradual system mutualisation. and then, convinces me a little less
this politicized parallelism between risk sharing and risk reduction, as you do so-
mething that actually is not connected to the treatment of sovereign in prudential
regulation, but the completion of a third pillar and so is the necessary completion
of the existence of a single supervision and of a unique resolution and a rather se-
vere mechanism as it is now known to all, it is clear to everyone, about the resolu-
tion of banks. This element is inside this package, is not part of another package, which
is also a package on which it will be necessary to think, to reﬂect, but which is insi-
de another trade-oﬀ that has to do with a common policy on the management so-
vereign debt; as is known in the crisis resolution we can have 8% of bail-in, then we
can have 5% resolution fund, but it is said that is enough 55 billion for the 55% and
thus could serve a back stock.
And then there is also the guarantee reserve deposits and as is well known, it is
related only to 0.8 of the “cover deposits” and therefore it may be useful to cover this
0.8 and to go beyond a ﬁscal back stock; the ﬁscal back stock argument is an issue
that should not be just put oﬀ until a future undetermined date.
About the insuﬃcient eﬀectiveness and impact of the country system in Euro-
pe, I cannot not say anything about the well-known story, so to speak, precisely be-
cause it is related also to a judgment on the Banking Union; I would just say three
concepts:
1) The BRRD and the bail-in are the right things because they avoid that the ban-
king crisis cost relapses on taxpayers, but they provide elements of proportionality
and ﬂexibility that should be used more.
2) The BRRD should be read together with the SMA, and its range, its eﬀectiveness
is also linked to the fact that this complex system prevents crises.
3) And then that the Italian banking system is solid and it is solid even without ha-
ving had need of public funding help and I think this should be an element to be
proud of, not an element of disappointment, we should be proud that we have
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a well capitalized and well solid banking system, without having had to use bil-
lions of Euros to support it. Finally there are the critical elements that must be
examined, perhaps, recognized.
First, it is questionable the position of the “T competition” that the use of the deposits
resolution fund mechanism could only take place in the presence of an absence of
resolutions, the art.11.3 does not say that.
Second, there is a temporal asymmetry problem between the securities that can
be bailed-in and have increased their risk level after their placement, it is therefo-
re a gap, a European problem, because having a rule of retroactive poses a problem,
it is perhaps hard to blame someone had bought or sold a stock before they became
more risky, because the rule was not there before, it did not exist.
However, persists, in my opinion, an insuﬃcient level of restriction, not a ban,
a limitation of retail placement of subordinated stocks that introduces a speciﬁc con-
centration limits and maybe the ban for lower risk categories; here there is still an
implementation space for MiFID 2.
So all these limitations justify a recovery action by the Italian government; whe-
ther it id humanitarian or whether it will be through an arbitration procedure it se-
ems a secondary element also because we are talking about very small numbers.
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EU is accelerating on the creation of the CMU, to mobilize resources for Europe’s
growth. Assogestioni highly welcomes the CMU and supports the areas of priority
indicated by the Commission.
In the current context, monetary policies are not enough to revive growth and
actions must be taken as to strengthen capital markets and unlock resources for new
investments.
After the big crisis, the lack of funding channels alternative to capital and bank
debt, curbed the growth potential of many enterprises, while cuts in public spending
blocked essential investments in education, technology, R&D and infrastructure.
While commercial banks are likely to remain a major source of funding, alter-
natives are needed, in order to bridge the funding gap. The objective of the CMU is
to create a deeper and more integrated capital markets as to:
- make it easier (and cheaper) for companies to ﬁnance themselves;
- ﬁnance infrastructure projects, which would not be undertaken otherwise and
at the same time
- open up new investment opportunities for savers and investors (in search for yields
in the current low return, high risk and high liquidity risk scenario).
All this should also help to make the ﬁnancial system more integrated and stable and
the lowering the barriers will also increase competition with improvements in eﬃ-
ciency of the system overall.
1) Level playing ﬁeld for all investment products
A CMU cannot be realized without removing all the barriers that hinder the crea-
tion of a single market for capitals in Europe. Assogestioni thinks that the creation
of a single coherent regulatory framework at the European level is needed, to avoid
regulatory arbitrages between countries and to ensure regulatory consistency and
a level playing ﬁeld across sectors and investment products.
Thus, investment products with similar characteristics and purposes (whether
investment funds, structured products or insurance vehicles) must be subject to the
same rules.
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In particular, same high level of transparency has to be ensured across all di-
stribution channels and all investment products as to allow comparability and to help
investors making conscious choices. If regulation nurtures high quality competition,
then this is good regulation.
In the last years, a number of new regulatory interventions have aﬀected the AM
industry, with the result of creating a stratiﬁcation and fragmentation of requirements,
and rules sometimes in contradiction to each other. In an industry highly regulated
and where the rules play a key role it is essential that these rules are consistently orien-
ted to the development of the market (not to its detriment) and they are designed
and implemented for the sake of end investors.
According to Assogestioni, it would be useful to promote the creation of a sin-
gle rulebook for asset management, gathering all the diﬀerent provisions stemming
from all pieces of legislation and regulation.
2) New asset classes and new instruments
a. SMEs
As for the measures encouraging the supply of credit to SMEs, Assogestioni thinks
it would be appropriate to encourage SMEs to collect a common minimum set of com-
parable and standardized credit information to facilitate the process of analysis and
evaluation by the lenders.
Centralized rating systems, issued, for instance by the central banks (or even by
the ECB) could also help the channeling of funding, thus creating a shared and con-
sistent measure of SMEs’ creditworthiness.
It is also important that all the information provided for the assessment of the
credit quality of SMEs is shared on an equal basis between banks and investment funds
MIFID II regulation on research matters could also hinder SMEs’ ﬁnancing, as
coverage would likely be reduced for these type of ﬁrms.
b. Loans
To encourage the expansion of the funding base and a greater diversiﬁcation of pro-
viders of funding for companies and infrastructure projects, it is important above all
to remove the barriers that still limit the possibility for funds to act as loan originators.
In order to have this a harmonization of the rules and conditions for the lending
activities of investment funds not ELTIF is needed. A standardization of the struc-
ture of agreement governing loan origination activities to create best practices is also
advocated.
c. ELTIF
Assogestioni has welcomed the creation of ELTIF, investment funds speciﬁcally targeted
to the long-term and aimed at ﬁnancing infrastructure projects. These funds should
play a pivotal role in ﬁnancing infrastructure investments and making them possible.
To facilitate investments in infrastructure, the introduction of a pan-European
deﬁnition of infrastructure as an asset class and the encouragement of a standardi-
zation of information related to investment in infrastructure would also help.
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Pension funds and insurance companies, in the light of long-term time horizon
for their investments, may be the ideal investors for this type of products. However,
the existence of some kind of regulatory limitations, in particular the provisions on
capital requirements inherent in Solvency II, could prevent insurance companies to
invest in such kind of vehicles
Are UCITS and ELTIF a good marriage? The Commission might also consider spe-
ciﬁc actions designed to further expand the group of possible investors for ELTIF en-
couraging (indirect) participation through UCITS funds of retail investors.
Fiscal incentives from PIR to ELTIF: Assogestioni would also welcome the de-
velopment at a national level of ﬁscal incentives related to long-term investments
through ELTIF, by extending to ELTIF the preferential tax treatment of UCITS, as fo-
reseen in several national jurisdictions.
3) Pan-European pension fund
We welcome the Commission’s objective to support pan-European individual pen-
sion plans, and to remove all the obstacles that prevent their development. A pan-
European market for “third pillar” products currently does not exist. The presence
of a wide range of national and supranational rules hinder its development, resul-
ting in a highly fragmented market.
A pan-European 29th regime implemented with an EU passport would be the right
solution, removing the obstacles to cross border access and encouraging the crea-
tion of a single market for personal pensions.
A Pan-European individual pension scheme:
- Same for all EU citizens.
- Tax harmonized across countries.
- With preferential taxation.
Could be the right tool to meet the retirement needs of households and, at the same
time, create a more direct link between savings and investment in the real econo-
my. Like what happened in the US with 401k.
Households in Italy are characterized by low debt and high savings. Typically,
however, these savings are invested sub-optimally, with excessive exposure to real
estate and ﬁnancial products with short-term horizon.
In terms of pension fund investments, Italy is bringing up the rear compared to
other countries of continental Europe, not to mention the UK and the United States.
The culture of long-term investment is still struggling to take root in Italy, also
because this is not properly incentivized. In order to promote its development, the
government could play in advance and point to:
- The harmonization of the tax treatment of Italian pension funds (from ETT to EET).
- The introduction of a preferential tax regime for long-term investments. (The in-
crease in the capital gains tax from 11% to 20% for pension funds has gone exac-
tly in the opposite direction).
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In conclusion, in order to make the CMU really eﬀective AMs are crucial actors. Their
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The European Commission’s Capital Markets Union (CMU) project aims to realise
one of the founding principles of the EU by the creation of a Single Market for ca-
pital. This will give access to capital more quickly, more cheaply and from more di-
verse sources for Europe’s businesses and enable ﬂows of investment across all 28
Member States.
Safely restarting securitisation, reviewing the Prospectus Directive and imple-
menting the Juncker Plan to meet the EU’s infrastructure needs are among the ﬁrst
priorities of the CMU. In its report Long term Finance for Infrastructure and
Growth Companies in Europe the International Regulatory Strategy Group (IRSG)
has looked at the impact on jobs and growth of implementing the infrastructure plan.
There is no shortage of money of money to ﬁnance infrastructure, but the esti-
mated €600 billion of additional investment needed each year to 2020 is greater than
any state or group of states can bear from the public purse alone. Only by the public
and private sectors working in partnership will infrastructure renewal on the required
scale be achieved.
The public and private sector interest most crucially intersects in the eﬃcient al-
location and pricing of risk. The ﬁnancing of infrastructure projects is subject to se-
lection risk, planning risk, procurement and project design risk, construction risk,
asset operation and longevity risk and political risk. Of these, planning and politi-
cal risk are most notably beyond the control of the private sector and political risk
is predominant. Only governments can give the long-term certainty throughout the
life of a project that makes political and planning risk acceptable to investors. The
public and private sector working in partnership can deliver a pipeline of strategi-
cally signiﬁcant investible and bankable infrastructure projects.
The creation of a Single Market for capital would enhance the ability of the pri-
vate sector to ﬁnance infrastructure by identifying and removing obstacles to the eﬃ-
cient allocation of capital, enabling access to deep and liquid pools of capital across
all 28 Member States. The European Infrastructure Plan and CMU are therefore com-
plementary initiatives.
The quality and availability of information about projects, companies and investors
is also important to the delivery of the European Infrastructure Plan. The creation
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of infrastructure databases at EU and Member State level (in cooperation with lo-
cal and regional authorities) would make infrastructure planning transparent
across the EU and make investment opportunities more visible. This transparency
would also further the CMU agenda.
Financial services regulation, especially capital requirements, must be calibra-
ted to enable infrastructure spending. The recalibration of Solvency II within CMU
is therefore to be welcomed. If capital requirements are approached in a way that
emphasises both stability and growth, insurance companies, pension funds and pen-
sion providers will be better able to invest in Europe’s infrastructure.
The long-term ﬁnancing of infrastructure rests on a narrow range of instruments.
Capital markets complement the traditional and central role of banks as credit in-
termediaries and lending entities. Without deep capital markets, long-term infra-
structure relies on too narrow a set of ﬁnancial instruments, including some with short
maturities or volatile underlying ﬁnancing sources. European Long-Term Investment
Funds (ELTIFs) are innovative ﬁnancial instruments which encourage investment
in longer-term assets. It will be important that the ﬁnancial services industry works
closely with regulators as ELTIFs are being transposed into national regulation to in-
spire investor conﬁdence to supply ﬁnance.
Institutional investors, such as insurers and pension funds have signiﬁcant ca-
pacity to provide infrastructure funding if regulation is properly calibrated, stable
and free from uncertainty. Consumers need access to products backed by long-term
assets which use capital markets eﬀectively to meet a range of long-term needs. The-
se include providing an income throughout retirement and insuring against health
and long-term care costs.
Substantial infrastructure investment is possible in a Deﬁned Contribution pen-
sion system. Investment in illiquid asset classes (such as unlisted infrastructure) can
be diﬃcult, especially where individuals have the option to switch funds easily. In
a Deﬁned Beneﬁt system, solvency and funding regulation can make long-term in-
vesting more diﬃcult, as requirements for illiquid assets are typically tighter than
for liquid assets. In Australia and Canada, investment and pension regulation allows
pension funds to invest in illiquid assets to a higher degree than in most other coun-
tries: Europe should learn from the success of these regulatory regimes in enabling
such investment.
National, sectoral and European investment strategies will be central to the suc-
cess of CMU. This success will rest on the strength of the partnerships between the
public and private sectors that will enable the ﬂow of capital and beneﬁt of infra-
structure across all 28 Member States of the EU. The quality of information for and
about projects, businesses and investors is important as is creating a regulatory re-
gime for ﬁnancial services that enables long-term investment in infrastructure. Fi-
nally, it must be realised that the EU is competing for investment and must be attractive
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Since the crisis, our countries have two major challenges: how to trigger growth and
how to fulﬁll the new prudential regulatory constraints.
Growth means risk at the entrepreneurial level. Risk must be ﬁnanced, but in-
vestors (private or institutional) are reluctant to take risk. The ﬁnancial industry must
intermediate this risk to make it acceptable and channel savings to transform it on
productive capital toward the real economy. Prudential constraints means how to
properly balance risk concentrated on banking balance sheets via credit vs risk ta-
ken by end investors via the capital market.
The tuning of this balance is a real structural political choice for the society. This
choice must be done through the proper ecosystem between politics, regulators, in-
vestors, Corporates and ﬁnancial industry. This community is how in Paris we deﬁ-
ne a ﬁnancial center.
It is the role of a FC not just to compete with others or being attractive towards
global investors, but to deﬁne the conditions to optimize the functioning of the do-
mestics “ﬁnancial pipes” to bring (mobilize) domestic savings where it is needed bet-
ween big corporate, medium size corp. SME and start up. Each target needed a spe-
ciﬁc ecosystem and strategy (including ﬁscal strategy to complement incentives on
top of the ﬁnancial intermediation.
To fulﬁll this role the FC must be properly structured and governed to be able to
integrate all the contradictory forces against its constituents and help the emergence
of a kind of consensus in the long-term.
In Europe and in France we are at a stage where we think that we shall not copy
the US model dominated by the capital market (80/20); but that the actual model
dominated by the credit (20/80) will evolve in favor of the market. We must accompany
this evolution in a way to avoid ﬁnancial rupture. That is why we have the “capital
market union” project and in France “Paris 2020” to ﬁx the proper strategy and prio-
rities.
Those priorities are ﬁrst based on long-term investment in favor of equity like
instruments from the investors’ point of view it is important to structure a strategy
to help them to take risk and mobilise their saving in the long-term. That is why the
fund management industry is crucial along with kind of long-term collective or in-
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dividual contracts: pension funds, life insurance, employee investment schemes, mu-
tual funds, accompany by a voluntarist ﬁnancial education.
From the corporate side what is important is the diversity of funding sources, and
credit seems the most “comfortable” as banks know very well the risk proﬁle of the
corporate are in a position to accompany stress period with more ﬂexibility than in-
vestors via capital markets. But in the same time markets may oﬀer a lot of advan-
tages and ﬂexibility from the banking side to deliver credit and respect prudential
ratios it is important to ﬁnd ways to “distribute” it to investors leveraging this indi-
rect usage of market via the chain: credit-securitisation-investment. This can be trig-
gered by banks and it is the “originate and distribute” model or by investors and it
is the “invest to lend” model.
It is clear that to optimize the functioning of those models it is essential to rely
on a strong system of ﬁnancial market infrastructures including securities services
and transparent and robust securities law.
At a certain step of the evolution of ﬁnancial centers, the stock exchanges may
play a wider role than just being a transaction/price factory as it is a subset of the
FC ecosystem. As the SE needs “fuel” it is of its interest to take initiatives to reinforce
the buy side structures to bring the necessary savings to the markets.
Obviously to trigger the proper dynamics of all the pieces of this puzzle must be
integrated in a clear political vision meaning a legislative and regulatory road map
based on macroeconomic assumptions: size of equities, bond, mutual fund markets
and therefore, GDP. When this alchemy is properly tuned, then foreign investors will
contribute naturally to the domestic growth and the virtuous circle is engaged.
It is clear that the actual crisis can be a good leverage to accelerate structural re-
forms as it should be the case in France. The priority is the condition to mobilize the
ﬁnancial industry to ﬁnance growth with domestic savings.
We share the idea that a stock exchange is primarily a market infrastructure to
serve the ﬁnancial ecosystem and leverage general interest in the way to interme-
diate corporate and investor’s needs. As the ﬁnancial center is not yet really struc-
tured, the stock exchange should be used in a broader function/perimeter than just
the primary and the secondary market.
Today in Russia the priority is to ﬁnd ways to reorient savings to the corporate
world directly or indirectly at the proper granular way (blue ships vs medium size
corporate MSC). The priority is to address the risk aversion of the investor; that is
cultural (takes time) and structural (also time) it should be necessary to be innovative
and ﬁnd shortcuts.
As the stock exchange is at the center of the game, it would be interesting to ﬁnd
out how to leverage this “force” to articulate few initiatives to facilitate the mobili-
zation of the buy side. I think that with the public authorities, the central bank and
intermediaries some concrete initiatives could be explored. As the direct investors
are culturally far from being able to access the world of capital market the priority
should be through fund intermediation.
In my sense the major objective of the CMU process is identifying all the major
questions (a good formalized question is a way for a good answer) and ask the in-
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dustry, not the Commission, to build up progressively answers, visions, solutions (le-
gislative or business driven/processes/instruments, from the private sector collec-
tive initiatives, with the proper public incentives).
At this stage we do not have to be afraid of words, like “strategy”. Each institu-
tion devote time and money to formalize its strategy, why not Europe? Another mi-
sunderstood concept is “industrial policy”. Yes the ﬁnancial industry in its speciﬁc
role of channeling/intermediating savings towards the best targets (enterprises) that
will create value and growth for the collectivity, need an industrial policy analysing
competitive issues (critical mass – degree of industrialization/compatibility/inte-
roperability), models (growth and stability; credit and capital market, debts vs equi-
ties, long-term investment and funds) and building consensus for actions.
In that matter it is clear that the key word should be “convergence” to create in-
tercategorial synergies, it is not one country or one segment (SMEs vs large cap) against
the other, it is all together as for example, if we want to facilitate SME ﬁnancing we
need to leverage the critical mass (including knowledge/practices) oﬀered by up-
per segments.
Europe should create a competitive advantage from its potential motto: “a con-
vergent diversity”. Our common driver, to trigger our necessary growth, is our col-
lective risk appetite, meaning entrepreneurial culture. To ﬁnance that dynamic it is
necessary to propagate that culture to the investors’ circle which is today risk adverse.
That is the fundamental role of the ﬁnancial intermediation including the fund ma-
nagement industry in the context of the long-term investment strategy. That is why
in France we promote a slightly diﬀerent approach: a “ﬁnancing and investment union”,
the CMU being just a (important) tool among others to achieve this objective.
Today we are confronted to a major gap: this common sense long-term vision and
a regulatory framework that promote short term strategies. That is why the “Long-
term investment intergroup” and also the Juncker plan initiative are essential to pro-
gressively but also urgently feel this gap.
That is why also ﬁnancial centers should play collectively a major role: they re-
present the general interest of all the stakeholders (users and providers) of the ﬁ-
nancial industry, they “incarnate locally” this “infrastructural” capacity to channel
savings and to structure risks to match entrepreneurial– investors schemes. As di-
versity, in Europe, is a given, they are also a condition to implement this needed “prox-
union”: an union for critical mass and proximity services for principle of reality, in
other words mass customization at the European dimension. This articulated net-
work of ﬁnancial centers on the ground is a unique tool to leverage our European
sovereignty and competitiveness in ﬁnancing our economy.
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The Capital Market Union, both the objective as well the action plan, which was pu-
blished at the end of September, was seen very positive by the members of our as-
sociation. That is the ﬁrst and maybe the most important point I want to mention.
Secondly, I have to say that I fully agree with the statement that there will be less
bank lending and more market.
I think the idea, at least for Germany, is not to have less bank lending, because
bank lending in Germany works reasonable well. More choice in ﬁnancing is a good
idea, of course. Improving the capital markets for issuing bonds and raising equity
at the stock exchange is certainly a good idea. And without any doubt there is a cer-
tain gap in capital markets ﬁnancing in Germany, which needs to be closed. This will
give more choice for the investors and also for the companies.
Another point is an urgent need for more venture capital in Germany. The en-
trepreneurs many times raised that issue. They want to see more seed capital. But
also in the following ﬁnancing rounds they feel that is not always enough capital avai-
lable. And not only a lack of capital, but also a lack of investors who understand their
businesses.
According to latest ﬁgures, there is a very strong community of start-ups in Ger-
many, including young and innovative companies in the ﬁnancial sector, the so-cal-
led FinTech companies. We need to support all those innovative companies. That in-
cludes providing reasonable funding options for them, from venture capital up to a
going-public at the stock market at a later stage. Access to risk capital needs to be
improved in Germany and all over Europe.
If I look at the German situation, EU initiatives for creating a capital markets union
and encouraging more cross-border investment are certainly very helpful. But in-
dependent of that, we have several issues in Germany that need to be addressed as
well. It starts with tax, where in my opinion providing tax incentives for venture ca-
pital and for investing in small and medium-sized enterprises are worthwhile to look
at. Fortunately, the German government is already doing so, at least for venture ca-
pital.
Another issue is the risk averseness of the average German investor, who prefers
to keep his money on his bank account, even in times of negative real interest. By
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doing so, German investors are losing money, but I think changing their mind-sets
is probably a challenge for the next decades.
Then we have in Germany – like in many other European countries – a so-cal-
led home bias. Investors prefer to invest in the domestic stock market, which they
know better, despite better investment opportunities elsewhere, perhaps. Here we
need more transparency and better information about EU listed companies, and the
right way of communication to the end investors.
The last thing I want to mention are the owners of small and medium-sized en-
terprises, who are regularly shying away from using the stock market. In many ca-
ses, they are afraid of pre and post-IPO transparency requirements and all the red
tape, which is involved in tapping the capital market. Some have been active in is-
suing corporate bonds, but with mixed results so far. In a few cases, investors have
lost money due to insolvency of the bond issuers.
To summarize, we need to oﬀer various ways of raising capital for start-ups, SME
and corporate issuers and we need to encourage business owners and investors in
making use of them, and not stopping at national borders, of course.
Only by doing so, we will stay competitive in the European Union.
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iNvesTiNg iN susTaiNaBle FiNaNce
aNd social iNFrasTrucTure – puBlic privaTe parTNership

a role For solidariTy iN BusiNess decisioNs
Domingo Sugranyes Bickel*
* Chairman Centesimus Annus pro Pontiﬁce Foundation.
The Centesimus Annus pro Pontiﬁce Foundation was founded by Saint John Paul II
in 1993 as a forum for businessmen, professionals, economists and academics that
delves into how Christian social teaching can be applied in real economic life. On be-
half of the Foundation and its members in 20 countries, I am very honored to have
been invited to speak in this highly acclaimed session of the Rome Investment Fo-
rum and I would like to congratulate the organisers for putting the emphasis on su-
stainable and social investment. What do these terms imply?
We urgently need a humanism capable of bringing together the diﬀerent ﬁelds
of knowledge, including economics, in the service of a more integral and integra-
ting vision writes Pope Francis in Laudato si’ (141). And his predecessor in Caritas
in Veritate: Locating resources, ﬁnancing, production, consumption and all the other
phases in the economic cycle inevitably have moral implications. Thus every economic
decision has a moral consequence (37).
When talking about investing in sustainable ﬁnance and social infrastructure, the
starting point is necessarily an integrating concept of sustainability and social uti-
lity, something which is very central to the economic and social views of the Catholic
Church and also acceptable for many, whether or not members of the Church.
New social demaNds oFFer greaT opporTuNiTies
In a way, we are at a lucky point in economic history, in spite of all our uncertain-
ties: the urgent need to rethink existing patterns in economic life can and should be
seen as opportunities. We need economic growth to continue ﬁghting poverty, but
there is also a demand for qualitative changes: more sustainable use of resources,
more responsible consumption, more opportunities for the young unemployed, bet-
ter professional education, better access to job satisfaction. We are facing a real de-
mand for a qualitatively diﬀerent economy, and this oﬀers huge opportunities for in-
novation and investment.
Experience shows that relying on centralized and impersonal public programs
does not bring sustainable solutions on either front: qualitative change cannot be
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achieved through regulation alone; and the old assistance systems can induce a dan-
gerous ‘welfare trap’ based on passivity and inaction which aggravates poverty.
We know that decentralized entrepreneurial initiative is the only context whe-
re the new demands can be satisﬁed, while the ﬁght against poverty can continue
at the same time. If there is demand for more responsible use of resources and more
sustainable products, let’s go for it: the market economy has given proof of its abi-
lity to adapt. The same applies to demands from workers of all ages for better jobs
and more job satisfaction.
In order to succeed in satisfying the new demands, entrepreneurial initiative ne-
eds a favourable institutional context. Let’s admit: there are big obstacles on the way:
entitlements which prevent the excluded from accessing jobs; inadequate education
systems which lead candidates to unemployment; subsidization which hinders com-
petition, and prevents start-ups to reach break-even; rigid legislations which hinder
innovation. We have the moral obligation to be self-critical about our own business
practices: too often, we pay lip-service to the market economy while at the same time
defend positions of corporatist privilege.
Who are the movers of this necessary rethinking of economic life? Some people
would say: the unions, the co-operatives, the new social movements… Maybe, but
it won’t work unless there is an eﬀective answer in the form of true economic inno-
vation, which in turn is inseparable from entrepreneurial initiative, intelligently sup-
ported – though not controlled – by the State. If there is consensus that environment
protection and job creation are today’s more urgent needs in Europe, then let’s turn
to the forces which really have the resources to change the state of things. And this
means providing adequate education, regulatory support and available ﬁnance to
support the ﬂourishing of a new breed of entrepreneurs of the present day.
“help The poor help Themselves”
From our viewpoint of the relatively well-oﬀ, it is preoccupying to see a growing di-
stance between levels of income. Not so much because of inequality as such – ega-
litarian utopia don’t usually produce good economic or democratic results – but be-
cause it seems that in relative terms, and sometimes even in absolute terms, the poor
are becoming poorer, even in our aﬄuent society: the problems of wage stagnation
or wage reduction, precariousness and marginality. Now the refugee emergency in
Europe brings new dimensions to the problem and sometimes can deviate available
resources from previously registered poor people. And the usual answer is: more tax.
Is additional tax a solution for these problems? Who guarantees that the new tax
revenues would be used for the needs of the poor, when public debt and government
uncontrolled expense eat such a large part of public income, and when welfare be-
neﬁts are still too often spread on people who don’t really need them?
In America ﬁrst, but also in Europe, more and more voluntary philanthropic ac-
tion is being undertaken by business. This important development requires speci-
ﬁc attention. Management expertise, transparency and good governance are great
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factors of success whereby corporate philanthropy can signiﬁcantly contribute to so-
cial action projects.
On the other hand, business promoted charities need to learn from Church sup-
ported and other charitable movements. Social projects can’t succeed unless they
are based on communities on the recipients’ end getting totally involved in decision
making and motivation, so as to become digniﬁed agents of their own destiny, using
a phrase by Pope Francis in his recent address to the United Nations. Religious and
NGOs have an indispensable know-how in organising participative, bottom-up ini-
tiatives.
Be it religious, idealistic, or corporate, philanthropic initiatives are highly posi-
tive, but there is need for more: more voluntary involvement by corporations and,
above all, more commitment by people and families in the rich parts of the world.
We need the funds to become larger so as to reach economies of scale. The amount
of resources mobilized needs to be signiﬁcantly higher if we are to change the trend
towards impoverishment. The running of the funds should not only be transparent;
their founders should also renounce corporate or local pride and embark more de-
cidedly on the purpose of the common good: and this probably requires joining re-
sources in creating common funds, putting them under independent management
and applying to them generally accepted accountability rules.
A focused action on promoting new, professionnally managed voluntary solidarity
funds can be an answer to the danger of increased marginalisation. This is a subject
on which the Centesimus Annus pro Pontiﬁce Foundation is now working and we
hope to come up with action oriented recommendations in the near future.
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But what about business itself: is there space for solidarity in business decisions? In-
vesting in Sustainable Finance and Social Infrastructure, our theme of this morning,
implies that business decisions involve a degree of solidarity, the same way as in eve-
ry human act, gift and fraternity co-exist with the natural yearning for individual sa-
tisfaction.
Against many situations of mismanagement, corruption and lack of accounta-
bility – which are now so frequently exposed to public scrutiny – we all know that
it is also possible to build areas of the market economy which serve directly the com-
mon good. How can we enlarge this bright side of the economy? Let me just indicate
a few practical possibilities:
1. Promoting a culture of service to society in our organizations is something whe-
re we all can invest. Putting organizations to the service of common good is in
the ﬁrst place a cultural fact which in the best cases permeates all policies, from
product design to the use of resources, from sales policies to personnel mana-
gement and ﬁnancial plans. Why not expressly change our order of priorities, not
as a marketing tool, but as a potent management resource?
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2. To foster these ideas, we need to promote intermediate bodies which autonomously
sustain solidarity and contribute to harmonize concepts and interests that would
otherwise be in conﬂict. It is not just Public Private Partnership, as in the title of
the present session. The idea is to look for opportunities of developing civil so-
ciety, i.e. initiatives which are really developed in common between diﬀerent
groups and organisations; for example, social development projects jointly sup-
ported by business, associations and public bodies.
3. Linking entitlements with duties allows to build co-responsibility at corporate
level and in all possible “alliances for change”. One of the diﬃcult pre-conditions
here is to return to more proportionate levels of rewards between diﬀerent le-
vels of responsbility, i.e. reducing excessively high salaries and bonuses. This is
not totally unrealistic: Let me just quote John Cryan, Deutsche Bank new co-CEO
in a recent speech in Frankfurt: “Bonuses don’t make bankers work harder… Pay
in the sector is still too high, and I don’t fully empathise with people who say they
turn up to work and work harder because they can be paid a little bit more” (FT,
nov 25, 2015).
4. Corporations and small business ﬁrms are all indispensable partners of profes-
sional training and transitional monitoring, which works very well in some Eu-
ropean countries, but is totally unsatisfactory in others.
If we are able to communicate these kind of ideas and take the right action in our
own professional environment, a favourable climate will naturally emerge for in-
vestment in sustainable ﬁnance and social infrastructure.
Public-private partnership is not an easy path, unless it is seen in such an inte-
grating framework of corporate culture and active civil society. Why is it diﬃcult?
Because we have had so many bad examples of politically inﬂuenced mismanage-
ment in ﬁnance, in real estate development, in construction and in many more are-
as of business. On the contrary, long-term, sustainable business continuity and suc-
cess are made of autonomous investment decisions and marketing policies, not on
relying on State subsidies or concessions. So a word of caution is necessary about
public-private partnership: it might be necessary in the broader context of “allian-
ces for change”, but it can work only if all parties are inspired by a vocation of pu-
blic service, under a strict regime of transparency, well known rules of the game, and
total accountability.
FiNaNce wiTh a purpose
Sustainable ﬁnance requires a chapter of its own. In the present context of profound
changes in the ﬁnancial sector, both through added regulation and through inter-
nally promoted ethical displicine, there is an urgent need for the reforms to be in-
stilled with real ethical and human perspective.
Financial institutions need to redeﬁne their business model in the new context,
which probably implies more moderate return targets, a shift towards long-term in-
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centives and bonus policies at all levels, and zero tolerance of unethical practice which
should always be punitively expensive for those involved. The added regulatory con-
straints and market demands are in any case forcing the institutions to pay even more
attention to consumer protection, to family ﬁnancial education and to avoid exces-
sive leveraging.
Perhaps in addition to all this, the deepest challenge is to rediscover ﬁnance with
a purpose: helping job creation through decentralized lending at the level of small
ﬁrms and local initiative; mobilize ﬁnancial technology for inclusive ﬁnance
through the use of mobile devices and digitization: these are just some of the objectives
which the best ﬁnancial institutions are already adopting among their basic policy
aims and this is probably the way towards real ﬁnancial reform.
To conclude, in the eyes of the Centesimus Annus pro Pontiﬁce Foundation the-
se questions and challenges do not limit the possibilities of future growth. On the
contrary, they are the key which motivates us to look forward and design a future
which considers deep changes in both purpose and practice in ﬁnance, enterprise
and the economy. These are ideas which contribute in the continous exercise to iden-
tify the best investment opportunities towards Financing Long-Term Europe.
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impacT iNvesTmeNT aNd social iNNovaTioN
Miguel Poiares Maduro*
* Former Minister for Regional Development, Portugal.
Wealth creation and with it the ﬁnancial system and social justice are often percei-
ved at best as separate – at worst as in opposition. This actually forgets the role that
the ﬁnancial system has had historically in the beginning as a way of democratising
access to wealth, but this is indeed the view which has become predominant.
The way the two are often reconciled is by putting the focus on the extent to which
wealth creation can create more resources that can be redistributed. And the tradi-
tional instrument for that – as the previous speaker mentioned – was the taxation
system. But this understanding, in opposition or at best as strictly separated of we-
alth creation on the one hand and on the other hand of social value, of social infra-
structure has shaped the understanding of the relationship between the two domains.
An understanding governed by diﬀerent set of values and pursuing diﬀerent goals.
This tension has been clearly exacerbated by the ﬁnancial crisis and the perception
that this crisis was linked to inadequate set of values, to a world deprived of ethics
and appropriate behaviour.
In my view – and this is the ﬁrst point I want to make – this tension feeds and is
fed by a deeper challenge to the foundation of the social contract on which our so-
cieties, our States have been based and worked for decades.
There are two main origins for this deeper challenge to this social contract.
The ﬁrst one is globalisation. Globalisation is perceived as redistributing wealth
between diﬀerent set of actors. Mobility for example is easier for capital than it is for
individuals and in that way then having redistributive eﬀects altering the social con-
tract by virtue of the consequences of globalisation. And globalisation is also perceived
as aﬀecting the autonomy of State political communities in regulating and distributing
the wealth as part of that social contract. So, globalisation puts in question the tra-
ditional forum for the governing of the social relationships that are part of that so-
cial contract.
The second deeper challenge for that social contract is linked to a variety of struc-
tural challenges in our society such as ageing but, I would say, the crucial element for
the future is terms of those societal structural changes and the way that it will aﬀect
our social contract is the technological revolution. This technological revolution is ha-
ving and will have extremely important and relevant redistributive impacts. First, be-
cause the nature of innovation today and the nature of technological innovation and
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the products and services that it creates is such that added value in these new products
and new services is often very strongly concentrated. And that strong concentration
therefore has an impact on equality and has profound redistributive consequences.
Second, robotics, artiﬁcial intelligence is bound to profoundly impact the nature of
employment. Some recent studies estimate that 50% of all jobs that we currently have,
70% of low skilled jobs, will be replaced in a period of 10 to 20 years. I will argue that
this set of conditions – globalisation, the structural challenges, the technological re-
volution – puts us in a situation very similar to that which we historically faced when
we had the industrial revolution. The industrial revolution had profound societal con-
sequences and the way to legitimate, to accommodate these consequences was the
emergence of the Welfare State. The Welfare State was the answer to the challenge
that we historically faced with the industrial revolution. So what we need today is to
design and to ﬁnd what is our answer to this profound challenge which we have in
societal terms. In my view, the fundamental part of that answer will come from im-
pact investment. And I believe so because a fundamental part of that answer will need
to come from breaking this separation between wealth creation on the one hand and
social justice on the other. This can be then by instruments that will internalise social
values, social goals in the operation of the ﬁnancial system and the market economy.
This can be also by pulling on the power of innovation, also not only at the le-
vel of products and services but also on the level of public policies. It is in this con-
text that I said that I believe social innovation and impact investment can play a fun-
damental role.
This is what we try to do in Portugal, by developing a very ambitious social in-
novation and impact investment program. Our program for social innovation is the
ﬁrst one also where EU structural funds are being used, is probably in relative terms
the most ambitious worldwide.
But in my view it’s not enough to have funds, to put money. For this to work, for
social innovation to succeed and to deliver what we expect and want it to deliver,
we need to change institutional culture. Infrastructure is important, funds are im-
portant, people are important, but it is crucial to change our institutional culture,
what is often described as the ecosystem. We need an ecosystem that is friendly to
innovation, that welcomes and understands impact investment and integrates the
set of values that is linked to it.
But the creation of this ecosystem, the change in institutional culture, is perhaps
also the most diﬃcult thing to achieve because we are culturally dependent. We have
sort of cultural bias on how we understand the world. And therefore one of the most
diﬃcult things for those who work on social innovation, on impact investment is to
make the others understand its potential because often the potential is understan-
dable only when it is lived. We do not have that reality yet, it is diﬃcult for those to
anticipate the potential of something which is totally foreign, stranger to how things
have usually been done.
I would like to make a small exercise with you, to try to make this point clear.
Imagine you are in the year 2000 and you have two groups of people that come
to you asking to fund a project. The ﬁrst is a group of very famous professors come
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and say well we are going to create the best encyclopaedia in the world. It is going
to surpass the Britannia encyclopaedia, it’s going to surpass Larousse, it’s going be
the best encyclopaedia in the world because we have the best professors. We have
agreements with Harvard, with Yale, with Sorbonne, with La Sapienza, with all the
best universities in the world and these people are going to write the entries and the
best encyclopaedia you can think of.
And then comes the second group of people, likely younger people, that come
to asking for ﬁnancing tool. Remember, this is the year 2000. You ask “What do you
want us to fund?”. They reply “We want to create an encyclopaedia. It’s going to be
a site on the Internet. Everyone can create an entry, everyone can come and edit that
entry and write whatever they want”.
Who do you think will be funded? The ﬁrst group, because that was our concept
of encyclopaedia. The second is what we call Wikipedia and has become the domi-
nant concept of an encyclopaedia. But until Wikipedia existed, if you would tell anyo-
ne mainstream to fund, to put lots of money in it, nobody would have done it because
that was not the concept of what an encyclopaedia would be.
This tells us a lesson about the nature of innovation, including social innovation,
about the extent of obstacles in terms of path dependency, of cultural bias that need
to be overcome. And in order to overcome them what we really need is a holistic ap-
proach that works at the level of diﬀerent institutional variables in order to create
the institutional cultural change that we need to set up the ecosystem that is frien-
dly to social innovation and impact investment.
There are decisive elements in this ecosystem. You need more cooperative men-
tality to ﬁght the silus culture that is dominant in the public sector, but is also do-
minant in the way that companies work. You need a cooperative mentality. Specia-
lisation is great but increasingly you need to balance that better with cooperation.
You need more openness to experimentation and risk-taking. You need a more me-
ritocratic culture, more focus on measurable results and metrics to assess them. And
you need – as the previous speaker also mentioned – much more focus on a smal-
ler scale, on decentralisation. The idea is that you can succeed in areas of innova-
tion by starting with a smaller scale, then generalising then expanding it.
It is with this in mind that in Portugal we created our social innovation program
and in that program we stressed a lot the instruments that aim at promoting coo-
peration between actors but also more integrated governance. We also stress very
much capacitation, very strong emphasis on that. Also tremendous importance is gi-
ven to developing new metrics, developing measurable indicators and that in an area
such as social innovation and impact investment is a novelty because you don’t mea-
sure results simply by market return, but because you want to measure other posi-
tive externalities which are created, how do you measure that ﬁnancially?
This is a crucial working where we have to invest much more. And our program
also has a tremendous focus both on scalability and sustainability. It has four pillars
in this respect.
The ﬁrst one is what we call capacity building for social investment. We give grants
of up to 50.000 EUR to each actor who has a project funded. This money can be used
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only for capacitation. So the idea is that with the money to fund a project comes a
speciﬁc funding that is only to be used for capacitation, to strengthen the manage-
rial capacity, to prepare these actors to receive the impact investment.
The second pillar is what we call venture philanthropy matching program. The
purpose here is to promote a pipeline of stronger and more sustainable projects. Ba-
sically what we do here is we match the founding that comes from foundation, cor-
porations and also other public entities, that are provided for impact initiatives in
a logic of venture philanthropy. And the idea is to grow the critical mass of these pro-
jects, to then allow them to be in a better position to beneﬁt from the additional two
pillars that we have in our program, that are the most substantial.
So these ﬁrst two are meant to reinforce the capacity of the system to then recei-
ve and make use of the two most important instruments. These two most important
instruments are one related to innovation on public policies. And it is the social impact
bonds. The State or public entities contract with NGOs but can also be private companies,
can also be local authorities and often what we have the indication from the ﬁrst pro-
ject is that you have a consortium of local authorities and NGOs. Aimed for example
at reducing academic failure, drop out rates from school. And what our program does
is that, it measures the beneﬁt, the social beneﬁt from the reduction in the drop out
rate. This is given a certain value, which is measurable in ﬁnancial terms; and if that
goal is achieved by that program, the State through our program pays to the investors
who have an economic return, an economic proﬁt from the investment they have made
in pursuing that social goal. So this social impact bonds is the instrument that we have
in promoting innovation in public policies. And our expectation is that these projects
will be multiple, but on a smaller scale, often at local level. And where a project such
as that will work in the area of education, but we also have other areas such as health,
employment, social inclusion, then can be generalised for other areas of the country.
The fourth and ﬁnal pillar that we have is the fund for social innovation. This is
actually the ﬁrst ﬁnancial instrument for social innovation set up with means of the
European Union structural fund. This fund will work at the wholesale level. In the
form of equity or partial equity or ﬁnancing of loans. Through entities that can be
banks, can be foundations and often again what we see here is that there are groups
forming with banks, foundations, NGOs, social actors, that they will be the retail en-
tities that will contract with Portugal Social Innovation and will provide funds in terms
of impact investment.
Now, these are the four pillars through which we try to cover the full range of
potential that we have in the area of social innovation and impact investment.
But it’s not enough to set up an ambitious program like this one. We have many
challenges that we have ahead, many challenges that we have not only at the level
of my own country, Portugal, but also Europe. I trust tremendously in the potential
of social innovation and impact investment. And I trust very much in this potential
to help us addressing the challenges that we have in reconstructing the conditions
for the social contract that have been the basis of our society.
But I want to conclude highlighting some of the challenges and the risks that we
have implementing this strategy.
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The ﬁrst are political risks. I was a politician for some years so I am well aware of
what you have to gain or to lose in investing on a topic like this. This is reason for me
why politicians very rarely, particularly in Europe, have not assumed ownership of the
idea of social innovation and impact investment. It hasn’t been given by politicians
often the importance. You have certainly the United Kingdom and the United States,
but outside these two countries very rarely it has been taken as a ﬂag, as something
that could be politically valuable. And you need politicians to think that it is politi-
cally valuable for them to assume ownership and lead and pursue this agenda.
And for me the reason is the complexity. It is very diﬃcult to explain this to peo-
ple. The advantages, the consequences… What does it mean to internalise in the eco-
nomy social goals? What does it mean exactly social innovation? What does it mean
impact investment? It is not something that you can go to a television and present
in a thirty seconds statement. And in fact, if you say “I give 150 million to traditio-
nal in the form of subsidies to social actors” you can get, but if you say “I give 150
million to social innovation and impact investment, it’s going to be leveraged by ﬁ-
nancial institution and used to support projects that will produce social goods” tha-
t’s more diﬃcult to understand.
This complexity means it is diﬃcult to sell but moreover it means something else
too. It means it is very easy to manipulate. In Portugal, when we presented this, ei-
ther we have almost no attention from the media or, when we have, is because so-
meone started to say “Oh, this is the beginning of a privatisation, this is a new form
of privatisation” And that’s it. You have the label privatisation and immediately you
are in trouble. So, the ﬁrst challenge that we have is how to sell it politically. How
to make it politically attractive. And this should be the focus of those that work on
this agenda. And I think the goal, the starting point is this. What we say is that we
want to create a market economy that is more socially friendly. That’s the starting
point that acts more in accordance with social values, that’s how to pursue this agen-
da politically.
The second challenge that we have is competition with traditional areas such as
philanthropy or the way in which traditionally social actors have played.
In the beginning in Portugal we had many suspicions, reservations from tradi-
tional social actors. This is a new area, is not the way we traditionally do things whe-
re you got the subsidy to produce a certain social service. The idea of sustainabili-
ty of a social project is contradictory of the idea how they are perceived. You get mo-
ney to provide a service. You don’t get money to produce something which then gi-
ves you a ﬁnancial return. So, the risks of division, of competition of those who say
“No, we shouldn’t invest in philanthropy, we shouldn’t invest in impact investment”
is a very strong one.
And here, again, the focus has to be that these two things are not in opposition
they are complementary. Social innovation and impact investment have a plus com-
pared to other traditional areas. They are a system to mainstream social values into
all areas of the economy, including when you act for proﬁt.
The third challenge is demand. I often say in Portugal “we have no problem in
funding”. My fear is, do we have projects with the quality necessary that will justi-
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fy the funding to be provided? Or do we have investors ready to come with their mo-
ney to make use of these new ﬁnancial instruments? This is basically the challenge
resulting from the fact that we are creating a new market where it does not exist. And
therefore the focus that we have put in Portugal in terms of capacitation and in terms
of creating a set of actors that we call activation actors, not to be passive but to be
proactive in the search fro example to help the traditional circle of social actors t make
use of these new possibilities. Because there is a lot of potential from which you can
pull but you need to reform and to capacitate those actors.
And very important in this respect – this leads me to my ﬁnal point – is visibili-
ty. As said, social innovation, impact investment often is on a smaller scale, should
start on a smaller scale. But on the other hand, in order to be successful in facing the
challenges that I mentioned, it needs to be part and be supported by a broad nar-
rative. In my view, and this is the point that I tried to make at the beginning, this nar-
rative is and could be the role that social innovation and impact investment can have
in allowing us to face the challenges for the social contract, in terms allowing us to
rebuild the social contract on which society has been founded.
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eThics iN FiNaNce:
The experieNce oF susTaiNaBle FiNaNce iN iTaly
Davide Dal Maso*
* Secretary General of the Italian Forum per la ﬁnanza sostenibile.
The relationship between ethics and ﬁnance is quite complex and can be addressed
from diﬀerent perspectives. I see at least three aspects worth investigating:
• the ﬁrst is if the principles of business ethics have a speciﬁc application in the ﬁ-
nancial sector;
• the second is how ethical principles steer the decision of ﬁnancial actors in re-
lation to the purpose of debtors’ (borrowers or investees) economic activities;
• the third (on which I will focus more) is to what extent ethics inﬂuence socie-
ty’s preferences and become a competitive factor for debtors in the market.
1. Like in any other business environment, moral or ethical problems arise from time
to time and professionals have to deal with them, both at individual and organisa-
tional level. One might argue that in an over-regulated sector such as ﬁnance, it’s the
law that states what is right and what is wrong and, therefore, an organization that
behaves in compliance with law is on the safe side. Unfortunately, it is not that sim-
ple. We know that law and contracts are incomplete. There is always room for ex-
pectancies that cannot be regulated by formal rules. In this grey area that law can-
not cover, it is ethics that is supposed to guide decisions.
The business of ﬁnance is particularly sensitive to conﬂict of interests. Insider tra-
ding is a classic. But let’s take a very ordinary case, such as lending, and let’s apply
it in one of the noblest example of business driven by values, the cooperative banks:
here, the principle of mutuality, the internal democracy, the [theoretical] alignment
of interests of diﬀerent stakeholders (a person can be at the same time shareowner
(member of the cooperative), client (both depositor and borrower), employee and
member of the board) can create either a magic formula or a complete mess – and
it’s ethics that makes the diﬀerence, not the rule of law.
Another example comes from the news about the role of banks in tax evasion that
emerged from the Panama Papers: one of the most respected Nordic ﬁnancial in-
stitutions, Nordea, has been alleged to have helped some of its clients to hide their
wealth. The bank regretted that it did have procedures earlier to ensure clients pay
the necessary taxes and its CEO added “Compliance is the bank’s absolute top prio-
rity”. Still, Denmark’s minister for culture and ecclesiastical aﬀairs, Bertel Haarder,
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said “ethical conduct will be an important competitive parameter in the future. It wo-
n’t be enough that a transaction is legal. It also needs to be morally defensible.” This
statement clearly demonstrates that compliance with law is a necessary but not suﬃ-
cient condition to run a business. In order to achieve the licence to operate, a com-
pany must do more than respect the basics; it has to move beyond and to fulﬁl the
legitimate expectations that come from the society.
For banks and ﬁnancial institutions in general, social legitimacy is particularly
hard to achieve. Historically, lenders do not have a good reputation. The practice of
making money with money (as opposed by earning it through labour) has always
been very controversial and many religions disapprove interests on lending. In more
recent times, the big crisis that (symbolically) started with Lehman Bros bankrupt
has been attributed to the opportunistic behaviour of Wall Street greedy bankers.
Clearly, it is a rough simpliﬁcation – but it witnesses how long is the way that ﬁnancial
institutions have to walk to regain public conﬁdence.
In this perspective, codes of ethics are perceived as a further level of regulation
that create smoke rather than provide an eﬃcient and credible tool to prevent mi-
sconducts. Instead, I believe that they are one of the most eﬀective means that ﬁnancial
institutions have to regain trust: acknowledging the existence of conﬂicts and cle-
arly stating how they are treated is the basis of the social contract with stakeholders.
Companies (and ﬁnancial institutions make no exception) tend to make very gene-
ral statements on the importance of their stakeholders, i.e. that they are all equal-
ly esteemed: the organisation wants to create value for shareholders and customers
and employees and communities and future generations and … – which is simply
impossible: every person with common sense knows that in any organisation some
stakeholders are more important than others, even if it might be politically incor-
rect to admit. But not to say who is more important than who just generates the con-
ditions for arbitrariness and ambiguity – that is exactly what an organization should
avert. Codes of ethics are not there to create verbose and useless superﬂuity and to
make things more complicated – exactly the opposite: an honest code of ethics helps
people to solve problems. It’s not by denying the existence of ethical dilemmas that
organisations can overtake tangles, but rather by dealing with them with transpa-
rency and frankness.
2. What I said above might concern, mutatis mutandis, any business. But in terms
of applied ethics, the ﬁnancial industry has a peculiarity that poses speciﬁc questions,
which is that its impacts are mainly indirect. Finance is an enabler for someone el-
se’s business – that, in turn, generates economic, social and environmental eﬀects.
It is not the ﬁnancial activity itself that emits, say, greenhouse gases, but banks’ cor-
porate customers might do. The question then is: is the bank responsible of the con-
sequences of its customers’ activities? Legally speaking, in most cases the answer is
not. But, as we learned, compliance with legal standards is not enough. The ethical
principle of responsibility suggests that one should consider also the repercussions
of the activities it makes possible. And, in fact, ﬁnancial institutions are bitterly cri-
ticised for supporting companies that run controversial businesses (armaments, al-
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cohol, pornography …) or manage a “normal” business in way that undermines so-
cial or human or environmental capital (for example, violation of human rights along
the value chain).
This debate is at the origin of what we call “ethical ﬁnance”, i.e. a particular way
to act as a ﬁnancial institution that is steered by an ethical purpose. An ethical bank
does not ﬁnance any business whatsoever, but only those that produce outputs in
line with its values. In other words, ethical ﬁnance expresses a clear view of the so-
ciety it wants to pursue. Its mission is to make it real by funding only the economic
actors who share this vision. The real innovation of ethical ﬁnance is that it overcomes
the idea of “neutrality” of ﬁnancial activity and extends to the capital supplier the
responsibility for the eﬀects of the underlying business. Finance is not a goal itself,
but a mean. The social legitimation of ﬁnance is not given for granted; it needs to
be justiﬁed by the extent to which it contributes to the achievement of an ethical eco-
nomy.
Of course, we know that the concept of ethics is relative, not absolute. Ethics is
a system of moral rules that are recognised by a homogeneous community. When
we speak of ethical ﬁnance, we should always clarify which ethics we are referring
to. Catholic ethics diﬀers from Islamic one – but both are applied by ﬁnancial insti-
tutions that deﬁne themselves as ethical. If we push the concept up to the extreme,
also maﬁa expresses an ethical vision (a set of stringent rules, fully respected by its
members) and its ﬁnancial activity is ethical in the sense that it is coherent with the
maﬁa values (maximisation of proﬁts at any cost, code of silence …) – but it is cle-
arly a paradox.
3. We are witnessing a vast phenomenon of change in moral values in the society.
After years when economic growth was perceived as the only goal, worth any social
cost, today people feel that a new balance has to be found in the economic system
and in the society. People’s new awareness, raised by social and environmental cri-
ses, generates eﬀects in several directions: citizens-voters push their representati-
ves in the political arena to pass more stringent regulations – that, in turn, penali-
ze (or reward) corporates’ social or environmental policies; citizens-consumers use
their purchasing power (the so-called ‘vote with the wallet’) and determine the suc-
cess of companies’ business strategies; citizens-employees transfer their values in the
organisations they work for, promoting the change from the inside. Like a tide, the
new social sensitivity instils the seeds of change at any level.
Finance is not immune to this development – and Sustainable and Responsible
Investment (SRI) is possibly the phenomenon that better synthetises it.
SRI consists in the integration of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG)
issues in the investment processes. This means that investors, when deciding asset
allocation, not only consider the economic fundamentals (solidity, proﬁtability …)
of investees, but also the quality of their ESG policies and practices. In practice, this
happens through the use of a set of indicators that measure how the invested com-
pany manages the relationships with its key stakeholders (shareholders, employe-
es, customers, communities, suppliers …).
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SRI can take diﬀerent shapes, according to the goals that the investor wants to
achieve. Eurosif, the European reference organisation in this domain, deﬁnes seven
possible approaches:
• Sustainability themed investments cover a wide range of themes from climate
change and energy eﬃciency to for– ests and water. Investors’ motivations may
vary greatly, but it is typical to support particular industries transitioning to more
sustainable consumption and production. This can be combined with a belief that
a particular theme will outperform the rest of the market over the holding pe-
riod, or may provide some degree of de-correlation to other investments.
• Best-in-Class assets typically involve selecting the top percentage of companies
within a sector using ESG criteria. For example, within the consumer goods sec-
tor, in companies eligible for portfolio selection, a portfolio manager might re-
strict the investable universe to the top 50% based on an ESG rating screen. The
relative allocation to the portfolio of the selected companies may then depend
on purely ﬁnancial criteria, but can also be made using a combination of ﬁnancial
and ESG analysis. Other Best-in-Class methods also exist (e.g. Best-in-
Universe, Best-in-Eﬀort), and the strategy is also referred to as positive scree-
ning.
• Norms-based screening is a strategy that involves assessing each company held
in the investment portfolio against speciﬁc standards of ESG performance. The-
se standards are based on international norms set by organisations or institutions
such as the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), the OECD Guide– lines for
Multinational Corporations and International Treaties. Investors will often use
one or a combination of these standards, or they may construct their own stan-
dard based on these initiatives. Once companies in the portfolio have been iden-
tiﬁed in breach of these standards, investors will perform a deeper analysis and
take action. This action typically falls into two categories: exclusion from por-
tfolio or engagement with companies.
• Exclusions or negative screening is a strategy that involves removing companies
or sectors from the investible universe of the portfolio. There are a number of
diﬀerent motivations and applications of this strategy, from risk management to
values-based investing (moral, ethical or mission-based requirements). The ex-
clusion of certain controversial activities is becoming common among Europe-
an investors. This often includes those prohibited by international conventions,
such as the 1997 Ottawa convention on anti-personnel landmines and the 2008
Oslo convention on cluster munitions.
• ESG integration is deﬁned as the explicit inclusion by asset managers of ESG risks
and opportunities into traditional ﬁnancial analysis and investment decisions ba-
sed on a systematic process and appropriate research sources. This strategy can
be further articulated into three sub-types:
- non systematic ESG Integration, when ESG research and analyses made avai-
lable to mainstream analysts and fund managers;
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- systematic consideration/inclusion of ESG research/analyses in ﬁnancial ra-
tings/valuations by analysts and fund managers;
- mandatory investment constraints based on ﬁnancial ratings/valuations de-
rived from ESG research/analyses (exclusions, under-weighting, etc.).
• Engagement and voting on ESG issues, driven in large part by the view that sha-
reholders are stewards of assets who are accountable to their beneﬁciaries for
how they manage those assets. Policymakers and other stakeholders are pro-
pagating this view through initiatives like Stewardship Codes and legislation such
as the EU Shareholder Rights Directive.
Despite the diﬃculties in understanding such a fast-evolving market, all studies de-
monstrate that SRI, however deﬁned and applied, is gaining momentum and it is gro-
wing in terms of size and quality. The undisputable success of SRI can is explained
by at least two reasons – that, in fact, are two sides of the same coin: market demand
and solid business case.
The former is easier to interpret: like in many other sectors, consumers’ prefe-
rence is moving towards products and services that are perceived as ‘sustainable’ –
whatever the ﬁnal client intends with it. People more and more buy organic food,
child labour free garments, hybrid vehicles, eco-certiﬁed travels and so forth. Of cour-
se, savers do not buy a mutual fund exactly with the same logic the use for a fair-
trade banana, because the social dimension of ﬁnance, as said earlier, is indirect and
therefore less immediate to catch (not surprisingly, SRI more diﬀused amongst the
highly educated and conscious targets). It will take a while to move from the niche
to the mass market, but it is only a matter of time.
SRI is in minimal part driven by retail investors. The vast majority of SRI assets
come from institutionals. Why do they go for SRI, provided that they don’t have to
fulﬁl an intimate moral imperative? The answer brings us to the latter reason of the
success of SRI: it works. Empirical evidence from a huge bulk of academic studies
shows that there is a positive correlation between ESG and ﬁnancial performance.
This statement would require a lot of reasoning and statistics to be accepted and this
is not the place where to do this exercise. But, to remain on the ground of intuition,
we can aﬃrm that the more a corporate strategy is aligned with society’s values, the
more is likely to achieve success. From this viewpoint, having a good ESG score me-
ans being able to prevent [market, legal and reputational] risks and to catch the op-
portunities created by the new demand of sustainable products and services. In a word,
because sustainability is the new competitive factor for success, sustainable companies
are less risky and eventually more proﬁtable. Institutional investors don’t go for SRI
because they are good in a moral perspective, but because, by doing so, they protect
their assets and fulﬁl their ﬁduciary duty towards their clients.
Now, going back to the initial questions, what is the relation between SRI and
ethics? Is it really diﬀerent from what we called ‘ethical ﬁnance’? My answer would
be that the purpose of SRI is not ethical – or not necessarily. But ethics, in a way, is
what makes SRI possible: in a rough simpliﬁcation, ethics is what people feel is right
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or wrong. If, in a given social context, polluting the atmosphere with greenhouse ga-
ses is perceived as ‘bad’, those companies that do not reduce their impact will be con-
sidered as anti-societal; their licence to operate will be questioned. In this sense, the-
re is a convergence between economic interest and societal interest. An ethical con-
duct can be economically sensible because is rewarded by the society (and vice-ver-
sa). Ethical behaviour is convenient – but behave ethically because is convenient is
not ethical. What makes an [economic] action morally valuable is its purpose: the
same action has a diﬀerent moral value depending on the aim for which it is taken.
Here lies the distinction between a [responsible] for-proﬁt business and a social
business: the former’s mission is to maximise proﬁts and it will take into consideration
other stakeholders’ interests to the extent in which it creates value that can be, di-
rectly or indirectly, monetized; the latter is there to create social value and it is dri-
ven by intrinsic motivations. In times of crisis, the former will compress any investment
that aﬀects proﬁtability; the latter will reduce margins, but will try to preserve so-
cial value creation. In other words, the former considers ethics as a constraint in its
objective function; the latter looks at moral goods as a goal to pursue.
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iNTroducTioN
There are too few public resources now available to address the social infrastructure
gap within the EU. This is due, in part, to an amalgam of ongoing government cau-
tion following 2007-09, lazy policy making focused on politically expedient short-
term gains and, in some ways, a longer less visible retreat from social compacts bet-
ween governments and their citizens.
This is compounded by major shifts in how societies are challenged by – and go-
vernments deal with – macro-trends (ageing populations, stressed health and social
welfare provision, climate change, environmental degradation, migration, social co-
hesion and stagnant quality of life) combined with the changing nature of power and
wealth within society. In all of this, infrastructure is a major determinant of quali-
ty of life, sustainable economic growth and thriving communities. Long-term su-
stainable investment in social infrastructure is one way to face up to the long-term
challenges confronting us.
For social infrastructure this means that the focus of investment is not simply on
building a hospital or school or road or water plant, and the return on investment
to be expected from that. It is also to ensure that that the entire lifecycle of a pro-
ject, from concept, funding, construction, going operational and periodic reviews
take account of social, economic and environmental performance and so maximi-
se the added value in monetary and non-monetary terms. How this can be achieved
requires consideration of several factors. What this chapter focuses on is how to ge-
nerate more engaged dialogue and consultation between stakeholders in co-producing
innovative solutions for meaningful investment by brieﬂy exploring six interrelated
dialogue issues:
1. Widening engagement in the new investment culture
2. Informed connection between private capital and public value
3. Reinventing how investable propositions are created
4. Generating dynamic propositions using the ‘Living Lab’
5. Trade-oﬀs and synergies
6. Shared responsibility for investment decisions.
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wideNiNg eNgagemeNT iN The New iNvesTmeNT culTure
A recent OECD report made clear that moving from the current mindset to a longer-
term investment environment requires a transformational change in government and
investor behaviour. But, what is largely missing from the dialogue shaping this new
investment culture are the public authorities (regional, city, municipality) and pu-
blic services (health, education, aﬀordable housing) who will seek funds for social
infrastructure investment.
Ensuring a coordinated approach between investors, regulatory bodies, public au-
thorities and public services industry will be essential in realizing this new “investment
culture”. Unfortunately, the agendas and priorities of these stakeholders rarely seem
compatible. That they have diﬀerent goals is natural but negotiation for social in-
frastructure investment requires a degree of informed collaboration. Even the basics
of communication suﬀer because they do not talk adequately with each other. In con-
sequence, this potential business cannot grow as it should or in an appropriate way.
Investable opportunities might be available, but investors don't understand the ﬁeld,
intermediation is underdeveloped, and market infrastructure beyond intermediaries
to support investment in social infrastructure is underdeveloped as well.
So, while it’s good to get your own house in order, what is it that needs to hap-
pen in the house down the street if you are going to work together to build a vibrant
neighbourhood? At present there is little work being done to remedy this situation.
So the question that naturally arises is…is it feasible to invest for the longer term in
social infrastructure? A positive answer might seem automatic, since there is a huge
potential market. But, there is a need to move beyond traditional methods and to-
ols to “extract” this potential (for example see Case 1 below).
Case 1: Financial models for social housing in Scotland
A recent report for Homes for Scotland, Attracting new sources of funding to
expand a growing market (2013)1 identiﬁed several reasons for lack of in-
vestment in social housing: investor mandates within ﬁnancial institutions that
do not include residential property and building speciﬁcations which do not
meet the speciﬁc requirements of the private rented sector. Equally, the diﬀerent
stakeholders often speak diﬀerent ‘languages’, even when talking about core
issues such as the meaning of planning and development risk, determinants
and interpretation of yield, and the implications of legislative change.
In considering ways forward this same report shows several ﬁnancial models that
are currently being developed to provide routes to ﬁnancing rental housing. Four
approaches where there are functional models in place were identiﬁed: leasing
models; direct purchase models; aggregated bond ﬁnancing models; and tho-
se that harness the borrowing powers of local authorities and housing associa-
1. Scanlon K, Whitehead C, Williams P and Gibb K (2013). Building the Rented Sector in Scotland:
Attracting new sources of funding to expand a growing market, A report for Homes for Scotland
by LSE and Cambridge Centre for Housing & Planning Research, December.
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tions. Most of these involve some form of subsidy or guarantee, at least initial-
ly. They are therefore most suited as means of expanding the provision of social
or intermediate rental products, where there is a growing need for additional sub-
market but low-subsidy provision (Homes for Scotland 2013: 27-34).
The interface between investors and end-users has to avoid treating the need for ﬁ-
nancial innovation in isolation. Although PPP remains an attractive source of ﬁnance
for capital investment, some work is needed to improve how investors, regulatory
bodies, intermediaries and end-users work together and what these players bring
to the ‘negotiating table’. A common challenge is how do we develop eﬀective systems
and tools for service intensive PPPs that capture their public purpose?
As the Initiative for Responsible Investment in the USA has shown, attention is
needed to:
1. The capital absorption capacity of places (regions and municipalities) and sec-
tors, including their ability to generate an active pipeline of buildable projects;
2. Improving the dynamics of eﬀective capital partnerships, including an equita-
ble sharing of risks and rewards. It is the relative capacity of places and sectors
to negotiate socially useful PPPs that achieve their social goals eﬀectively that
is the issue here.
privaTe capiTal aNd puBlic value
We can’t simply say we are running out of traditional funding options so lets unlock
the assets held by pension funds, re-insurance companies and others. They have ﬁ-
duciary responsibilities and so cannot shoulder the burden of addressing the social
infrastructure gap in the EU alone. That said, they do have the potential to play an
important part in reframing how economies address these challenges. For this to hap-
pen, there is a basic need for more informed dialogue and new ways of behaving bet-
ween Institutions that carry out maturity transformation for savers, intermediaries
who act as a conduit for funds, and end-users that place investments in physical and
human capital. In short, investors, intermediaries need to be more proactive in de-
livering patient and productive capital while public authorities and services need to
create pipelines of good quality investable propositions that are sustainable.
For institutional investors this is not about using them as shock absorbers against
some of the macro-trends mentioned earlier. There is a basic need for more infor-
med dialogue and behaviour between Institutions that carry out maturity tran-
sformation for savers, intermediaries who act as a conduit for funds, and end-users
that place investments in physical and human capital. In short, in a networked and
shared economy, investors, intermediaries and end-users need to be more proacti-
ve in delivering patient and productive capital.
That said, the ﬁrst step between private capital and public value is knowing when
private investment is the path to go down, and right now we don’t have the best ways
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to sort that out with the public interest in mind2. In this context, infrastructure in
general will be an important asset class for channeling private capital to public pur-
pose if it can be done well. There are conventional challenges here but the key ones
that need attention are: (i) overcoming the uncertainty among public authorities and
services about whether, when and how private investment is the right path to take
(ii) rethinking how private capital is used to reduce the social infrastructure gap in
ways that meet investor needs while delivering sustainable return on investment (iii)
reinventing what public authorities and public services can do to generate pipelines
of investable propositions with enhanced public value. These need to be addressed
if the launch of a new phase of LTSI in Europe is not simply to be shaped by mar-
ket/supply-side interests that in turn limit the public value of investments. And this,
in itself, is a challenge if it is simply used to drive ‘more of the same’.
impacT meTrics To measure puBlic value
Case 2: The triple bottom-line as practiced by Impact Infrastructure LLC
The TBL means the ﬁnancial, social and environmental attributes associa-
ted with a given undertaking (TBL results). TBL Analysis can be aﬀordable
especially for public authorities and NGOs that often represent demand-side
interests – thanks to advances in technology. Technology including cloud ba-
sed computing allows access to and eﬃcient analysis of vast amounts of high
quality, infrastructure and community speciﬁc data (much of which is avai-
lable in the public domain, free of charge and in real time). That data includes
peer reviewed research and meta-analysis studies (studies of large numbers
of studies) that address the majority of concerns related to sourcing adequate
amounts of objective information on which to base comprehensive asses-
sments. In addition, advances have been made in the development of sector
speciﬁc metrics and analytical tools. Those tools account for geographic spe-
ciﬁcity including market factors like labor, real estate, energy prices, and car-
bon valuations. Thanks to the minimal cost of applying BCE analysis, com-
prehensive TBL based business cases can be utilised at each step in the pro-
ject development process from the initial TBL case of early planning to re-
visions at conceptual, preliminary and ﬁnal design, throughout construction
and long term operations. Cases can be run and re-run each time key deci-
sions are made so that the certainty associated with the case and project im-
proves as additional data becomes available.3
2. Watson J, Otero AB, Felli F, Wright S, Wood D and Scione L (2014), The unexpected business
within social infrastructure, INTEGRATE Brieﬁng Paper 1: 18.
3. Williams JF, Valuing long-term public beneﬁts of investments in infrastructure. In: Garonna
P and Reviglio E (eds.) (Pending) Investing in long-term Europe: re-launching ﬁxed, network
and social infrastructure. FEBAF/CdP, Rome.
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In May 2014 the Rockefeller Foundation ran a seminar in Bellagio on Sustainable
Infrastructure. This was attended by two INTEGRATE Advisory Board/Scientiﬁc Com-
mittee members. Three interdependent needs were identiﬁed in relation to metrics
in order to build an industry that is deﬁned not only by risk and ﬁnancial return, but
also by social and environmental impact:
1. Management information systems for fund managers and other data aggrega-
tors, who otherwise often rely on a patchwork of Excel spreadsheets to track im-
pact data on their portfolios;
2. Impact ratings (performance standards) for asset managers and owners, who re-
ported lacking the tools needed to assess their pipeline and active portfolios on
the basis of non-ﬁnancial performance;
3. Standardized deﬁnitions of impact performance measures that serve as building
blocks for the above as well as enable benchmarking.
Responding to the various macro-trends and ﬁnancial insecurity exposes the ultimate
performance signiﬁers for public authorities and related long-term investment in so-
cial infrastructure projects: adaptability and resilience. You need to show added va-
lue from your service and investments and when and how to adapt to changing cir-
cumstances. As discovery conversations about investment in social housing in Sco-
tland showed, stakeholders saw added value being realised in three obvious ways:
(i) the public value that LTI can and should generate (ii) aligning complementary
impact investments with the life cycle of long-term investment projects (iii) that both
(i) and (ii) deliver concrete contributions to addressing policy priorities. In the case
of Scotland, how the approach to social (and other forms of) housing in Scotland
can contribute to creating the social and economic resilience by helping tenants to
feel safe and secure; vibrant communities with economic life; social housing desi-
gned to help meet climate change targets.
re-iNveNTiNg how iNvesTaBle proposiTioNs are creaTed
Institutional investors have voiced concern that while they have funds to invest in
social infrastructure, the pipelines that have traditionally generated investable pro-
positions have been spluttering or become completely blocked. These pipelines have
become increasingly sclerotic and are no longer ‘ﬁt for purpose’. They operate like
the production line of a manufacturing industry with the storyline – and therefore
the parameters of what needs doing to generate a viable business proposition – sha-
ped by ﬁnancial intermediaries and adopted by governments and regulatory bodies.
Stakeholders who quite frankly have little energy to challenge the storyline and the
particular competencies and tools needed to meet the standards required. So, the
hardening of the arteries of those pipelines is not just a product of poorly scoped,
ad hoc and incoherent investment propositions. These are a symptom and not the
cause. The cause is that the process of generating investable projects has become over-
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ly technical and the storyline increasingly divorced from the circumstances that crea-
te the need for investment.
There is a need to re-invent how investable propositions are created: requesting
new money coherently while also meeting the need to oﬀer a slightly higher rate of
return. This goes beyond shifting from generating ad-hoc or isolated deals to buil-
ding pipelines of investable projects through a coordinated process that can sustain
itself over time.
geNeraTiNg dyNamic iNvesTmeNT proposiTioNs usiNg The ‘liviNg laB’
Reinvention requires long-term planning, associated risk assessment, innovation and
quality project management. But on top of these foundations should be platforms
where institutional investors and the end-users can come together to experiment.
Identifying a problem and exploring answers to the question “how might we?”
These platforms are emerging as ‘Living Labs’ to redeﬁne urban space and its prac-
tices including reconﬁgured public services in a people friendly city. A Living Lab is
in innovation environment in which real-life user-driven research and innovation co-
designs new products, services and social infrastructure. This human-based invol-
vement enables the development of useful new services and products. A Living Lab
takes advantage of pools of creative talent, socio-cultural diversity, and the unpre-
dictability of inventiveness and imagination of end-users.
These co-designers involve changing combinations of public authorities and ser-
vices, business and science parks, incubators, universities, investors, companies and,
of course, the end-user communities, both non-professional and professional.
Living Labs use real world testing by end-users in an authentic digital, physical,
and social environment. For Living Lab partners, this process ensures that compa-
tibility between emerging technologies, the innovative products and services they
enable and the social infrastructures that can utilise them, are fully developed be-
fore they reach the market.
For example, INTEGRATE has been talking with the Amsterdam Institute of Ad-
vanced Metropolitan Solutions (AMS – see Case 3 below). AMS is working with the
city council to turn Amsterdam into a global living lab with initial priorities focused
on mobility and water transport. This living lab will be used to test innovative ide-
as and can become the basis for the city to sustainably generate investable propo-
sitions for social and harder infrastructure that address priorities for integrated long-
term solutions that help Amsterdam remain competitive and an attractive place to
live and work while being resilient to macro-trends such as climate change.
Case 3: The Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Metropolitan Solutions (AMS)4
AMS puts into play the ‘living lab’ research concept. A living lab is a user-cen-
4. http://www.ams-amsterdam.com/category/research-programs.
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tered, open-innovation ecosystem, often operating in a territorial context (e.g.
city, agglomeration, region), integrating concurrent research and innovation
processes within a public-private-people partnership. In this way, AMS se-
eks to develop a deeper understanding of the city – sense the city –, design
solutions for its challenges, and integrate these into the city. Amsterdam will
be the AMS living lab to develop and test these metropolitan solutions – espe-
cially involving the Amsterdam citizens as testers, users and co-creators. Cur-
rent projects include:
- Urban Pulse (Understanding resource ﬂows and dynamics in Amsterdam).
- Urban Mobility Lab (Unraveling transport ﬂows in Amsterdam).
- Rain Sense (Citizens preparing Amsterdam for future weather).
Case 4: 100 Resilient Cities5
Pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation (100RC) is dedicated to helping ci-
ties (currently 67) around the world become more resilient to the physical,
social and economic challenges that are a growing part of the 21st centu-
ry. 100RC supports the adoption and incorporation of a view of resilience that
includes not just the shocks – earthquakes, ﬁres, ﬂoods, etc. – but also the
stresses that weaken the fabric of a city on a day to day or cyclical basis. Four
dimensions of urban resilience provide a focus: health and wellbeing, eco-
nomy and society, leadership and strategy, infrastructure and environment.
Each dimension has three drivers. One critical problem that 100RC helps ci-
ties overcome is the diﬃculty of sharing information about more and less suc-
cessful initiatives and practice, which prevents existing resilience solutions
from scaling. Early in 2015 they launched a Chief Resilience Oﬃcer (CRO)
Network Exchange Program through which member cities have the oppor-
tunity to co-create immersive learning experiences around common resilience
challenges they face.
The potential of using living labs to test ideas for social infrastructure and transla-
te this into a dynamic investment proposition is intriguing. It is not intended to pro-
duce a constantly changing proposition, but rather, one in which scenarios can be
explored in real world settings. Scenarios that test the ﬂexibility and resilience of the
proposed infrastructure to how the macro-trends mentioned earlier play out in lo-
cal communities. While the ‘Living Lab’ is the experimental platform, a parallel ini-
tiative (100 Resilient Cities – see Case 4)) provides good practice examples and in-
sights that can help critically appraise answers to the “how might we?” question be-
fore exploring sustainable solutions.
5. http://www.100resilientcities.org/pages/about-us#/-_Yz45MDY4NydpPTEocz5j/.
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Trade-oFFs aNd syNergies
Social infrastructure is a sub-sector of infrastructure that consists of the social con-
nections and the organisations & services that build them in a community. Ideally,
strong social infrastructures create strong communities with resilience and the foun-
dations for growth in both economic capital and social justice.
But to get close to that ideal, social infrastructure investment needs to be done in
a way that the Initiative for Responsible Investment at Harvard calls ‘taking the high
road’. This means design, build and operate infrastructure in ways that go beyond short-
term capital costs and minimum service requirements6. The critical high road standards
are about resilience and long-term economic, environmental and social performan-
ce. That means: safe, secure, cohesive and vibrant communities; contribution to em-
ployment and growth and ﬂexibility when faced with the varying impact of climate
change. The bottom line in thinking of sustainable responsible ﬁnance for social in-
frastructure is about investment in social infrastructure that is adaptable and resilient.
It takes lots of political/cultural work to shape how money moves, and right now
the people who make money from the moving do that work. The usual targets for
infrastructure investment are asset-rich transport, energy, environment and tele-
communications. If our economies and societies are to become more capable and re-
silient then service-rich social infrastructure should gain the same central role. To
get to this point, public authorities (regions, cities and municipalities) and public ser-
vices need to ﬁnd ways to create project bundles or portfolios in order to reach mi-
nimum ﬁnancing thresholds. If not, then the size of typical social infrastructure pro-
jects is a problem as the expense of project ﬁnancing is preclusive until bundling is
available.
shared respoNsiBiliTy For iNvesTmeNT decisioNs
One approach that might help regain the trust of policy makers and public is to im-
prove the governance of PPPs. This was an issue for the recent Dutch EU Presiden-
cy. Coincidentally, the Department for Civil Engineering at the University of Hong
Kong put forward a possible solution. Their starting point is that there is currently
no systematic mechanism governing how social concerns should be captured at dif-
ferent stages of a PPP project. They say
7. We should think about establishing a process framework that put people as a ma-
jor stakeholder for PPP schemes.
8. The framework would embrace bottom-up participative strategies for infrastructure
planning. Perhaps somewhat similar to the participatory budgeting initiative for
Paris residents that Anne Hildago put in place when she became mayor.
6. High Road Infrastructure Working Group (2015), Unlocking the market for more and better in-
frastructure, Draft Report for the Ford Foundation, August.
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9. With this new framework, decision-making power moves towards a shared-po-
wered network.
10. Arguably, it would better handle changing public aspirations and demands for
infrastructure planning7.
Transparent standards are tools with which to coordinate inputs into investable pro-
jects and would be essential for monitoring how the mechanism advanced by the Uni-
versity of Hong Kong behaves. From the perspective of the public sector, standards
can deﬁne what kinds of social and environmental beneﬁts are required to justify pu-
blic participation and subsidy in infrastructure projects. From the (responsible) in-
vestor’s perspective, standards can help determine how environmental and social per-
formance can help mitigate diﬀerent kinds of risk and ensure long-term value in pro-
ject development and operation. From the perspective of civil society, a transparent
set of standards – and ways to evaluate potential projects against them – can prove
important to building project legitimacy and mitigating political risk. In sum, core
performance standards – on issues including carbon mitigation, climate resilience,
labor standards, social equity, human rights, governance mechanisms, and so on –
can help public authorities, public services and the communities they serve to prio-
ritise which investments deserve the time, attention, and resources necessary to bring
typically complex deals to fruition8.
coNclusioNs: doiNg The zeN circle ‘ThiNg’
Brief coverage of the issues in this chapter show several challenges and possible so-
lutions for unlocking public value from private capital investment in social infra-
structure. But, there is a Zen essential to the challenges – the lack of a virtuous cir-
cle. This also applies, for example, to what is being saved and what Pension Funds
need to payout. That cycle is breaking. One of the consequences of 2007-2009 is that
most societies cannot conceivably grow fast enough to pay oﬀ the promises they have
made for debt repayments and pensions.
A study by Bridgewater Associates9 estimates that, due to near zero percent in-
terest rates and ﬁnancial repression, that public pension funds will earn an annual
return of 4% or less in the coming years. They suggest, in turn, that this would cau-
se bankruptcy for 85% of public pension funds within 30 years. The funds would need
an annual investment return of about 9% to meet those obligations, the report says.
7. Ng S Thomas, Wong James MW, Wong Kelwin KW (2013), A public private people partner-
ships (P4) process framework for infrastructure development in Hong Kong, Cities 31: 370-
381.
8. Watson J, Wood D, Mair C, Dhaene G, Dowdeswell B and Wright S (pending), Matching in-
stitutional investor needs and public sector competencies, INTEGRATE Working Paper 3.
9. Reported in http://americasmarkets.usatoday.com/2014/04/09/report-85-of-pensions-
could-fail-in-30-years/.
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Many pension plans assume they will earn 7% to 8% annual returns, an assumption
that is too high. There is a shortfall (maybe 20%) between what is being saved and
what pension funds need to payout.
What these and other institutional investors should, in part, strive for are alter-
native investment options that facilitate new virtuous circles in which they work with
public authorities and public services as co-producers of adaptable and resilient so-
cial infrastructure aligned to long-term planning priorities: an approach in which
value is found in sustainable ROI while maximising public value.
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reduciNg losses By BuildiNg resilieNce To disasTers
Paola Albrito*
* Head Regional Oﬃce for Europe, United Nations Oﬃce for Disaster Risk Reduction.
I would like to start my contribution by sharing with you a few numbers and stati-
stics.
Globally, disaster losses have increased to $250-300 billion a year, over 80% of
economic losses from disasters are due to weather-related hazards.
Last year in Europe, the number of hydrological disasters showed a 45% increase
compared to its decennial average. Damages from disasters in Europe in 2014 amoun-
ted to $7.8 billion. The 2014 ﬂooding in Serbia which proved to be one of the costliest
disasters with damages running up to $2 billion put the country into recession.
If we couple these considerations with climate change, we know unfortunately
that there will be an increase in extreme weather events translating into an increa-
sed risk and slow on set disasters.
These numbers highlight an important consideration: reducing such losses by
building resilience to disasters is a key contribution to countries and society sustai-
nability.
Who is suﬀering for this? Vulnerable people and populations share the highest
cost of these disasters but no one is spared – business, ﬁnancial services markers and
investors are also losing. A practical example: Sub-tropical storm Sandy triggered
the evacuation of thousands from the East Coast of the US, leading to the shut-down
of national and local transport systems and severely disrupted electricity and com-
munication supplies with power cuts aﬀecting an estimated 8.5 million homes and
businesses. Of the reﬁneries in the East Coast of the US, 70% had to be shut down
for days. Equity trading on all markets was cancelled for 2 days.
Not paying attention to disaster risk reduction can lead to serious deterioration
of the economy and ecosystems and a loss of trust by the population and investors.
Frequent small and medium-impact disasters and single intense events can severe-
ly disrupt community lifelines—the systems that provide food distribution, water sup-
ply, health care, transportation, waste disposal, and communications—locally and
with the rest of the world. Business and private investors may shy away from cities
with a perceived indiﬀerence to acting to reduce disaster risk.
To overcome the perception that the disaster risk management budget compe-
tes for scarce resources with other priorities, risk reduction must be an integral part
of local development. Holistic disaster risk management is more attractive when it
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simultaneously addresses the needs of many stakeholders and competing priorities.
In general, the incentives are stronger when disaster risk management visibly con-
tributes to improved economic and social well-being.
Analysis on disasters also highlights the critical interdependence between bu-
siness and the public sectors. Even if public investment may be low (less than 15%
of total capital formation in many countries), how that investment is made, mana-
ged and regulated is fundamental to business resilience, competitiveness and su-
stainability. If public infrastructure is vulnerable, business is also at risks.
However, we observe that (adequate) returns and responsible ﬁnance do not al-
ways go hand-in-hand. The inconvenient truth is that irresponsible ﬁnance often co-
mes with larger short-term gains for those who pursue it.
Part of the disaster risk produced through investments in urban development and
social infrastructures is spread across communities and sectors to become shared costs.
In urban developments these shared costs are produced through large number of in-
dividual public and private investment decision and non-decisions taken over the long-
term – making it diﬃcult to attribute responsibility.
There is now consensus that the ﬂow of speculative ﬁnancial capital into the real
estate sector in the US led to an over-accumulation of capital in that sector and risks
in the ﬁnancial sector triggered the global crisis that began in 2007-2008.
Public regulations have been ineﬀective: in many higher income countries, from
the mid 1950s to the mid 70s, there was a strong culture of public intervention and
investment in government-planned and implemented urban development and
land use. But from the mid 70s inward there was a gradual shift in focus to increa-
sed private investments. This encouraged speculative development. In Serbia, for exam-
ple, rapid privatization of housing stock including public housing and public infra-
structure that previously have been heavily subsidized by national and municipal go-
vernment budgets has resulted in the rapid decay of buildings and increased disa-
ster risks.
In urban development identifying these trade-oﬀs is complicated for many rea-
sons. Many intensive risks have long-return periods, meaning that for investors in
urban development, the risks have low visibility and are downplayed. When asses-
sed the risks may be ignored given the expectations of a high short-term return on
capital.
When regulatory mechanisms do exist there have been challenges to imple-
mentation in practice. The 2013 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction
provides the example of the UK and how diﬃcult it is to get to the bottom in terms
of applications of public regulations. With the ﬂoods in 2007 the UK realized that
the economic losses sustained were extremely high, leading to a change in the re-
gulations requiring local planning authorities to identify risks posed by ﬂoods in new
developments. In 2012 the UK was hit again by heavy rains causing losses estima-
ted at about 1 billion pounds. So what went wrong again in 2012? The rate of con-
struction in the ﬂoodplain has continued to increase and the existing ﬂood risk “zo-
ning” only accounts for river and coastal ﬂooding. Therefore development can still
take place in areas subject to surface water and ﬂash ﬂooding.
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More investments in infrastructure and the built environment will be required
over the next 40 years than has occurred over the last 4 millennia (70% growth by
2020). How disaster risk is addressed in the construction and real estate develop-
ment sectors is therefore going to shape the future of disaster risk reduction. It the-
refore goes without saying that steps towards a more sustainable responsible ﬁnance
can have a massive impact on economic, social and environmental standards and de-
velopments. New approaches to sustainable urban development provide opportu-
nities for engaging private investors and the construction sector in new public-pri-
vate partnerships for resilient investments.
The opportunity we are faced with is to ensure that in investing in infrastructure
developments we do not “build-in new risks”; this important reﬂection is at the heart
of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, adopted in Japan at the UN Third
World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction. The Sendai Framework outlines seven
clear targets and four priorities for action to prevent new and reduce existing disaster
risks. It aims to achieve the substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives,
livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental
assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries over the next 15 years.
Let me give you another practical example from the UK on how reducing expo-
sure to ﬂood hazard can be achieved. In Scotland since 1995, new construction in
ﬂoodplains has been reduced to almost zero as a result of a national planning poli-
cy. The Scottish success was the result of working closely with private real estate de-
velopers and insures. Planners in local governments were legally obliged to set up
Flood Liaison and Advice Groups bringing together private and public sector inclu-
ding property developers, landowners, emergency planners and others. The success
of this initiative is undisputed. Only one local authority, Moray, did not engage and
continued construction in ﬂoodplains. Consequently it now has serious problems with
ﬂooding and access to ﬂood insurance.
This is part of the work that UNISDR has been doing, work together with diﬀe-
rent actors including the private sector on how to increase possibility of sustainability
of long-terms investments by knowing risks and ensuring their reduction.
There is a very important point to stress, that whatever action we take in addressing
our social infrastructure we have to be mindful of principles and values. How to tran-
slate these into practice includes: ensuring informed risk decision, empowerment
of local authority and communities and shared responsibility.
Europe is going through a number of ﬁnancial reforms and we know that reforms
are targeting ﬁnancial requirement. Many of them are related to critical infrastruc-
ture: hospital, schools, but also power plants. Let’s ensure that the decision taken
will be risk informed – this would be a solid step in helping their sustainability.
One last element that became very clear during the Third United Nations World
Conference for Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai is that implementing decisions in-
clusive of disaster risk reduction considerations helps social and human gains. Let
us think of schools, hospitals and also “other” important and unique components of
our society and history: cultural heritage. If we do not preserve it we are going to
lose a tremendous reminder of the beauty, inspiration and richness of our identity.
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Toward a Big challeNge For FiNaNcial operaTors
Gian Franco Giannini Guazzugli*
* Italian association of ﬁnancial advisors/tied agents – Anasf.
ANASF has always paid attention to the protection of savers and has always encouraged
awareness about investment choices and fund managing.
By virtue of that commitment, ANASF handles relations with national and European
institutions. Furthermore, the Association is actively involved in the consultations that
may have an impact on the ﬁnancial advisor profession, but also on investors. Among
the various topics discussed, there is ’sustainability in investments’ and ANASF has
always stressed in its position papers sent to the Authorities, the sensitivity of retail
customers towards these issues and called on the legislator to create targeted in-
struments that encourage investment in sustainable products. It is particularly important
to overcome the prejudice that sustainable investments are not proﬁtable, and that
there is a trade-oﬀ between ethical and sustainable choices and economic return. The
assessed economic results, for the same investment sector, by the ﬁnance SRI tools,
show absolutely satisfactory results, often with a return in two digits.
Given the economic and ethical value of the SRI investments, today it is neces-
sary that the lawmaker introduce tools and practices able to promote among the in-
vestors the adoption of the right behavior.
Some recent surveys conducted on a sample of ﬁnancial advisors on SRI issues
have found how it is necessary to push on demand, helping savers to support su-
stainable investments with traditional investments. Every client interested in ethi-
cal and sustainable products has given a positive feedback and has proven a positi-
ve attitude to these types of investments.
However, there cannot be a diﬀusion of responsible investments without a pro-
per training, both for savers and operators, that must also have access to useful to-
ols in order to propose this kind of products to savers. To carry out this activity in
the right way, ﬁnancial intermediaries and other general institutions should iden-
tify plans encompassing all aspects of ethical ﬁnance.
There is still much to do in this area, but in these last years the interest of savers
for SRI investments has gradually increased. For ﬁnancial advisors it is therefore ne-
cessary to be able to respond to these needs by providing adequate information to
investors to make ethical and responsible investment decisions. The ﬁnancial advi-
sor can have a decisive role to select the tools that meet these new needs, helping
savers to take the right decision.
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The majority of clients, in fact, may not be aware of sustainable and responsi-
ble products or may not be able to recognize their particular terminology, even though
they could be interested in investing in social and environmental challenges.
Furthermore, helping the saver in investment decisions can foster a deep rela-
tionship with the ﬁnancial advisor, who will be able to better advise her/his client.
The management company plays another important role in Sri investment, re-
presenting a trusted ﬁgure in proposing and selecting adequate investment solutions.
As I said, that there is still much to do on the side of training. Well, let's not for-
get that general ﬁnancial education is very low among Italians. In fact, they rank at
the last place in ﬁnancial literacy. This lack of knowledge often results in risky in-
vestment choices. Those who do not receive assistance and advice from a qualiﬁed
operator carry out hasty and reckless ﬁnancial operations, often with negative re-
percussions on their savings. The goal can only be one: the investor must become a
prepared and awarecitizen, and to achieve this aim it is necessary to promote a dia-
logue between all stakeholders: investors, operators, institutions, lawmakers. This
dialogue is necessary to create a saving culture, even sustainable.
A ﬁrst tool, designed to strengthen saver protection, is certainly represented by
ﬁnancial education initiatives, realized by institutions, but even more by private bo-
dies, including our Association. The usefulness of such initiatives emerges in rela-
tion to the possibility of spurring the individual citizen's ability to orient themsel-
ves in the provision of ﬁnancial services, in search for solutions that best respond to
the speciﬁc characteristics and needs.
So what do we wish for the future? There are many tools available for operators
in order to promote sustainable ﬁnance. Surely pension funds, but also the mutual
funds, can become the link between savers and SRI investment. It is important to crea-
te a relationship between the investor and the real economy. The savings should en-
courage businesses, especially SMEs, with long-term goals. Companies could thus
rely on long-term loans to promote their business. At the same time, savers can be-
neﬁt from long-term sustainable investments, which are generally less exposed to
market volatility.
To promote their diﬀusion it is essential that these products will provide an ad-
vantageous tax system that allows to reward those who invest in the real economy,
in a sustainable way and for a long-term. The lawmaker should take action as soon
as possible in order to foster long-term savings.
Communication is also a key feature and requires inﬂuential examples. We must
spread the meaning and the importance of sustainable ﬁnance. Finance does not mean
a frantic search for proﬁt, because it is the result of a long-term planning activity help
every citizen to improve their future life.
We must make it clear to savers that the quality and characteristics identiﬁed for
SRI diﬀer from the general ones in terms of attention to the values underpinning the
search for sustainable performance, beyond pure ﬁnancial results.
Let’s not forget that this component may also allow the ﬁnancial advisor to con-
solidate over time the relationship of trust with her/his customers. We are going to
face a big challenge.
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aNd social iNFrasTrucTure
Valeria Ronzitti*
* European Centre of Employers and Enterprises providing Public Services– CEEP.
Public services are represented within CEEP, as we defend interests of public servi-
ces providers at EU level. Our members are providers of both physical, such as ener-
gy, transport and water networks, etc. and social infrastructures, like healthcare, so-
cial services, housing, etc.
I would like to begin by painting a more positive image of the European action
when it comes to investments, compared to the one often given by other stakehol-
ders within the public services’ community.
I might be too much of an insider, but having been present in Brussels since the
start of the ﬁnancial and economic crisis and calling since then for more investment
at EU level, I can now see a more favourable European climate, at least from a po-
licy-making point of view.
We are realistic and know that the “Juncker Plan” cannot solve everything. Ho-
wever, it brought investment back into the European agenda, which is in itself already
an important ﬁrst step. Also, in this positive climate, I wish to mention that the 2016
Annual Growth Survey, which the EU Commission uses as a basis for its recom-
mendations to the Member States, recognizes for the ﬁrst time a strong need for the
Member States to invest more in social infrastructure and to boost social investment.
This is a clear signal. In previous years, Annual Growth Surveys were nearly ex-
clusively focused on strict ﬁscal consolidation. There is a progress at EU level. It is
now up to each player to grasp the opportunities provided by this new setting.
I think each player has a responsibility in this context. When we talk about so-
cial infrastructure, the most important responsibility has been, is, and should re-
main, on the shoulders of policy-makers, both at national or local level. Investment
in social infrastructure will not increase if the legal framework does not encoura-
ge private investors to consider social investments. This could be done through tax
relief, like the Government of the United Kingdom did in 2014; by setting up tra-
ding platforms; by encouraging ﬂexible legal structure for social impact investment
actors. The United Kingdom also initiated a reduction of transaction costs, which
for instance prevented strong actors like pension funds to invest in social infra-
structures.
Then there is a key role to play by public investment banks. The European In-
vestment Bank has a strong experience in ﬁnancing major transnational infrastructure
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projects, such as the rail- or highways. The EIB has a major role to play when it co-
mes to social investments, but the institution is still not used to investing in such in-
frastructures. It needs to learn, to get more acquainted with the role of social in-
frastructures, and to really start putting in place tailor-made investment platforms:
investing in social infrastructure is diﬀerent from investing in road and energy net-
works. Dedicated technical assistance needs to be put in place, as there is a lot of igno-
rance on the social promotors’ side, and they need help.
Private investors also have a role to play. However, it can only be a limited one,
without major responsibilities. We can expect them to think a little bit out of the box,
to see “prosperity” and not only “growth” and “competitiveness”. You can refer to cor-
porate social responsibility and sustainability models. But, in the end, if the policy
makers do not put the right framework in place, I think there is little that private in-
vestors can do alone.
Once identiﬁed the diﬀerent stakeholders we need to speak about the operational
side of the plan and in this context an issue of prime importance is the need to ag-
gregate projects. As a matter of fact, childcare, housing or hospitals operates at a lo-
cal level; usually, such promotors can only present modest-sized projects. They need
to be supported in order to bring small-scale projects together and reach a critical
mass to become eligible for ﬁnancing. This is becoming a matter of urgency. This is
even truer if seen in the context of the current refugee crisis. Schools, hospitals and
housing services, operating at the very local level, will be at the centre of attention,
welcoming and integrating migrants and refugees in Europe. The national promo-
tional banks are already doing an important job to favour this integration. Now, in-
stitutional investors, pension funds need to start thinking outside of the box. As I spe-
ak, this is a reality in The Netherlands, where pension funds are very active in this
ﬁeld. It is far from being widespread elsewhere. I see the Dutch model as a very good
example in this case.
Finally, the only criticism I can think of about the Junker Plan is that it strongly
relies on the idea that private investors can relaunch investment by themselves. When
it comes to social infrastructure, I think that private investors alone cannot do much.
There is also a strong responsibility on the side of providers of social infrastructu-
re. There is a lot of work we can do in changing mentalities. I think it is very much
of our responsibility to help policy-makers achieve what is really essential, and help
those who provide social services and social infrastructure to measure their social
impact. It is not a simple task, but there are ways to do it. It is a precondition for in-
vestors to understand that there is a return on social investment.
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) can also be an interesting tool, but it remains
a diﬃcult concept for many providers of public services. It is therefore our respon-
sibility to shape PPPs in a positive way, for them not to be caricatured as “privatisation
through the backdoor”.
Finally, there is a very important model which should be more developed: the
social impact bonds’ model. On this issue, there is a very positive example from the
Netherlands, and I am happy to see that it grows in Portugal. That is the direction
we have to follow.
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I can now come to my conclusion. There should be a stronger cooperation bet-
ween providers and policy-makers to simplify the complexity of social infrastructure
and give them more visibility and better communication. At the end of the day, the
ﬁnal responsibility should remain in the policy makers’ hands. They should be the
ones shaping the proper framework, as I cannot see private investors leading the way
alone when it comes to social infrastructure. Those are to me some of the key ele-
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achieve The goals oF susTaiNaBile developmeNT
aNd reduciNg risk
Margareta Wahlström*
* Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction, United Nations.
The most puzzling thing for me over this years is people’s individuals behaviour, risk
perception we talk about, to social contract. Our assumption is always good will so
we assume that business will be involved, we make assumptions but there is a ter-
ritory where we all have a common goal that we would like to achieve.
I was hoping to be able to say but I have not get the message yet that the Paris
accord has been agreed but I will in any case say what I have read from one of the
commentators yesterday. He or she said that the ultimate measure of what the Pa-
ris pact is whether is a success or a failure is whether it will send a market signal for
investors to take their money oﬀ the fossil fuel and put them to zero carbon energy
sources. That is a big assumption but yes, I think that’s what ultimately needs to hap-
pen and all the negotiations, the eﬀorts to include all of society, business of course,
what you have heard about the past years has been leading us to making the as-
sumptions that that indeed will happen, that the market signal is the right one and
if that happens – I am going maybe to see some limitations to it – many of the things
that needs to be achieved through the global policy which has been set in 2015 are
achievable.
What we are doing in the risk reduction work sounds like it would be a limiting
part in the global development agenda. Without being an environmentalist I would
say if we could only aﬀord one global instrument, that would be the instrument be-
cause member states, communities, ever since they realised that disasters risk is not
about disasters but is about sustainable development – and this is about 40 years ago
– they have taken a very wide approach to the topic and they basically say unless you
deal with knowledge in its broadest sense, governance, people, the entire social sphe-
re that we were just discussing, and of course the capability to deal with disasters
and of course rebuild after disasters, we are not going to be able to continue to be-
lieve sustainability as continuous but of course better balance growth is possible.
So they were shameless about this and over the past years member states become
even more shameless about the scope they have given themselves.
In March this year, countries agreed on this in Japan and considerably widened
the scope. This is not about natural hazards anymore, it’s about biological, pande-
mic hazards, it’s deﬁnitely inspired by the consequences of the Fukushima conse-
quences – the tsunami and the earthquake – and it also says, uses a code word for
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conﬂicts: manmade hazards. As you know, in the global policy agenda conﬂicts is
not really a popular word.
In the development goals we speak about peaceful societies, that’s a positive ex-
pression. But the mix here in the Sendai framework – we are trying to incorporate
every possible hazard, every possible risk to societies. I think this is extremely am-
bitious, the challenge is how we make countries going to use this.
The second point from the global policy perspective is, these last few years the-
re has been a word that has been uttered all the time and this is coherence. And what
did we mean at high level? What we meant is, all these instruments which have been
negotiated need to speak to each other and reinforce each other. There is no sense
in asking which is the most important, which come ﬁrst, but the reality that there
has been a high degree of ambition but less a degree of success. If I tell you that one
of the negotiators in Paris said a few years ago, in public “Sustainable development
has got nothing to do with climate change”.
So we have Sendai, the Addis Abeba accord, which is a very critical instrument,
we have the New York outcome and Paris will come. So what conclusions would I
draw from this? The four priorities for action in Sendai are: understanding risk, di-
saster risk governance, investing in people and in preparedness national response–
this is national capacity building. I think the most challenging part of this is the go-
vernance piece. Governance not only as our institutions but also precisely as how do
we work together, how do we agree on setting goals. Just to go to our business agen-
da in the private and public sector, when we about ﬁve years ago, when we said that
if we are ever to achieve the goals of sustainabile development and reducing risk:
climate risk, disaster risk – I actually wanted to have ﬁnancial risk in that framework
but I realised that was not going to ﬂy so I took it back but I think it’s coming back
through the discussions I hear – if we are able to do something that truly has an im-
pact we have to have the private sector in its broadest sense: business, ﬁnance, in-
stitutions including which is a bit more diﬃcult the philanthropic associations which
are the least and last regulated entities because we cannot really tell them how to
invest but we can only motivate them.
The entry point with the private sector, their expectation is that we come and
we ask for money. So I decided to say that we don’t want your money, we want to
change your behaviour. Can you be motivated as businesses to look at your own bu-
siness resilience and believe that disaster is a threat to your long-term viability and
even medium-term viability? Is disaster risk for you? When we started asking that
question together with the private sectors supporters, it was extremely diﬃcult to
ﬁnd someone to talk to. I think they needed endless months to get into the compa-
nies, not even the boardroom, but senior executive level. And the answer was “not
really”. But then come 2011, Japan, the ﬂoods in Thailand, the impact on global GDP
from the disruption of the supply chain and the conversation started changing. It’s
not yet fully there of course, but the combination of risk form climate, political in-
stability and from some general “environmental risk” – it doesn’t matter how they
call it, it’s the impact that is really on the agenda. So on that basis we invited we have
these negotiation going on, what do you want? Do you want to be seen and heard?
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And with cooperation of many, many actors from the private sector – they have a very
strong role to play in the implementation of this framework. If you look at it one day
you will see that there are calls for every part of the business but in particular for the
ﬁnancial institutions to step forward and to play their role.
Europe in itself – as I think OECD has helped us to see – comes third in the world
annual ranking of impact on GDP of disaster losses. That’s not the place for Europe
to be but that’s basically because of lack of infrastructure and other issues, lack of
risk perception and risk management. But what does it mean for small island sta-
tes? Maybe you hear that some think that they will sink in the sea when the sea le-
vel rises but well before they do that they might get wiped out by a cyclone. Well be-
fore that some of them lose well over 100 of annual GDP through a cyclone and as
cyclones happen frequently they never manage to recover from the previous one.
The World Bank have shown us that the most indebted countries in the world
are small island states in the Caribbean because of the cycle of hurricanes and the
losses and the loans they need to take, private sector loans which are not free of char-
ge because they are middle income countries to rebuild infrastructure and someti-
mes even before they have started the project the new airport gets wiped out.
This cycle of missed development opportunity but there is also a cycle of natio-
nal of what we try to achieve, of poverty being one of the consequences. So if you
ever see a claim that there is an economic growth peak after a disaster this is a very
short term peak. The long-term impact, the medium term impact is that people have
a negative economic and social impact. Far too little research, I always try to call for
more interest in research on the social and economic consequences of disasters. Even
medium-term there is a lack of understanding.
But what exists and some is my personal conversation, I go back to disasters that
happended 10, 15 years ago and ask people “What happended to your life?”. And
two things that still recall is the ﬁrst one is maybe real but a little less tangible “No
one really cared about us.” Does not matter what the world thought about us but the
feeling of abandonment was there.
The second one is loss of economic opportunity. Unemployment and when em-
ployed again for less economic beneﬁt than before. And even long-term unemploy-
ment ultimately leads to less success in life or less perception of success in life. So
these are some of the very concrete things that has come out of understanding why
although still we call it disaster risk reduction is fundamentally sustainable deve-
lopment, it must be included in countries’ development plan as a risk.
It must be mainstream. Disaster risk reduction is not a sector. The only purpo-
se is to include risk in every sector in society, be agriculture, education, health. And
the second perspective is, and I come back to the issue of governance. The vision that
has been built over the years is, if you leave this risk arena to one institution you are
unlikely to be successful. Today we understand very well that the biggest risks oc-
cur when none is watching.
What about ﬂash ﬂoods in the UK? Regulators can regulate the ﬂoods of the ri-
ver or the seaside, but the water that falls down from the sky, no one had really thought
about that as a risk. And we see many, many examples like that.
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The problem with Fukushima was that the people in charge of earthquakes and
tsunami had absolutely no idea about risks in the nuclear industry and the people
in charge of risks in the nuclear industry never talked to the people in charge of ﬂo-
ods. So institutional issues and lack of collaboration created many risks.
If I describe to you that the Sendai framework does not only give you four prio-
rities for action but also outlines where action needs to be taken you will not be sur-
prised if you see that most of the action is at local level, a lot at national level. And the
more you go up the hierarchy the more vague the action is and the less there is to do.
This is the answer form very large communities that we work with. The more we
allow us to trust the local and to ensure that there is capacity the higher degree of
possibility for success. And this is true not only for people but also for business. The
most successful partnerships for sustainability we have seen them at local level. Lo-
cal government with local communities, local businesses, this is where everything
seems to be happening now.
But there are few pieces of slight limitation. One is everyone will see that it is the-
re. There is actually a very severe distrust between government, people, governments,
businesses. If this distrust wasn’t there, we would have been able to do what needs
to be done.
This is the question we have asked ourselves in our work. “If everyone knows that
prevention is better than cure, why can’t we move the prevention agenda much more
forcefully?” What are the limitations? The limitations – you just say the word and
you already have a diﬀerent conversation – is the trust gap. Which seems to get more
severe and not less severe. And the gap between multiple perspectives is not only bet-
ween the governments and the people.
And this is also a diﬃcult time. A lot of people in Europe talks about changing
from a maternal paternal State to a State that demands, much more private initia-
tive from its citizens. It is not just a statement but something that falls on people and
personally coming form one of these Welfare States I noticed a very peculiar attitude
of my co-citizens in terms of what they still expect from the State that it does not pro-
vide anymore. And that seriously limit people’s personal innovation. Because we know
that of course if you do not have any provider for yourself you become very entre-
preneurial and active. How do we get that mixed signals in a territory where peo-
ple get the message of being empowered?
About ﬁve years ago around the time of the Fukushima disaster, every country
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, China, UK, United States etc, they all said “Well, ci-
tizens, the cost of disasters and the frequency is so high now, the State cannot car-
ry this cost anymore and you need to take more responsibility for yourself”. That was
the end of the conversation, they did not say “And therefore we will do that and that”.
No, you need to take more responsibility for yourself.
But it’s a very interesting message and it came at a very interesting time. I think
all the policymaking now – probably including Italy – is driving that agenda but not
very explicitly.
There is a big opportunity where the governance model that we are being invi-
ted to develop here – because the Sendai model says governments are primarily re-
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sponsible but they can’t do it alone, they need all of society to engage. So the que-
stion that I have now launched with many, many people, groups, interested indivi-
duals, “This is very good. This is a promise, but the government is not going to call
us. We shouldn’t sit and wait to be invited.” We have to develop the idea, the model
and reach out to them and oﬀer the collaboration that creates the sense of common
purpose. Because the rest model – and I’ve seen a lot of it – governments but only
governments – international institutions as well – We come up with all the answers
and then we say “Ah, we should consult”. “We came up with this, what do you think?”
And that’s probably not the type of consultation that will generate the type of col-
laboration and the sense of common purpose really building on what is feasible to
do.
So we have suggested perhaps that type of governance model needs to include
a mechanism and a political willingness that involves all of society in deﬁning what
the problem is, what the solution is and deﬁning what the respective roles can be.
Valeria said before cannot really demand from the private sector or expect them.
I think one can demand from the private sector. Not through regulation but just
through their self-preservation because if only 75 per cent of the risk scenarios that
HPSCC tells us that we can show you, if only 75 per cent comes through the long-
term viability of mainstream business is as much in jeopardy as my individual life
and welfare.
So I do believe that there is a territory to expect a bit more. And if it isn’t we have
reason to be pessimistic
But then there is, and this is my ﬁnal point; i have heard a lot, you have heard a
lot, about this enormous amount of money that are slightly passive today an they are
just waited to be released because of the climate agreement. We are talking about
trillions and trillions of dollars, I do not know where they are, and sometimes I have
asked: ‘is this real money or just virtual money?’
If I ask to this money to see them we learn one behaviour to show me the mo-
ney. I asked a university Professor and he says: ’No, I agree with you, I think it is only
virtual money’.
This is a very scaring thought. Because our whole system is build on this money,
from the Paris agreement and be released in investment that will be the foundation
for the sustainability unsafety of our own civilization. Actually do exist, I mean I am
not going a bit beyond the UN positions in this regard, but all this questions come
up as we try to understand the space where, yes, the public sector cannot continue
to be a diﬀerent type of State and, yes, the private sector can play a much more si-
gniﬁcant role in responsible function, but that famous level playing wrong that the
private sector has asked for now over 10 years of negotiations, needs to be better de-
ﬁned and this requires both the public sector and private sector.
And the ﬁnal point is important issues around communication, education, all ful-
ly agree on them. There is also a need for, and that is probably one the most com-
plicated thing, is a easy think to say. A couple of years ago I was on a panel about
global responsability, on the panel there were two former prime ministers, there was
a parlamentarian from the European Parliament, there was somebody else an then
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there was me. All these gentlemen said that the problem was the lack of leadership.
Two former prime ministers, a parlamentarian. What is wrong with this picture? Are-
n’t you those who are supposed to provide that leadership?
Call for an ethical leadership in a very complicated world. Very soppresed bet-
ween diﬀerent forces but also generally with, I think, a very worrying perspective.
Well that ethical moral leadership that is communicated as a position clear and
straightforward and not vacillate for short-term beneﬁts.
We hear Pope Francis being the leading Twitter in the world and I think he pro-
vides the kind of ethical and moral leadership, that we do need a lot more of, other-
wise, what we already know we will have diﬃculties driving that implementation.
My ﬁnal and personal, very personal is that when we get to 2030 I hope we’ll have
the wisdom to say maybe we just need only one instrument. Just make our work ea-
sier, let’s not have sustainability development, the climate one, disaster risk reduc-
tion one, ﬁnancial one, let’s integrate them into one. One instrument that guides the
sustainability of development, of all societies.
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The missioN oF The world BaNk iN poverTy eradicaTioN
Sergio Lugaresi*
* World Bank.
The world met the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) target of halving the glo-
bal poverty rate in 2010, ﬁve years ahead of schedule. In many ways, development
has advanced more rapidly over the 15-year MDG era than at any other time in hu-
man history.
Still poverty remains unacceptably high, with an estimated 900 million people
in 2012 living on less than $1.90 a day. Poverty also is becoming increasingly con-
centrated in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the MDGs were successful in redu-
cing income poverty, but they were less successful in ameliorating non-income de-
privations, such as access to quality education or to basic health services. In 2013,
over 5 billion people in developing countries were breathing polluted air.
Last year, the United Nations have adopted the new Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs). The SDGs aim to scale up impact through a more integrated appro-
ach to development. Meeting SDG investment needs to shift from “billions” in oﬃ-
cial development assistance to “trillions” in investments of all kinds, unlocking, le-
veraging, and catalyzing public and private resources.
In this framework, the mission of the World Bank Group is to eradicate pover-
ty. These mean to reach three objectives: 1) to end extreme poverty globally by 2030;
2) to promote shared prosperity, i.e. a steady increase of the income of the bottom
40 percent of the population of each country; 3) to reduce inequality of opportunities,
i.e. the non-income dimension of poverty, investing in human resources.
To reach these objectives, the World Bank Group provides mainly project ﬁnance
and technical assistance. It has built up knowledges in many various ﬁelds of deve-
lopment. Knowledges and competences are grouped in four areas:
1) Equitable Growth, Finance and Institutions, which includes Finance & Markets,
Governance, Macroeconomics & Fiscal Management, Poverty & Equity, Trade &
Competitiveness; in particular, policies that encourage the geographic expansion
of the ﬁnancial sector and broaden access to banks and other intermediating in-
stitutions may help channel savings to investments in small and medium en-
terprises, as well as underserved regions.
2) Human Development: Education, Health, Nutrition & Population, Social Protection
& Labor; robust insurance mechanisms are needed to protect the extremely poor
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from destitution and the vulnerable against evolving risks, including climate chan-
ge; income poverty is typically accompanied by inadequate access to Education,
Health, housing, employment and personal security – areas where improvements
would increase the chances for escaping poverty.
3) Sustainable Development: Agriculture, Energy & Extractives, Environment & Na-
tural Resources, Social, Urban, Rural & Resilience, Transport & ICT, Water;
4) Crosscutting solutions: Climate Change Fragility, Conﬂict & Violence Gender Jobs
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP).
Let me expand a little bit on Climate Change and on a few sectors that are most aﬀected
and need huge investments: 1) Agriculture, 2) Energy and extractives, 3) Transport
and ITC, 4) Water, 5) Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience. At the end, I will mention
how the World Bank intends to mobilize Public and Private resources and what are
the business opportunities for Italian companies.
climaTe chaNge
No country will be immune from the impacts of continued warming and increasing
damage from weather-related disasters, but it will be the poor – those least responsible
for the damage – who will suﬀer the most. In Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia,
the number of exposed poor could grow to 325 million by 2030. Globally, urbani-
zation is increasing the number of people in slums, which frequently form in the hi-
ghest-risk areas, exposing the poor to greater risks from heat waves, ﬂooding, mud-
slides, and disease.
Among the World Bank's priority actions:
1) Building low-carbon, climate-resilient cities by mobilizing direct ﬁnance and ex-
pertise and helping fast growing cities avoid locking in carbon intensive infra-
structure.
2) Moving forward on climate-smart agriculture through building an Action Alliance
to realize the triple win of increasing yields and income, making farms more re-
silient to climate change, and helping to sequester carbon in the soil.
3) Working with others to accelerate energy eﬃciency, investment in renewable ener-
gy, and universal access to modern energy.
4) Laying the groundwork for placing a robust value on carbon, including a push
for innovation in carbon markets.
5) Supporting the removal of harmful fossil fuel subsidies.
These actions require innovative ways to mobilize resources from both the public and
private sectors. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), through its work with
the private sector, supports renewable power, energy eﬃciency, green buildings, and
other climate-smart solutions for developing countries, and has invested more than
$11 billion in climate-related projects since 2005. IBRD and IFC are also the wor-
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ld's largest issuers of green bonds to support low-carbon projects, with $5.3 billion
issued by the World Bank Treasury in 61 bonds and 17 currencies, and $3.4 billion
by the IFC, including two $1 billion benchmark oﬀerings in 2013.
agriculTure
Agriculture is vulnerable to climate change and it is, with associated deforestation,
the largest contributor to greenhouse gases. Ending extreme poverty and boosting
shared prosperity cannot be achieved without more and better investment in agri-
culture, food security, and nutrition. Seventy-ﬁve percent of the world’s poor live in
rural areas, most are involved in farming. At the same time, food production must
increase by at least 50% to feed 9 billion people by 2050.
Agriculture can help to stop a 4°C warmer world: it is the only sector that can
suck carbon out of the atmosphere. Climate Smart Agriculture has the potential to
deliver a “triple win” of increased productivity, enhanced resilience, and lower emis-
sions.
eNergy aNd exTracTives
An environmentally and socially responsible approach to energy and extractives is
critical to attain sustainability objectives. The energy sector contributes about 40%
of global CO2 emissions, making the transition to a more sustainable energy mix cri-
tical for climate change mitigation. World Bank Group energy teams play a critical
role in this process. At the same time, providing reliable electricity to the unserved
and inadequately served people of the world is central to eﬀorts to eradicate extre-
me poverty and create shared prosperity.
The World Bank’s priorities are:
• Achieving universal access to reliable modern energy: generation, transmission,
electriﬁcation, clean cooking solutions.
• Shifting energy systems to a more sustainable path: renewable energy, natural
gas, energy eﬃciency.
• Improving the investment climate for energy: sector reform and governance, stren-
gthening utilities, enhancing investment framework and encouraging private sec-
tor participation, rationalizing subsidies.
TraNsporT aNd iTc
Virtual and physical connectivity is a critical factor of competitiveness and economic
growth. However, a third of the world’s population lacks access to an all-weather road,
and two-thirds of people in developing countries are more than one hour away from
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a large city. Sixty percent of the world’s population lack internet access, and even whe-
re broadband service is available, many of the poorest cannot aﬀord it.
The WBG is the largest provider of development ﬁnance for transport globally,
with an active portfolio of $47 billion; 74% of Bank projects include an ICT-related
component.
waTer
Around 2.5 billion people lack access to improved sanitation and 748 million lack
access to improved water supply. One in 3 of the poorest 40% do not have access to
improved drinking water and 4 in 5 do not have access to improved sanitation. De-
gradation of water quality due to poor water management is reducing the amount
of freshwater, degrading land, aﬀecting ecosystems and aﬀecting the health of mil-
lions of poor. In perspective, energy demand will increase 35% by 2035, increasing
water use by 15%: by 2050, developing countries will need to double food produc-
tion with less water allocated for irrigation. Coastal cities could see $1 trillion in da-
mages due to climate-change related ﬂoods by 2050.
social, urBaN, rural aNd resilieNce
1 billion people live in slums today and poverty is urbanizing. 1.5 billion people live
in countries aﬀected by repeated cycles of violence. In the past decade, the number
of people aﬀected by natural disasters tripled to 2 billion.
Although 80% of GDP is generated in urban areas, social exclusion and inequali-
ty are rapidly growing in cities. Since 1980, low-income countries have accounted for
only 9% of the disaster events but 48% of fatalities. Increasing the resilience of cities,
villages, and communities is critical because the burden of disasters, conﬂict, crime, and
violence falls disproportionately on the poor and the bottom 40% of the population.
1 billion people are expected to move to cities by 2030. The growth path of ci-
ties, human settlements, and rural areas has local and global implications for su-
stainability and climate change. Ensuring that the marginalized and vulnerable seg-
ments of society have a say in deﬁning their development path is indispensable.
puBlic-privaTe parTNership (ppp)
In PPPs, risk can be allocated between the public and private actors according to their
capacity to manage it. PPPs also leverage scarce public funding and introduce pri-
vate sector technology and innovation to public services.
The challenge of project ﬁnancing is not a fundamental lack of capital, but ra-
ther a shortage of investment grade projects. Governments need to pay more attention
to the selection, quality and management of infrastructure projects.
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For this reason, the World Bank has set up a Global Infrastructure Facility (GFI):
a global open platform to facilitate the preparation and structuring of complex in-
frastructure PPPs.
how To Track opporTuNiTies
UN-Development Business (UNDB) contains all projects ﬁnanced by the WB, and other
Multilateral Financial Institutions. Development Gateway Market (European Com-
mission dgMarket) includes also projects ﬁnanced nationally. E-Consultant2 is the
WB data bank for consultants. The World Bank website (www.worldbank.org) con-
tains country frameforks, operational summaries, information documents. In par-
ticular the procurement page (www.worldbank.org/procure) contains the procu-
rement framework, standard bidding and procurement documents, a guide to bu-
siness opportunities and much more.
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There is a moral crisis, there is a lack of faith, of trust, in institutions. Populism is on
the rise because they feel that we or you leads.
When you take pools of what concern people most; things like climate change,
system development are very low, immigration, terrorism now, all this issues are much
bigger.
As Mark Valley said, the reason why that will be no change is that the people who
stand to lose from change has got all the power and, the people who stand a gain from
change, has none of the power. That describes the global aid system today.
We need to stand over because for how things are now, there will be no chan-
ge.
So, to stand over, we made a movie, called poverty, inc.
It is subtitled: ’why ﬁghting poverty is a big business?’
It shows you how the most well intentioned charible activities can actually harm
the poor.
Help comes from a good heart, people gives food, gives shoes, they encourage
others to get. The problem is: it does not work. What poors need is to no longer be
excluted. They have way to get out of it, to ﬁx it.
The donations have an unpredictable impact on the local economy, because why
would poors buy something that they can have for free.
An interesting example able to describe the failure of the aid system is what is
happening now in Haiti.
Some of the disincentives that have been created by the development aids, cha-
rible organizations, for example when it came to adopting children.
It turned out that there are aided children in the orphages in Haiti, that actual-
ly have parents. They have being send to the orphages, so they can be adopted and
send money back home.
This is not planned but this things happen, because people respond to incentives,
and, that way of thinking about economics, is what we try to do in our Institute.
This movie describes even countries as Italy or Greece, showing us how inter-
connected we are.
They are countries where there is no growth, no trust in institutions and whe-
re the elite is out of touch.
The poverTy cure: a markeT approach
All these matters are becoming universal, so we hope to show this movie, espe-
cially in northern Europe: in Geneva, in Brussel, in London; these are the centres of
this global power.
All we want to do, is to start a conversation. To re-examine the very primisis of
the aid system and of the global trade system.
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Growth of course is a key issue at the global level, but let me start by emphasising
that growth is the key to the survival of the European social model. The last centu-
ry as widely demonstrated that reasonable degree, distribution, and fairy economic
system is sustainable only in the present of suﬃcient rhetor rules. Without growth,
society has become increasingly intolerance, intolerance for diversity, social immobility
that in a long arm may be destroyed the very basis of our model of life and question
even the democratic way of government.
ecoNomic progress is liNked To social aNd poliTical progress
Economic theory has identiﬁed the most important drivers of the growth. One way
or another, any of this driver, de facto, is a forum investment on innovation, infra-
structure, productive capital and even human capital. As Keynes, noted investment
depends on expectations. The risk we are facing in Europe in the coming decade is
that Europe is perceived as a no growth area where the climate for investment is bad
and retards are relatively low. This would practically deliver the expectations in rea-
lity. It is the duty for government to restore conditions for positive expectations; many
governments around the world have long understood the critical injunction in which
we are. We need appropriate positive expectations to restore positive expectations.
Italy does not ask for weekening budget, but on the contrary, we are committed to
rigorous budget policies, but together with discipline in budget policies, at national
level, and expensive macro economic policy is necessary at Union level.
Europe has not to wait, that some other country in the world, as United States
or others behaves as the engine of the international economy, Europe has to be the
engine for itself and for the world and for its citizens. The economic and social pro-
gress, not the austerity, has to be the future of the Europe of course a macro-economic
policy has to be an answer for reforms at institutional and economic level.
About institutions, a strategy to restore positive expectations and to restore growth
must start with stable institution that can credibly committed to pro growth policies.
Of course, what we need is not more institution, but if anything, less but better in-
stitution and more eﬀective institutions, that is institution able to take credibly com-
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mitments to worlds about a large scape public investment plan and an investor frien-
dly policy in all the main areas of interest. We must ﬁnd at European Union and Eu-
rozone level a diﬀerent equilibrium between national sovereignty and EU identity,
and in the research we must be bold, because both national policies and EU policies
are at risk of lacking the necessary degree of credibility without a framework of con-
tinuum deepening of the intra EU relationships.
The very complex of European instituition that has so long provided a framework
from which many countries, including Italy, have gain stability to deliver a credible
reform program that may convince investors that Europe is not able to deliver a stra-
tegy for the long run, some radical thinking is necessary here.
In Italy we have tried to be radical in several ways. For instance with the consti-
tutional reform and the new voting system we are providing the basis for stability of
future governments and to improve the eﬀectiveness of a democratic decision-making.
Lack of investment has often be in the past the product of uncertainty about po-
licies and regulation, now we are giving stability to rules and improving our regu-
lation system.
policies, FirsT oF all The juNcker plaN.
Investment needs not only credible institutions, but policies as well. in an uncertain
environment, especially for long run investments, public intervention is necessary.
I am proud to claim that the central rule that Italy has played in shaping the new com-
missions commitment that was the investment plan for Europe and kick-start of the
European plan for strategic investement.
We are also so far through to ‘Cassa Depositi e Prestiti’, one of the main contri-
butors to the investment plan. The Juncker plan and the European fund is the ap-
propriate instruments as it provides high level and impartial scrutiny over the qua-
lity of projects.
Policies, structural reforms. Another pillar to ensure larger investment in Euro-
pe is of course structural reforms, Italian governments has been engaged in the past
years into structural reforms ranging from market liberalizations to labour market
reforms. This is completely new, considering that ﬁscal stability in the past has been
achieved often through tax increases now we are obtaining ﬁscal stability, reducing
tax. Competitiveness is crucial to delivering increased strategic investments, in this
ﬁeld the government can and will pursue policies to improve the regulatory envi-
ronment and we are, as I said before, announcing the regulatory framework in or-
der to give stability and to give commitment to worse stability of rules.
iNFrasTrucTure iNvesTmeNT
We have improved the project evaluation and decreased the number of programming
investment. It may seen to an outside observer that this means less investment, on
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the contrary. The past programs were only artiﬁcially inﬂating the number of pro-
jects. We are now concentrating resources on a credible number of projects.
This is an announcement of the investment capacity of Italian institutions, cen-
tral and local governments.
Finance. Due to the consistent reform eﬀort in the last year, I could verify a re-
venued interest of international investors on Italy which I think is due to the ap-
preciation for a productive system. We consider ﬁnance not part of the problem but
part of the solution. The Italian government action has been aimed at creating more
opportunities for investment of diﬀerent intermediates expand the range of instru-
ments available to ﬁrms and investors and increasing the equity participation in Ita-
lian ﬁrms. Some example: new forms of ﬁnancing, for instance mini-bonds reforms,
were encouraged.
The market for ﬁnancing ﬁrms have been opened to long-term investors, like pen-
sion funds and the insurance ﬁrms. A whole coherent regulatory and incentive for
innovative start-ups has been released. Of course, we expect ﬁnancial investors more
interested to productive investment rather than speculation.
In the last years a wave of new regulation has improved dramatically the tran-
sparency and capital requirements of the credit intermediaries.
Credit intermediaries exist for a purpose, producing information and monitor
ﬁrms.
We need eﬃcient and eﬀective ﬁnancial intermediaries and we need rules, which




Head of Regional Oﬃce for Europe of the United Nations Oﬃce for Disaster Risk Reduction
In her current role, she supported the Europe region preparatory process and deli-
very of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, which was
endorsed at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction. Paola joi-
ned UNISDR in 2004 during the preparations for the Second UN World Conferen-
ce on Disaster Reduction, contributing to the conference the Outcome Analysis Do-
cument on the status of risk reduction implementation at the global level.
Between 2005 and 2008, Paola worked on policy issues related to building re-
silience to disasters, including the development of guidelines on indicators assessing
disaster risks, and the mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction into sustainable de-
velopment policies and programmes.
Her previous work experience includes the coordination of Common Country As-
sessment and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (programmes
addressing sustainable development issues) in Djibouti as part of the UN Resident
Coordinator Oﬃce (1999-2003); supporting the UN Country Teams in developing
sustainable development policies as part of the United Nations Staﬀ System Colle-
ge in Turin; and conducting programme evaluations as independent consultant at
the International Labour Organisation.
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aNgelo Federico arcelli
Partner in Oliver Wyman and Director for Government Relations (Europe) of Marsh and
MacLennan Companies
He is a partner in, a global strategic consulting ﬁrm. As a part of his assignment in
Oliver Wyman he also serves, since 2014, as a director for government relations (Eu-
rope) of Marsh and MacLennan Companies
He has served as adviser to the vice president of European Investment Bank (Lu-
xembourg, 2004-2008) and then adviser and member of the executive board of the
World Bank (Washington, DC – USA, 2008-2009). In 2009-2010 he has been advi-
ser in the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), part of the World Bank Group. He
has been a member of the Consultative Committee (“Osservatorio”) on the European
Constitution in Italy’s Ministry of EU Aﬀairs (2002-2004).
In the private sector, he held positions in IMI Bank, McKinsey & Company and
Accenture.
Having held several academic position, in the US and Europe, he is currently non-
resident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations of SAIS Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity – Washington, DC – USA (resident in 2012-2013).
He holds a degree (MSc) in economics from Bocconi University (Milan) and a
PhD in economic history from the same university.
FraNco BassaNiNi
Special Adviser to the Prime Minister and President of the Long-term Investors Club
Franco Bassanini, former Italian Cabinet Minister for Public Administration and Re-
gional Aﬀairs (1996-2001) and Professor of Constitutional Law at the First Univer-
sity of Rome, is now President of Astrid Foundation, an Italian think tank gathering
lisT oF auThors224
together about 350 scientists and experts in the ﬁeld of European and National in-
stitutions, public policies, public administration's reform, market regulation and e-
government (www.astrid.eu). He has also been, and currently is President of the Su-
pervisory Board of Condotte d’Acqua Inc., Chairman of the Executive Boards of Me-
troweb Italia Inc., Metroweb Sviluppo Inc. and CDP Reti Inc.(holding controlling Snam
and Terna Inc.). He has been member of the Italian Parliament from 1979 to 2006,
Chairman of Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (the Italian National Development Bank) from
2008 to 2015 and recently Chairman of the Long-Term Investors’ Club.
alBerTo BaBaN
President of Conﬁndustria Piccola Industria
Born in Venice in 1966. Since 2013 Alberto Baban is the President of Conﬁndustria
Piccola Industria, the organization of Conﬁndustria for SMEs, and Vice President of
the Confederation. He is also Vice President of BUSINESSMED, the Union des Con-
federations Méditerranéenne d'Entreprises. President of Tapì Group. Located in Mas-
sanzago (Padua), the company produces technical and synthetic plastic corks for wi-
nes and spirits. Founded in 1998, since 2000 the company became a corporation and
nowadays has 5 production sites in Italy and abroad with commercial relations with
60 countries. Alberto Baban is also the majority shareholder of GTA Moda, a com-
pany active in the ﬁeld of fashion for men's trousers. Alberto Baban is also co-foun-
der of VeNetWork Spa, a company shared by 50 entrepreneurs. VeNetWork Spa ope-
rates in the funding and development of new businesses and exploits the networ-
king advantages to start new investments in companies based in the Veneto area. Star-
ting from this experience, Alberto Baban works to promote the industrial develop-
ment and growth of Italian excellences in all Italian regions. Since 2014 Alberto Ba-




President, Narodowy Bank Polski, and Professor of Economics
Born in 1952, Marek Belka specialises in applied economics and contemporary eco-
nomic thought. He has served, among others, as Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of
Finance (twice) and as Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland. He has worked as
Chairman of the Council for International Coordination for Iraq, as Director of Eco-
nomic Policy in the Coalition Provisional Authority, and as Executive Secretary of
Economic Commission for Europe. Before he was appointed President of Narodowy
Bank Polski in June 2010, he was Director of the European Department at the In-
ternational Monetary Fund.
jocheN BiedermaNN
Senior Advisor, Frankfurt Main Finance
Jochen is an experienced consultant in the ﬁnancial industry and beyond. Based in
Frankfurt and Hong Kong, he supports ﬁnancial centres, stock exchanges, regula-
tory authorities and corporates in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. On behalf of
the ﬁnancial centre of Frankfurt he takes care of development and implementing par-
tnerships between Frankfurt and other international ﬁnancial centres, as well as of
positioning Frankfurt as an Oﬀshore Renminbi centre among German and EU com-
panies to ease their business with China. Additionally, he helps leading ﬁnancial cen-
tres like Frankfurt to develop themselves into global FinTech hubs, establishing vi-
brant start-up ecosystems and supporting young companies with new business ide-
as in ﬁnance & technology.
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chrisTiaN BuchmaNN
Committee of the Regions, Chair of the ECON Committee
Mr. Christian Buchmann was born in Graz on 27th of September 1962. He is gra-
duated at Carnerigasse grammar school of Graz, afterwards compulsory military ser-
vice in the Austrian Federal Army. He studied at the University of Graz and Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). He holds a master’s degree and a doctorate
in Social and Economic Sciences. He started his career in 1982 at Styrian Federal Eco-
nomic Chamber. Member of the City Government Graz, was responsible for Economic
Aﬀairs, Science and Culture. From 2005 to 2010 was appointed as Minister for Eco-
nomic Aﬀairs, Innovation and Finance in Styria and from 2010 to 2015 covered the
position of Minister for Economic Aﬀairs, Europe and Culture. Since 2015 he is Mi-
nister for Economic Aﬀairs, Tourism, Europe and Culture in Styria and, also, Presi-
dent of the Commission for Economic Policy (ECON) of the Committee of the Re-
gions. Since 2011 Mr. Buchmann is Member of the Committee of the Regions of the
European Union. Since 2012 is Vice president of the Automotive Intergroup of the
Committee of the Regions.
Federico corNelli
Head EU Regulatory Aﬀairs at ABI – Italian Banking Association. Federico holds a de-
gree in Economics at Bocconi University and a PhD in ﬁnance. Fellow at Cambridge and
German Bundeskultur Ausstaschdienst at Wuerzburg, he started his career as ﬁnancial
analyst and then corporate banker in 1990 at Banco di Roma and then Arab Banking.
Corporation in London, Bahrain and Milan. In 1994 he joined BNL – Banca Na-
zionale del Lavoro as corporate banker, economist, head of ﬁnancial market analy-
sis and strategies and in 2003 head of marketing – ﬁnancial institutions.
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In 2005 he was named head of ﬁnancial analysis department and member of the
Surveillance Committee at Consob of Italy, the Italian ﬁnancial market regulator.
In 2007 he served as expert for the US Department of State.
In 2009 he joined Federcasse as Chief Operating Oﬃcer and as General Mana-
ger of the institutional cross guarantee fund of the Italian credit cooperative banking
system.
davide dal maso
Secretary General Forum Finanza Sostenibile
Mr. Dal Maso has worked for years as a business consultant, specialising in envi-
ronmental management and innovation. Among the founders of the Milan-based Avan-
zi – a think tank for sustainability, he has focused his studies on the relationship bet-
ween ﬁnancial activities and sustainable development. He currently runs research
and consulting activities for the design and the implementation of strategies and ma-
nagement systems for corporate social responsibility. Davide is President of Make
a Cube3, an incubator that assists start ups with high potential for creating social and
green value, by providing comprehensive business support services, including
back-oﬃce, governance expertise, access to knowledge and ﬁnancing.
He is Secretary General of the Forum per la Finanza Sostenibile (the Italian So-
cial Investment Forum) – a non-proﬁt multistakeholders organisation whose mission
is to enhance the awareness of Italian ﬁnancial community on sustainability. In this
capacity, he is also member of the Board of Eurosif, the European Sustainable In-
vestment Forum. He is member of the board of the Italian CSR Manager Network,
the association of CSR professionals, as well as of Make a Change, the Italian Mo-
vement for the promotion of the values of social business. He has been until 2011
director and Head of SRI Department at Vigeo Italia (formerly Avanzi SRI Research),
the ﬁrst Italian social rating agency, providing ESG research and consulting servi-
ces for institutional investors and ﬁnancial professionals.
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edouard-FraNçois de leNcquesaiNg
CEO, European Institute of Financial Regulation/Paris-Europlace
Edouard-François de Lencquesaing after being a consultant with ACCENTURE has
been a banker with CCF-HSBC,head of transaction banking & IT, ending special ad-
visor of the chairman. He is now a consultant in his own firm specialized on Euro-
pean issues related to the financial industry (Netmanagers) and CEO of European
institute of Financial Regulation (EIFR), treasurer of “Confrontation Europe” he was
special advisor of Paris Europlace. He is very much involved in European issues &
EU-US convergence in finance. He is also business angel. He is Délégué Départemental
de l’Ordre de Malte France. He is Commander in the French Navy (reserve).
claudio de viNceNTi
Undersecretary of State for the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Italy
Claudio De Vincenti is a professor of economics. On February 28, 2014 he was ap-
pointed Undersecretary of Economic Development, while, on June 25, 2014 he was
designated Deputy Minister. Then, form April 10, 2014 was chosen as Undersecre-
tary of State for the Presidency of the Council of Ministers with the function of Se-
cretary of the Council of Ministers. In the past he has covered the position of Un-
dersecretary to the Minister of Public Development. His professional activity invol-
ves various lines which include: intensive research and teaching as a Professor of Eco-
nomics at the Department of Economics and Law, University of Rome “La Sapien-
za”; regulation activity in public utility services; Economic Advisor to the Presidency
of the Council, the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Health; par-
ticipation in national and international consultation committees and organizations.
He is also author of numerous scientific publications in Italian and international jour-
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nals. His activity of research includes Macroeconomics and its microfoundations, Pu-
blic Economics, Welfare Policies. He held numerous positions among which he was
President of the Scientific Committee of the Prices Observatory of the Ministry of
Productive Activity; coordinator of the Technical and Scientific Council of the Family
Observatory for the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Member of the Board of
Directors of AIFA (Italian Drugs Agency). He was also member of the Evaluation Com-
mittee for the social security spending in the Ministry of Labour. He is also the mem-
ber of the Executive Committee of the Foundation Astrid, Member of the Executi-
ve Committee of the Foundation Nens and Member of the Scientific Committee of
the “European Research Centre” in Rome.
Nicky edwards
Former Director of Policy and Public Aﬀairs, TheCityUK
Nicky Edwards joined TheCityUK in December 2013 as Director of Policy and Pu-
blic Affairs, where she leads a team which engages with UK policymakers, EU in-
stitutions and other Member States to present the evidence of the importance of fi-
nancial and related professional services to global competitiveness. TheCityUK pro-
duced, in its role as a partner in the International Regulatory Strategy Group (IRSG),
the report ‘Long term finance for infrastructure and growth companies’ (March 2015),
providing recommendations to Member States, the European Commission, the fi-
nancial services industry, central banks and regulatory authorities, and the EIB and
the EIF on how best to bring about increased investment in infrastructure and removing
barriers to long term growth. She was previously at Just Retirement, where she ma-
naged the group’s public affairs programme during its initial public offering and li-
sting on the FTSE 250 and developed campaigns on the use of housing equity, reti-
rement finance and care funding. Prior to this Nicky was Head of Public Affairs at
both The Law Society and General Social Care Council. In the 2010-2015 Parliament,
Nicky served as a member of the Speaker’s Advisory Council on Public Engagement,




Dario Focarelli is Director General of ANIA since the 18th of September 2012.
Since 2004 to 2013 he was Director of the Economics and Finance Dept and Chief
Economist of ANIA (Italian Association of insurance firms) as well Chairman of the
ECON Committee composed by representatives of Italian insurance firms.
From 2004 to 2008 he was Member of the Consultative Panel of experts from the
insurance industry, and users and consumers (CEIOPS). From 2004 to 2012 he was
Member of the Ecofin Committee of the European insurance trade associations (In-
surance Europe). Prior to that he was Deputy Director of the Bank of Italy Research
Dept. and joined several task forces under the aegida of the Committee on the Glo-
bal Financial System (BIS) in Basel, the European Commission (EPC) in Brussels,
the European Central Bank in Frankfurt. In 2011 he was Member of the Insurance
and Reinsurance Stakeholder Group of the EIOPA. From 2011 to February 2015 he
was Member of the Advisory Scientific Committee of the ESRB a body of the Euro-
pean System of Financial Supervision. Since 2012 he is Member of the Executive Com-
mittee of Insurance Europe.
paolo garoNNa
Secretary General of the Italian Banking Insurance and Finance Federation
Full Professor of Political Economy at the LUISS Guido Carli University of Rome, Pao-
lo Garonna was Director General of the Association of Italian Insurers (ANIA), Di-
rector General of the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) and, from 1989
to 1992, Deputy Director for Labour, Social Affairs and Education at the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Paris. He was also De-
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puty Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE) in Geneva, and Chief Economist of Confindustria from 2003 to 2005. He
carried out research in America as Fulbright scholar, and in Cambridge, Great Bri-
tain, where he co-operated with the Nobel Prize winner Richard Stone. He has pu-
blished a considerable number of books and essays on Applied Economics, Statistics
and Finance. He has been the Secretary General of the Italian Banking, Insurance
and Finance Federation since October 2012.
mark garviN
Vice Chairman for the Corporate & Investment Bank at J.P. Morgan
Mark Garvin is Vice Chairman for the Corporate & Investment Bank at J.P. Morgan.
He is also Chairman of J.P. Morgan Europe Ltd and Chairman of the Supervisory
Board of J.P. Morgan AG. Mr Garvin has worked for J.P. Morgan and its predeces-
sor banks since 1978. After serving in various capacities in the Latin American di-
vision he became credit officer in Paris in 1982. He transferred to London in 1985
where he assumed responsibility for UK client coverage. In 1988 he was appointed
deputy general manager of the London branch and in 1992 became UK Senior Coun-
try Officer. In 1997 he was appointed Chief Operating Officer – Europe, Middle East
& Africa, and in 2004 became Chairman, Treasury & Securities Services International,
a position he held until assuming his current role in 2012. He is Senior Independent
Director of Euroclear Plc, Deputy Chairman of The British Bankers Association and
a Director of BritishAmerican Business.
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roBerTo gualTieri
MEP, Chair of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Aﬀairs
Roberto Gualtieri (born in Rome, 19/07/1966) has been a member of the Europe-
an Parliament since 2009. In July 2014, he has been elected Chair of the Commit-
tee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. He graduated in literature and philosophy
(1992) and has a research doctorate (PhD) in contemporary history (1997). Mr. Gual-
tieri is an associate professor of contemporary history at 'La Sapienza' University, Rome.
He is member of the National board of the Partito Democratico (Italy), since 2008.
FraNco giaNNiNi guazzugli
Vicepresident ANASF
Franco Giannini Guazzugli was born in 1953. He is financial advisor of Fideuram sin-
ce 1984, in Anasf since 1986. He started his professional career at the Cassa di Risparmio
di Roma in 1977, where worked until 1984. Coordinator of Lazio from 1996 to 1998,
he was elected for the first time in the National Council at the Sorrento Congress of 1998.
He is serving his fifth mandate in the Council. In the four years from 2002 to 2006, he
was a member of the Commission to draft the Charter of the Rights of Investors. From
2006 to 2011, he was responsible of the Decentralization Commission the Center Area.
From May 2011 to 2015 was Deputy Chairman of Anasf; he was in the Executive Com-
mittee before with mandate for Decentralization and then with mandate for Contractual,
Fiscal and social security protection Area, with particular impact in the area of taxa-
tion. In 2013 he was appointed as representative of the Anasf – Council Forum of Su-





Kishore Jayabalan is director of Istituto Acton, the Acton Institute's Rome office. For-
merly, he worked for the Vatican's Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace as an ana-
lyst for environmental and disarmament issues and desk officer for English-speaking
countries. Kishore Jayabalan earned a B.A. in political science and economics from
the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. In college, he was executive editor of The Mi-
chigan Review and an economic policy intern for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
He worked as an international economist for the Bureau of Labor Statistics in Wa-
shington, D.C. and then graduated with an M.A. in political science from the Uni-
versity of Toronto. During his graduate studies, Kishore was baptized and received
into the Roman Catholic Church by Pope John Paul II in Rome in 1996. He later wor-
ked as a student campus minister at the university's Newman Centre, which led to
his appointment to the Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See to the United
Nations in New York in 1997. Two years later, he returned to Rome to work for the
Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. Kishore became director of Istituto Acton
in 2005 and organizes the institute's educational and outreach efforts in Rome and
throughout Europe.
luca lazzaroli
Deputy Secretary General, European Investment Bank
Luca Lazzaroli holds an Economics and Finance degree from the University of Rome
“La Sapienza” where he also pursued his post-graduate studies after studying at the
Georgetown University in Washington D.C. – USA. He is a Chartered Accountant (“Re-
visore Contabile” and “Dottore Commercialista”). He spent the first four years of his
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professional career working for The Chase Manhattan Bank, in Milan and London,
as a credit officer first, subsequently joining the corporate finance team. He joined
the European Investment Bank in 1992 in the risk department. He subsequently mo-
ved to the Italian operational department and in the second half of 2000 worked for
the Italian PPP Task Force as head of the financial unit. In 2001-2006 he was back
at the EIB with the Benelux Division where he was appointed Deputy Division Head.
In 2006 he was subsequently appointed Head of Division in charge of lending to in-
frastructure projects and PPPs in Spain. In May 2011 he became Head of the South-
East Europe lending department (covering Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and
Cyprus). In April 2014 he was appointed Deputy Secretary General in the General
Secretariat of the EIB. Since 1 June 2015 he is Director General, Deputy Head of Ope-
rations.
johN llewellyN
Co-founder and partner Llewellyn Consulting
John Llewellyn, before co-founding Llewellyn Consulting, John Llewellyn was Glo-
bal Chief Economist and then Senior Economic Policy Advisor at Lehman Brothers.
This followed almost twenty years at the Organisation for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) in Paris, where variously he was Head of International
Forecasting and Policy Analysis, editor of the OECD Economic Outlook, Deputy Di-
rector for Social Affairs, Manpower and Education, and finally Chef de Cabinet to
the Secretary-General. Prior to that he spent nearly ten years at the Faculty of Eco-
nomics of the University of Cambridge, and he was also a Fellow of St. John’s Col-
lege. In 1974 he was appointed Assistant Director of Research in the Faculty of Eco-
nomics.
John earned his undergraduate degree at the Victoria University of Wellington,




CEO and Group CIO, Pioneer Investments and Chairman, Assogestioni
Giordano Lombardo is Chief Executive Officer and Group Chief Investment Offi-
cer of Pioneer Investments. Prior to his appointment as CEO, he held the position
of Deputy CEO and has been Group CIO, responsible for global investment activities,
since 2001. Giordano is also Chairman of Assogestioni, the Italian Association of
Fund Managers, Vice Chairman of FeBAF (Federazione Banche Assicurazioni e Fi-
nanza) and Vice Chairman of Italy’s Corporate Governance Committee. With over
30 years of experience in the asset management industry, including over 20 years
with Pioneer Investments, Giordano holds various directorships within the Pioneer
Investments group of companies, including Chairman of Pioneer Investment Ma-
nagement SGRpA (Italy) and Pioneer Investment Management Limited (Ire-
land).
sergio lugaresi
Head of Oﬃce, World Bank Oﬃce in Rome
Sergio Lugaresi is currently project manager at the Italian Banking Association in Fran-
kfurt and ad interim Head of Rome Office of the World Bank in Rome. He is also mem-
ber of the Panel of Experts of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He has been
Head of Regulatory Affairs at UniCredit S.p.A. and Chief Economist in Capitalia and
Banca di Roma. Previously he had worked as manager at the Italian Statistical Of-
fice (ISTAT) and as economist at the IMF and at the Italian Institute for Economic
Planning (ISPE). He took his PhD at the University of Modena. He has published se-
veral articles and papers on economic and monetary policy, fiscal policy, income re-
distribution. He was born in 1957, is married and has three children.
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miguel poiares maduro
Former Minister for Regional Development, Portugal
Miguel Poiares Maduro is Professor at the European University Institute. From 2013
to 2015 he was Portuguese Minister in the Cabinet of the Prime Minister and for Re-
gional Development. At the time of his appointment to Government he was Direc-
tor of Global Governance Programme at the European University Institute and Vi-
siting Professor at Yale Law School. From 2003 to 2009 he was Advocate General at
the European Court of Justice. He has also taught the College of Europe, the Uni-
versidades Católica and Nova in Portugal, the London School of Economics, the Cen-
tro de Estudios Constitucionales (Madrid) and Chicago Law School. He is a Doctor
of Laws by the European University Institute (Florence) and was the first winner of
the Rowe and Maw Prize and winner of the Prize Obiettivo Europa (for the best PhD
thesis at the EUI). He has been Fulbright Visiting Research Scholar at Harvard Law
School. He is Co-Director of the Academy of International Trade Law (Macao).
raiNer masera
Dean of the School of Business at the Università degli Studi Guglielmo Marconi in Rome
He served as technical Minister for the Budget and Economic Planning in the Dini
Government and was appointed one of the 5 “Wise Men” for the review of the “Lam-
falussy” process (IIMG) and Member of the High Level Group of European Commission
on Financial Supervision in the EU (Group de Larosière). He was Member of the Bo-
ard of the Bank for International Settlements and Member of G10 Deputies, Central
Director in Bank of Italy (Rome), Managing Director of IMI SpA, Chief Executive Of-
ficer and Chairman of the Group Sanpaolo IMI (Turin) and of RFI SpA, Chief of the
Italian Delegation of the Franco-Italian Government Committee for the new Turin-
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Lyon railway link and Expert Member of the Board of the European Investment Bank.
He is currently Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Financial Management of
Fondazione Roma.
marcello messori
LUISS School of European Political Economy
Marcello Messori is professor of Economics at the Department of Political Science,
LUISS University (Rome) and Director of the LUISS School of European Political Eco-
nomy. He teaches European Economics and Economia Europea. He taught at the De-
partment of Economics, University of Rome ‘Tor Vergata’ from mid Nineties to the
a.y. 2011-‘12. He published more than one hundred and fifty works in Italian, En-
glish, French, and German. In the last fifteen years, his scientific activity has focu-
sed on four main areas: the evolution of the Italian banking system with specific re-
ference to its allocation of the property rights, the new Keynesian models based on
asymmetric information and on financial constraints, the Italian sector of institutional
investors, and the economic governance of the European Union. During the same pe-
riod, Marcello Messori has been the coordinator of national and international research
groups and has been involved in various institutional activities.
carlos moNTalvo reBuelTa
Executive Director of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
(EIOPA)
Mr. Carlos Montalvo Rebuelta is the Executive Director of the European Insurance
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). In his role, he presides over the day-
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to-day management of EIOPA. Mr. Montalvo was elected by the Board of Supervi-
sors of EIOPA on 25 February, 2011. His nomination followed a pre-selection by the
European Commission. The European Parliament's approval followed an open hea-
ring on 17 March. Mr. Montalvo moved to Frankfurt in November 2007 where he has
been Secretary General of CEIOPS, the Committee of European Insurance and Oc-
cupational Pensions Supervisors. Prior to his current role, Mr. Montalvo was an in-
surance supervisor for the the Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones
(DGSFP), the Spanish insurance supervisory authority. There he headed the Inter-
national Area of the Supervisory Department and coordinated insurance groups and
financial conglomerates related issues. Mr. Montalvo is a lawyer with a diploma in
economics and has carried out both national and international tasks, such as on-site
inspections or participation in different legislative initiatives. He has also been in-
volved in qualitative supervision related issues, including the chairmanship of CE-
IOPS working group on internal control for insurance undertakings (Madrid
Group), and has participated as invited professor in different fora.
mario Nava
Director of the Regulation and Prudential Supervision of Financial Institutions,
DG FISMA, European Commission
Mario Nava (born Milan, 1966) is currently Director of the 'Regulation and prudential
supervision of financial institutions' directorate in the Financial Stability, Financial
Services and Capital Markets Union DG (formerly the Internal Markets and Servi-
ces DG) of the European Commission. Prior to that, from April 2011, he held the po-
sition of Acting Director. From November 2009 until September 2013, he was Head
of the 'Banking and Financial Conglomerates' unit. Previously in the Internal Mar-
kets and Service DG, from May 2004 to October 2009, he was the Head of the ‘Fi-
nancial Markets Infrastructure’ Unit. From December 2007 to May 2008, he was also
Acting Director for the Financial Services Policy and Financial Markets Directorate.
From 2001-2004, he was a member of the Group of Policy Advisers of the EU Com-
mission President, Prof. Romano Prodi. Within the Group he was responsible for eco-
nomic matters in general and in particular the EU budget and economic policy co-
ordination between the Member States. Prior to joining the Group of Policy Advisers,
he worked first for the Commission's Taxation Department (1994-1996), then for the
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Budget Department (1996-2000), and then in the Cabinet of the Competition Com-
missioner, Prof. Mario Monti (2000-2001). Alongside his work at the Commission
he is active in research and teaching. He is a visiting professor at Milan's Bocconi Uni-
versity and an occasional lecturer in many universities across Europe.
pier carlo padoaN
Italian Minister of Economy and Finance
Pier Carlo Padoan was appointed Minister of Economy and Finance in the Government
led by Matteo Renzi on 24 February 2014. Mr. Padoan was Professor of Economics at
the University La Sapienza of Rome, and Director of the Fondazione Italianieuropei,
a policy think-tank focusing on economic and social issues. On 1 June 2007 Mr. Pier
Carlo Padoan was appointed Deputy Secretary-General of the OECD. As of 1 Decem-
ber, he was also appointed Chief Economist while retaining his role as deputy Secre-
tary-General. In addition to heading the Economics Department, Mr Padoan was the
G20 Finance Deputy for the OECD and has also lead the Strategic Response, the Gre-
en Growth and Innovation initiatives of the Organization. From 2001 to 2005, Mr. Pa-
doan was the Italian Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund, with re-
sponsibility for Greece, Portugal, San Marino, Albania and Timor Leste. He served as
a member of the Board and chaired a number of Board Committees. During his man-
date at the IMF he was also in charge of European Co-ordination. From 1998 to 2001,
Mr Padoan served as Economic Adviser to the Italian Prime Ministers, Massimo D’Ale-
ma e Giuliano Amato, in charge of international economic policies. He was responsi-
ble for co-ordinating the Italian position in the Agenda 2000 negotiations for the EU
budget, Lisbon Agenda, European Council, bilateral meetings, and G8 Summits. He has
been a consultant to the World Bank, European Commission, European Central Bank.
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FaBrizio pagaNi
Head of the Oﬃce of Italy’s Minister of Finance
Fabrizio Pagani is Head of the Office of Italy’s Minister of Finance. In this capacity,
he supports the Minister on key domestic and international economic and financial
issues and heads a team which serves as policy unit for the Minister. In particular,
he is leading/spearheading/coordinating the work of the Italian government on pu-
blic and private investment, finance for growth, privatization, banks and other fi-
nancial institutions. Since 2014, he is non-executive Director of ENI and Chairman
of ENI’s Scenarios and Sustainability Committee. In the previous Italian government,
he has served as senior counsellor and G20 Sherpa of the Prime Minister. In this ca-
pacity, he also led the task force “Destinazione Italia” on the attraction of Foreign Di-
rect Investment. Previously, he has been Head of the Sherpa Office of the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Special Political
Counselor to the OECD Secretary-General. From 2006 to 2008, he was Chief of Staff
for the Undersecretary of State at the Office of the Italian Prime Minister. He also
served as member of the board of SACE, Italy’s export credit agency. Formerly, Mr.
Pagani held different positions within the Italian government, where he served as
senior staff for the Minister of European Policies and for the Minister of Industry, Ener-
gy and Foreign Trade, and in academia (University of Pisa, University of York – UK,
SciencesPo – Paris).
pieTro paroliN
H. E. Secretary of State, Cardinal of the Catholic Church
Cardinal Pietro Parolin, secretary of State, was born in Schiavon (Vicenza) on 17 Ja-
nuary 1955. He was ordained a priest on 27 April 1980 and incardinated into the
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diocese of Vicenza. He holds a degree in canon law. He entered the diplomatic ser-
vice of the Holy See on the 1 July 1986, beginning work at the pontifical represen-
tations in Nigeria and Mexico and at the Section for Relations with States of the Se-
cretariat of State. He was appointed Under-Secretary for Relations with States of the
Secretariat of State on 30 November 2002. On the 17 August 2009 he was appoin-
ted as apostolic nuncio to Venezuela and, at the same time, elevated to the dignity
of archbishop and assigned the titular see of Acquapendente. He received Episcopal
ordination from Pope Benedict XVI on 12 September of the same year. On 31 August
2013 Pope Francis appointed him as Secretary of State, beginning his mandate on
15 October. Member of the group of cardinals established to advise Pope Francis in
the government of the universal Church and to study a plan for revising the Apostolic
Constitution on the Roman Curia,‘Pastor Bonus’. Created and proclaimed Cardinal
by Pope Francis in the consistory of 22 February 2014, of the Title of Santi Simone
e Giuda Taddeo a Torre Angela. Cardinal Pietro Parolin is member of various Con-
gregations: for the Doctrine of the Fait; for the Oriental Churches; for the Evange-
lization of Peoples; for Bishops; he is also member of the Cardinal Commission for
the Supervision of the Institute for the Works of Religion (IOR).
edoardo reviglio
Chief Economist, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti
Edoardo Reviglio, is Chief Economist at “Cassa depositi e prestiti” (CDP), Rome. He
is professor of economics at LUISS Guido Carli in Rome and at International University
College of Turin. He is the General Secretary of the Commission to reform the Pu-
blic Property section of the Italian Civil Code. He is member of the Scientific Board
of several Italian and international institutions and Think Tanks (Long Term Inve-
stment Club, Integrate, Torino World Affairs Institute, SWFs Lab). In the past he has
covered various positions in the public sector, including: Chief Economist and Head
of the Research Department at Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) and Mem-
ber of the Council of Economic Advisers of the Italian Ministry of Economy and Fi-
nance. In 2009-2011 he acted as Economic Advisor to the Italian Minister of Economy
and Finance. Prof. Reviglio received his BA, Summa Cum Laude, from Yale College;
was Research Fellow at the Mathematical Center Vito Volterra (Università di Roma
Tor Vergata, 1988-90); visiting Scholar at Department of Mathematics of Yale Uni-
versity (1990-1992); Post Doctoral Fellow and Research Associate at the Department
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of Mathematics of Imperial College, University of London (1992-1994). In 1988 he
was a trainee in Finance and Banking at Manufacturers Hanover Trust, NY. His fields
of research include: banking and finance, international economics, public finance,
economic history and law and economics.
valeria roNziTTi
General Secretary CEEP (European Centre of Employers and Enterprises Providing Pu-
blic Services and Services of General Interest)
Ms. Ronzitti is General Secretary of CEEP since May 2012. She reached this position
after having worked for the organisation for nine years. Jurist, she joined CEEP Ge-
neral Secretariat as legal advisor in 2003, after having started her career practicing
labour and civil law in a law firm in Italy. In her function as Head of Social Affairs
from 2005 to 2009 she represented CEEP General Secretariat in several negotiations.
Amongst others: the European cross-sectoral negotiations on the orientations for re-
ference on managing change (2003), the lessons learned on European Work Coun-
cils (2005), the autonomous agreement on work-related stress (2004), the autonomous
agreement on violence and harassment at work (2007), the joint labour market ana-
lysis (2007), the revision of the parental leave agreement (2009). Alongside her fun-
ctions in CEEP she was also, from 2005 to 2010, Director of HOSPEEM, the Euro-
pean Hospital and Healthcare Employers Association, that she contributed to set up
as a sectoral member of CEEP. In that function she negotiated the sectoral agreement
on sharps instruments, which was transposed into a directive. In her function as Di-
rector from 2009 to 2012 she continued to represent CEEP General Secretariat in Eu-
ropean cross-sectoral negotiations such as the autonomous agreement on inclusive
labour markets (2010) and the (failed) revision of the working time directive, whi-
le also supervising CEEP policy implementation, communication to CEEP members
and managing CEEP staff. In her function as CEEP General Secretary she is respon-
sible for managing the organisation, including overall policy making and imple-
mentation, external representation, communication to members, management




Director General of the Bank of Italy and President of the Insurance Supervisory Authority
(Ivass)
Born in Bari on 6 January 1949. From 10 May 2013, Senior Deputy Governor of the
Bank of Italy. In this capacity, he stands in for the Governor during the latter's ab-
sence or incapacity; he has authority for the Bank's ordinary administration.
President (and member of the Joint Directorate) of the Insurance Supervisory
Authority (Ivass). In 2013 he was called to the “Working Group on Economic, So-
cial and European Issues” (the so-called “Group of Wise Men”) established by the Pre-
sident of the Republic Giorgio Napolitano. He joined the Bank of Italy in 1976, whe-
re he was first assigned to the Supervisory Unit of the Milan regional office, then,
in 1979, to the Economic Research Department. He was Head of the Economic Re-
search Department from 2000 to 2006, Managing Director for economic research and
international relations from 2007 to 2011, Secretary General of the Bank of Italy and
Advisor to the Governing Board for economic policy matters in 2011, and Deputy Go-
vernor of the Bank of Italy from January 2012 to May 2013. He is a member of the
Steering Committe of the Italian Strategic Fund, the Foundation Board of the In-
ternational Center for Monetary and Banking Studies in Geneva, the Einaudi Insti-
tute for Economics and Finance, the Istituto Affari Internazionali, the Board of Go-
vernors of Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, the Advisory Board of the Italian Associa-
tion for Private Equity e Venture Capital, the Advisory Board of Tor Vergata University




Chairman of CENTESIMUS ANNUS – PRO PONTIFICE Foundation
Born 29 April 1945 in Fribourg (Switzerland). Spanish nationality. Active from 1969
at UNIAPAC (International Christian Union of Business Executives), Brussels. Secretary-
General from 1974 to 1981. From 1981 with MAPFRE insurance group in Madrid,
Spain; at the beginning of the group’s international development. Responsibilities
in Reinsurance, Credit and Guarantee Insurance, Corporate Finance and Investors
Relations. Managing Director in charge of CORPORACIÓN MAPFRE, the public li-
sted holding controlled by MAPFRE MUTUALIDAD. Since 2000, Member of the Group
Executive in charge of Finance. After completion of the demutualization process, Exe-
cutive Vice-Chairman of MAPFRE Group until retirement from executive office in 2008.
Member of the Board of FUNDACIÓN MAPFRE and of several group subsidiaries un-
til April 2015 (statutory age limit). Member of the Board of SOCIETÀ CATTOLICA
DI ASSICURAZIONE, Verona, Italy. Past-President of UNIAPAC, International Chri-
stian Union of Business Executives (1997-2000). Since 2009, Chairman of FON-
DAZIONE CENTESIMUS ANNUS – PRO PONTIFICE, The Vatican.
aNToNio TajaNi
Vice-President of the European Parliament
Antonio Tajani is the First Vice-President of the European Parliament and was elec-
ted in July 2014 in the first ballot, with 452 votes. As Vice-President of the Europe-
an Parliament, he is in charge of Interreligious dialogue, Conciliation, Security, the
LUX prize and relations with Latin America. In the European Parliament, he is mem-
ber of the Industry, Research and Energy Committee, as well as a substitute mem-
ber of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee. He is also a member of the
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delegations for relations with Brazil, Mercosur and Chile, as well as a member of the
delegation to the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly. Prior to his current
role, he was Vice-President of the European Commission from 2008 to 2014. Taja-
ni was Commissioner for Transport from 2008 to 2010 and Commissioner for Industry
and Entrepreneurship from 2010 to 2014. Antonio Tajani was elected Member of the
European Parliament in 1994, 1999, 2004 and lastly in 2014 with over 120,000 pre-
ference votes. He was the Head of the parliamentary delegation of Forza Italia in the
European Parliament from 1999 until 2008. He was also a member of the Conven-
tion on the Future of Europe. In 2002, he was appointed Vice-President of the Eu-
ropean People's Party, and subsequently re-elected in 2006, 2009 and 2012.
margareTa wahlsTröm
Former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction
In November 2008, the United Nations Secretary-General Mr. Ban Ki-moon announced
the appointment of Margareta Wahlström as his first Special Representative for Di-
saster Risk Reduction. Ms. Wahlström has extensive experience in both disaster re-
lief operations and disaster risk management, with the United Nations system and
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Her broad ex-
perience spans conflict and nonconflict emergencies, and addressing long-term is-
sues of sustainable development. Ms Wahlström is also the head of UNISDR, the Uni-
ted Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. Margareta Wahlström’s previous ap-
pointments include, among others, Coordinator of the Independent Panel on Safe-
ty and Security of UN Personnel and Premises, chaired by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, 2008;
Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator and Assistant-Secretary-General for Huma-
nitarian Affairs, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2004-2008, and
United Nations Special Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance to the Tsunami-
Affected Communities, 2004-2005; Deputy Special Representative of the Secreta-
ry-General for Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation, United Nations Assistance Mis-
sion in Afghanistan, 2002-2004; Under-Secretary-General for Disaster Response and
Operations and Deputy Director Operations, International Federation of Red Cross




Jonathan Watson PhD is Managing Director and co-founder of INTEGRATE a non-
profit social foundation for practical thinking for long-term investment in innova-
tive social infrastructure (2012+). INTEGRATE conducted a ‘quiet conversation’ with
key stakeholders (institutional investors, national promotional banks, trades union
syndicates, public authorities & services, asset managers, European Commission &
European Parliament) between 2012 and 2015. Previous related work has included:
led the EUREGIO III project (2009-2011) that explored and assessed the use of Struc-
tural Funds for direct health care investment. The project findings directly informed
the EU Council Conclusions – Towards modern, responsive and sustainable health
systems (6 June 2011); conducted the needs assessment and degree design/content
for an Erasmus Mundas funded European Master’s degree in Sustainable Regio-
nal Health Systems with a partnership of 4 EU-based universities launched in 2008;
from 2001-2007 he ran a consultancy in the UK and Europe for Governments/Uni-
versities/third sector completing 40 R&D projects. He was Honorary Professor (2010-
2013) and Special Professor of Health and Public Policy (2001-2010) at the Scho-
ol of Community Health Sciences, University of Nottingham, Visiting Professor of He-
alth and Public Policy, University of York (1999-2001).
laureNT zylBerBerg
Director of the institutional relations and of European and international cooperation,
Group Caisse des Dépôts
Laurent Zylberberg, 53, has a sociology and legal background. He holds a PhD (1992)
in sociology. Political adviser for various Ministers (Home office, Defence, Prime Mi-
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nister’s office, Social Affairs) from 1989 to 1993, in the meantime, he taught at the
Sorbonne University in political science and public law. He was then Social Affairs
Counsellor at the French Embassy in London until 1996 when he moved to Brussels
to head the European’s office of the public affairs company “Euroconsultants”. Back
to Paris in 1998, he joined France Telecom Group as marketing director for public
services. In 2002, he is appointed Group Director for public affairs. In 2005, he works
as Director for international employee relations then, in 2008, he became Group Em-
ployee Relations Director. In 2011, he is appointed as CEO of Orange Vietnam. Back
in Paris in 2013, Orange’s CEO appointed him as Group Chief Compliance Officer.
Since October 1st 2014, Laurent Zylberberg is Director of the institutional relations
and of European and international cooperation of the Group Caisse des Dépôts.

